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ABSTRACT 
Author: William A. A. Maguire, Department of Accounting 
and Finance, University of Auckland, Private Bag, 
Auckland, New Zealand. 
This thesis examines the impact on share prices of voluntary 
reporting of financial targets and constraints, particularly 
the target rate of return, target dividend payout ratio and 
target debt ratio. 
Hypotheses developed about 
of this reporting are that 
a positive impact on 
in estimation risk 
the potential share price impact 
there will be 
share prices through a reduction 
an increase in the dispersion of share price changes 
owing to a revision of expectations 
a positive impact on share prices owing to a signalling 
effect. 
The hypotheses are tested by examining share price behaviour 
accompanying the voluntary reporting of financial targets 
and constraints over the period 1974 to 1982 by thirty four 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
This is an event study, in which the event is defined as the 
first occasion on which a company reports the specified 
financial targets and constraints. To test for a positive 
impact on share prices, weekly excess returns are calculated 
using the market model. To test for an increase in the 
dispersion of share price changes, weekly variability ratios 
are calculated which provide a measure of returns in the 
event week relative to the average variability of returns in 
the estimation period. The controls applied in this study 
to demonstrate the link between the event and the share 
price impact are the market model, diversification of 
calendar dates and two control groups. 
The results of the study reveal a positive impact on share 
prices when companies first report financial targets and 
constraints. This is consistent with all three hypotheses. 
As this form of voluntary reporting has not previously been 
tested in this way, the results should be of interest to 
financial managers and to those concerned with the 
regulation of financial reporting in South Africa • 
• 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS (July, 1991) PAGE iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I express my deep appreciation for the time, guidance and 
support given to me by the following three people. 
Professor John Affleck-Graves (Department of Finance, 
University of Notre Dame, Indiana), supervisor for the 
duration of this task, gave prompt, comprehensive feedback 
and continual encouragement through the difficulties of 
communicating by mail and fax. Dr Derek Botha (Department 
of Accounting, University of Cape Town), co-supervisor, who 
provided similar support. Professor Jerry Bowman, 
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of 
Auckland, who read and provided constructive criticim on 
many of the earlier drafts. 
For the space, time and strength to complete this task, I 
thank Iona, Giselle and Mary-Tabitha Maguire. 
over the life of this study, I have benefited from the 
support and understanding many colleagues to I also express 
my appreciation. At the inception, this study received the 
support of Professor Leon Kritzinger, then Head, Department 
of Accounting, UCT), and the following have helped in many 
ways: Professor Craig Ansley (University of Auckland), 
Professor Rory Knight (International Management Institute, 
Geneva), Professor Martin Putterill (University of Auckland) 
and Professor Zevenbergen (Bureau for Financial Analysis, 
University of Pretoria). And to Michael Morris, Head of 
Department, Accounting and Finance and Professor Barry 
Spicer for recent assistance with scheduling my teaching 
load and facilitating the completion of the study. 
The financial assistance of the Institute for Research 
Development towards this research is hereby acknowledged. 
Opinions expressed in this work, or conclusions arrived at, 
are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the 
Institute for Research Development. The financial 
assistance of the Staff Research Fund, University of Natal 
is similarly acknowledged. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS PAGE iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 



















Average of paired differences between abnormal 
residuals 
Average of market adjusted returns 
Average of paired differences between market 
returns 
Accounting Practices Board (South Africa) 
Average of variability ratios 
Average of paired differences between variability 
ratios 
Cumulative average of abnormal residuals 
Cumulative average of market adjusted returns 
Cumulative average of paired differences between 
abnormal residuals 
Cumulative average of differences between market 
adjusted returns 
Center for Security Prices at the University of 
Chicago 
Difference between averages of abnormal residuals 
Difference between averages of market adjusted 
returns 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (USA) 
First-in-first-out 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Last-in-first-out 
Securities and Exchange Commission (USA) 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 





CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
1. 0 OBJECTIVE 2 
2.0 MOTIVATION 3 
3.0 ORGANISATION AND PRESENTATION 10 
3.1 Organisation 10 
3.2 Presentation 11 
3.3 Terminology 12 
4.0 REFERENCES 14 
CHAPTER TWO: FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 16 
2.0 PURPOSE OBJECTIVE 17 
3.0 FINANCIAL STRATEGIES 21 
3.1 Two fundamental decisions 21 
3.2 Investment decision 22 
3.3 Dividend decision 23 
3.4 Capital structure decision 30 
4.0 MARKET EFFICIENCY 35 
4.1 The concept and its implications 36 
4.2 South African evidence 39 
5.0 VOLUNTARY REPORTING 48 
5.1 Voluntary reporting in context 48 
5.2 Motivation for voluntary reporting 51 
5.3 Voluntary reporting in South Africa 55 
5.4 Conclusion ~ 59 
6.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 61 
6.1 Laboratory studies 61 
6.2 Surveys 62 
6.3 Interviews 64 
6.4 Capital market studies 65 
7.0 SUMMARY 66 
8.0 REFERENCES 68 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS PAGE vi 
CONTENTS 































Decision to disclose 
Veracity of signals 























MARKET MODEL AND ITS USE 
Market model 
Abnormal residuals 







































MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS PAGE vii 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER FOUR (continued) 
7.0 CONTROLS 
7.1 Need for controls 
7.2 Controlling for confounding events 
7.3 Efficacy of control groups 
7.4 External control group 


















INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
Hypotheses 
Expected results 
Tests of statistical significance 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL AND 
INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL AND 
EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
TABLES 
10.0 APPENDIX 5.1: Figures depicting weekly 
results 



























MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS PAGE vii 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 241 
2.0 REVIEW 241 
2.1 Objective 241 
2.2 Hypotheses 241 
2.3 Methodology 242 
2.4 Results 244 
2.5 Conclusion 248 
3.0 IMPLICATIONS 249 
4.0 LIMITATIONS 252 
5.0 EXTENSIONS 255 
6.0 CONCLUSION 258 
7.0 REFERENCES 259 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 261 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 1 
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
CONTENTS 
1.0 OBJECTIVE 2 
2.0 MOTIVATION 3 
3.0 ORGANISATION AND PRESENTATION 10 
3.1 Organisation 10 
3.2 Presentation 11 
3.3 Terminology 12 
4.0 REFERENCES 14 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 2 
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
1.0 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of 
voluntary reporting on share prices, with particular 
reference to the reporting of financial targets and 
constraints in South Africa. The results of the study 
should make a specific contribution to the existing 
knowledge of the impact of voluntary reporting on share 
prices. 
The hypothesised information content of financial targets 
and constraints set by management is tested by examining the 
share price behaviour accompanying the voluntary reporting 
of financial targets and constraints over the period 1974 to 
1982 by thirty four companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). 
This study focuses on three key variables. They are the 
target rate of return, the target debt ratio and the target 
dividend payout ratio. Any company reporting information 
relating to these three variables does so voluntarily as 
this disclosure is not mandatory either directly in terms of 
the Companies Act, 68 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Companies Act"), or in terms of Statements of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice issued by the Accounting 
Practices Board (APB). 
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The title of the thesis refers to "financial targets and 
constraints". The three variables are stated as targets 
and are properly described as such, but the related 
financial strategies are frequently formulated in such a way 
that the target debt ratio and/or the target dividend payout 
ratio is clearly regarded as a constraint on the company's 
actions. The word "constraints" is included in the title 
to accommodate this notion. However, there are frequent 
references in the text to "targets" alone. This is done in 
the interests of ease of expression and there is no 
intention to limit the scope. 
2.0 MOTIVATION 
The motivation for this study lies in its potential 
contribution to knowledge. As regards the specific subject 
matter, this study is not a replication of any previous 
study, although the research method is well used. The 
motivation should also be viewed in the broader context of 
voluntary reporting and of information content studies in 
general. As the financial targets under study fall within 
Stern's (1980, p7-8) recommendations, 1 it is appropriate to 
1 
In addition to being a consultant on financial policy and a visiting professor at several 
universities in the United States at the time, Professor Joel Stern had knowledge of local conditions 
through his role as consultant to a number of South African companies and as sometime Visiting 
Professor to the Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town. 
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review his observations and recommendations briefly before 
considering the motivation further. 
Stern (1980, p7) argues as follows: 
The share price is the current value that the market as a 
whole places on a company's expected performance. 
Management frequently hold the opinion that the shares of 
the companies which they manage do not sell at a fair value. 
This is frequently because management possesses more 
information than do investors. Moreover, management often 
provides shareholders with low quality information. Share 
prices reflect all relevant publicly available information 
and investors pay a discount for uncertainty, never a 
premium. Ceteris paribus, less and lower quality 
information leads to lower share prices. Investors require 
information on the corporate objectives and financial 
policies that describe where the company is going and how it 
hopes to get there. This information is encapsulated in 
the six factors which are inputs to the free cash flow 
model. As management is in a position to provide this 
information, the managements of many companies have taken to 
providing additional information in their annual reports. 
The six factors identified by Stern (1980, p8) are: 
* Net operating profit after tax. 
* The amount of new investment. 
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* The expected rate of return on investment. 2 
* The length of time in years for which high-returning 
projects are expected to exceed the blended cost of 
capital. 3 
* The expected dividend payout ratio. 4 
* The target debt ratio. 
Stern (1980, p8) maintains that research findings over the 
previous twenty years prove to his satisfaction that the six 
principal factors above account for 90% of a company's 
market value, and that other factors are primarily a 
function of these six. He also asserts that reporting 
information related to the factors listed above results in 
superior risk-adjusted performance and greater market value, 
but he provides no direct empirical evidence in support of 
this assertion. 
To define the scope of the study, it was necessary first to 
identify those companies which voluntarily report 
2 
"Target rate of return" is used in preference to "expected rate of return" as it is consistent 
with the notion of management's planned actions. The two terms have the same meaning in this 
context. It also achieves consistent terminology for the three variables under study. The target 
rate of return should, however, be distinguished from the minimum rate required by the shareholders, 
which is represented by the weighted average cost of capital (referred to by Stern (1980) as the 
"blended cost of capital"). 
311weighted average cost of capital" is the more usually used equivalent term for "blended cost of 
capital" (see also footnote 2). 
411Target dividend payout ratio" is used in preference to "expected dividend payout ratio" as it 
is consistent with the notion of management's planned actions. The two terms have the same meaning 
in this context. It also achieves consistent terminology for the three variables under study. 
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information relating to the six principal factors. It was 
also decided initially to include in the study an 
examination of statement of corporate objectives or 
philosophy which provide a backdrop to the factors listed by 
Stern (1980). The disclosure of capital commitments is 
mandatory, 5 and the mandatory disclosure of details relating 
to net operating profit ensures that it can be readily 
approximated. 6 Capital commitments and net operating 
prof it were thus excluded from the study at this stage. A 
survey of the annual reports of non-mining South African 
companies revealed that7 
* only two companies reported any information on 
projected capital expenditure beyond that r~quired by 
the Companies Act. 8 
* none of the companies reported the time period over 
which high-returning projects were expected to exceed 
the cost of capital. 
* very few companies included statements of corporate 
objectives or philosophy in their annual reports. 
5 . 
In terms of Schedule 4 of the C0111Janies Act, a COll1Jany is required to disclose the amount of its 
capital conmitments and to distinguish between those that have been contracted for and those 
authorised by its board of directors but not yet contracted for. 
6
Net operating profit after tax is before finance costs, extraordinary items and non·cash 
bookeeping entries but after taxation. The reporting of these items is currently required by the 
C~nies Act and by Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice issued by the APB, so that 
it is a relatively easy matter to approximate net operating profit. 
7 
The annual reports were surveyed in 1983 in the library of the Graduate School of Business, 
University of Cape Town. See also chapter 4, section 5.0. 
8 
See footnote 5 above. 
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As the disclosure of capital commitments is mandatory, and 
as the discretionary disclosure relating to projected 
capital expenditure extends to no more than two companies, 
this variable was excluded from the study. Of necessity, 
the time horizon for high-returning projects was also 
excluded. Where statements of corporate objectives were 
made, these were considered to be couched in such vague 
terms that they were unlikely to provide valuable inputs to 
investors' decision models. The study therefore focuses on 
the target rate of return, the target debt ratio and the 
target dividend payout ratio. Having identified those 
companies which include information on financial targets and 
constraints in their annual reports, it was decided to 
develop formal hypotheses as to why superior performance 
should be expected and to test these hypotheses. 
The motivation for the study can now be expressed as 
follows: 
First, as Stern's seminars, consultancy and lectures are 
well known in South Africa, and as there appears to be no 
direct empirical evidence supporting his recommendations, a 
study aimed at testing whether there is indeed a beneficial 
effect on the share prices of companies reporting the 
specified financial targets would be of considerable 
academic and practical interest. 
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Second, whether to report financial targets is itself 
potentially an important element of financial strategy. As 
management's decision on this is likely to be , based on 
benefit/cost considerations, the potential impact on the 
share price of reporting these variables is a key issue. 
The results of this study should accordingly be of 
considerable interest to executives who are concerned with 
the formulation of financial and reporting strategy. 
Third, the reporting of financial targets and constraints 
falls within the domain of voluntary reporting. Given the 
substantial volume of information which is currently 
reported voluntarily, the research work done on voluntary 
reporting is comparatively limited, although the level of 
interest in this research area appears to have grown 
considerably over the last five years. These studies 
include the full range of research methods; surveys, 
laboratory studies, interviews and market studies. The 
areas covered by these studies are discretionary disclosure 
in general, the voluntary release of forecasts, segmental 
reporting, replacement or current cost reporting, and social 
reporting. 9 This thesis contributes a market study on an 
aspect not yet examined. 
9
several analytical papers which build voluntary reporting (or discretionary disclosure) models 
are cited in chapter 3, as are a nllllber of papers on the voluntary release of forecasts. Many of the 
studies on voluntary reporting in general are survey-based, a nl.lllber of which are cited in chapter 2. 
Prodhan (1986) and Standish and Ung (1982) are examples of studies on segmental and replacement cost 
reporting respectively. 
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Fourth, although this thesis does not address the issues 
from the viewpoint of accounting regulators, the results 
should nevertheless be of interest to that audience. Where 
the regulation of accounting disclosure is concerned, the 
incentives to report voluntarily and the response of the 
market to voluntarily reported information should be useful 
inputs to their deliberations. 
I 
Finally, the relationship between (accounting) information 
and share prices is the subject of a large number of studies 
internationally. 10 The first capital market study of this 
nature in South Africa was completed relatively recently, by 
Knight (1981). While considerable evidence relating to 
stock exchanges in other countries was available at that 
time, Knight (1981) suggests strong justification for 
similar work, including replications, to be carried out in 
South Africa. In particular, he argues that the 
institutional environment and local conditions in South 
Africa are not identical to those pertaining to studies done 
in other countries, and Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986, 
p79) make the point again several years later. I Although 
the study by Knight (1981) has been followed by a number of 
information impact studies in South Africa,
11 the volume of 
10
Not all of these studies are restricted to accounting information, although the majority are. 
The financial information in the current study is not strictly accounting information in the sense of 
being a direct output of the accounting process. 
11 Many of the studies done in South Africa are cited in this thesis, principally in chapter 2. 
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work is low relative to that in the USA, for example. It 
is submitted that the inventory of work done in this country 
is such that the addition of a further capital market study 
is a potential contribution to knowledge in the general area 
of information impact studies as well as in the specific 
sense mentioned above. Precisely because of the different 
institutional framework and conditions, this work may also 
be of interest to researchers working in other 
. t 12 environmen s. 
3.0 ORGANISATION AND PRESENTATION 
3.1 Organisation 
Chapter 1 introduces and sets out the objective, motivation 
and organisation of the thesis. As the impact of reporting 
financial objectives and constraints on share prices must be 
evaluated in context, a framework for the study is provided 
in chapter 2. First, a purpose objective is suggested for 
the firm, followed by the considerations applicable to 
formulating financial strategies. As market efficiency has 
a bearing on the interpretation of share price behaviour, 
this is reviewed with particular reference to the JSE. 
Voluntary reporting is then placed in context. Finally, 
12
oimson (1988, p13) notes the opportunities for international comparisons given the different 
institutional settings, differering tax systems and variations in the extent of information production 
and dissemination across countries (albeit in reference to research on stock market regularities). 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 11 
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
available research methods are reviewed and the selection of 
a capital market research methodology is justified. 
Formal hypotheses are developed in chapter 3, based on an 
examination of the theories relating to estimation risk, 
rational expectations and signalling. The research 
methodology is specified and its supporting rationale 
presented in chapter 4. The results are reported in 
chapter 5. The research conclusion and its implications 
are reviewed in chapter 6. 
3.2 Presentation 
To promote readability, each chapter is preceded by a 
contents page and succeeded by a list of references 
pertinent to that chapter. The bibliography appears at the 
end of the thesis. The Harvard system of referencing is 
used. In chapters 2 and 3, tables and figures appear in 
the body of the text. Owing to the size of the tables and 
figures in chapters 4 and 5, they are placed at the end of 
those chapters. 
Abbreviations have also been used with readability and 
economy of presentation in mind. Before an abbreviation is 
used in this thesis, it is given in brackets after the term 
to which it relates. A list of abbreviations appears on 
page iv. 
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3.3 Terminology 
Given the diversity of sources from which this thesis draws 
and the complexity of some of the issues, it is not 
surprising that a variety of terms are encountered which may 
refer to similar or even identical concepts or ideas. 
Researchers tend to develop their own sets of language or 
terminology to assist in their model building or analyses 
which need not coincide with those of others working in the 
same area. Some of these terms or words may imply subtle 
differences of meaning while others are merely alternatives. 
An attempt has been made to standardise the terminology in 
this thesis; for example, "return interval" (see chapter 4) 
has been selected from several similar terms used to 
describe the time period between observations for return 
calculation. When drawing from a particular source, the 
original term is retained in deference to the author's 
choice; for example, "traders" (Verrecchia, 1983) is 
retained in chapter 3, section 4.3 in preference to 
standardising to "investors". Where considered necessary, 
footnotes refer to the usage. 
There are other instances of variations in usage, such as 
the use of both "firm" and "company"; as used in this 
thesis, the former usually has a more abstract or conceptual 
connotation while the latter is used in referring, for 
example, specifically to the companies included in the 
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study. Similarly, "investor" is used in the more general 
sense while "shareholder" applies to the current owner of 
shares in a company. It is hoped that other instances of 
variations in language usage lend variety without detracting 
from clarity. 
Finally, the masculine gender has been used throughout in 
the interests of economy of presentation and readability; 
there is no intention to imply exclusivity. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the framework for the thesis by 
outlining the background to and the issues driving the 
study. The financial targets and constraints under study 
are strategic variables. Consequently, the company's 
statement of financial targets and constraints should be a 
product of the strategy formulation process. These targets 
and constraints also derive from financial variables which 
lie at the heart of the financial management process; 
namely, the rate of return on resources invested and the way 
in which the firm is financed. 
The firm's purpose objective (section 2.0) provides the 
focus for both strategy formulation and financial 
management. The two fundamental decisions in financial 
management are the investment decision and the financing 
d 
. . 1 ec1s1on. With the development of corporate strategy as 
an orientation in the management literature, a strategic 
perspective on these financial management decisions has 
developed. These two financial management decisions and 
their potential contributions to the purpose objective are 
considered in section 3.0. 
1 . 
In most standard corporate finance texts, these two fundamental decisions provide the framework 
for their coverage of the finance discipline. See for example, Brealey and Myers (1988) and Copeland 
and Weston (1988). 
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Investors require information to place a value on the shares 
of a company. The relationship between share prices and 
information is therefore central, and the degree of 
efficiency of the market as an information processor is 
relevant. After a consideration of market efficiency 
(section 4.0), the role of voluntary reporting is examined 
in context (section 5.0). In section 6.0, possible 
research methods are reviewed and the selection of a 
research methodology for this study is motivated. 
2.0 THE PURPOSE OBJECTIVE 
A firm's purpose objective is aptly described by Argenti 
(1975, p39) as the reason for its having been formed at the 
outset, or its "raison d'etre 11 • 2 The firm would thus not 
exist without its purpose objective, which takes precedence 
over all other goals or objectives. One way of expressing 
the purpose objective would be "the maximisation of the 
present value of future cash flows to the firm". A firm's 
purpose objective emerges from a consensus of management, 
and so need not be stated in precisely the above terms. 
However, it would have to represent the firm's "raison 




(1975) reasoning applies to all organisations, not only those that are 
However, as this thesis is concerned with profit-oriented organisations, all 
references in this section are to the firm. 
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suggested purpose objective. A deficiency of the 
objective stated above is that it provides no yardstick 
against which performance can be compared. Argenti (1975) 
rectifies this by recommending that the purpose objective be 
supported by specific, quantified targets (for example, a 
target rate of return of 20% or a prof it target of 
RS million). 
For a prof it-oriented organisation, the above-stated purpose 
objective stands up to the test; no matter what the 
conditions, the objective must ultimately be concerned with 
the maximisation of the wealth of its shareholders. There 
are, however, other stakeholders in the firm; the 
management, employees, lenders, suppliers, customers, 
government and the public at large, to whom a responsibility 
is generally acknowledged. 
Argenti (1975) suggests that the claims of stakeholders 
other than shareholders be recognised explicitly by drawing 
up an ethos statement. This is a written statement in 
which these stakeholders are clearly identified and specific 
objectives are formulated and stated for each category. 3 
One view is that these objectives are concurrent with the 
purpose objective. This is consistent with the concept of 
3
while the ethos statement should be in written form to be effective, it need not be made public. 
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satisf icing in which case appropriate wording would replace 
"maximisation" in the purpose objective. Another view is 
that the ethos statement is effectively a constraint on the 
strategies available to management for adoption in pursuit 
of the purpose objective. In terms of this latter view, 
"maximisation" is retained in the purpose objective, but the 
constraints imposed by the demands of the other stakeholders 
are clearly recognised in the ethos statement. This view 
maintains the pre-eminence of the purpose objective. 
The purpose objective stated above may also be challenged on 
the grounds that it is people who have objectives, not 
organisations. In terms of this view, the dominant 
coalition will determine the agenda irrespective of the 
stated organisational purpose (see for example, Cyert and 
March, 1963) . For instance, management may be more 
concerned with boosting its ego through size, prestige or 
growth objectives rather than through maximising shareholder 
wealth. There are limits to behaviour of this nature, 
imposed by efficient markets and contracting arrangements. 4 
In a questionnaire survey of senior executives in South 
African companies listed on the JSE, Bosch and du Plessis 
(1982) find strong support for the view that wealth 
4 
See for example, ~atts and Zirrmerman (1986). Aspects of this issue are considered in chapter 
3, section 4.0. 
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maximisation is the primary goal of the firm. 5 Responses 
included support for both maximisation subject to 
constraints and satisf icing in dealing with multiple goals. 
It should be noted that while a questionnaire of this nature 
may reveal the views of the senior executives concerned, 
their expressed opinions need not coincide with the goals 
actually pursued. 6 However, Mcconnel and Muscarella (1985) 
provide an example of an empirical study which supports the 
wealth maximisation objective. In a USA capital market 
study of announcements of capital expenditure plans, they 
conclude that their results are consistent with the market 
value maximisation hypothesis and inconsistent with the size 
maximisation hypothesis. 
Having acknowledged the multiplicity of objectives and the 
need to think either in terms of maximisation subject to 
constraints or in terms of satisficing, ·most corporate 
finance texts continue to refer to management's primary 
objective as wealth maximisation, which finds expression in 
the share . 7 price. This arises out of the belief (or 
assumption) that the shareholders ultimately represent the 
5 . 
"Primary goal" is the equivalent of "purpose objective" in the context of this section. 
6
A brief review of the use of questionnaire surveys as a research method appears in section 6.2 
of this chapter. 
7 
This applies in most corporate finance texts. See, for example, Copeland and Weston (1988) 
who, after reviewing the literature on corporate objectives continue with the ass~tion that managers 
always make decisions that maximise the value of the firm. 
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dominant coalition. The preferred view in this study, 
which is consistent with the finance texts, is that the 
purpose objective is wealth maximisation subject to the 
constraints imposed by the ethos statement. However, the 
satisf icing view does not compromise the arguments presented 
in this thesis. While recognising that the dominant 
coalition determines the objective, reference -is made to 
"the firm's objective" or "the objective of the firm" in 
this thesis for ease of exposition. 
3.0 FINANCIAL STRATEGIES8 
3.1 Two fundamental decisions 
The task of the financial manager is to formulate and 
combine financial strategies in such a way that the purpose 
objective is achieved. The decisions involved in 
formulating these strategies are the investment decision and 
the financing decision. The investment decision is 
concerned with maximising the present value of future cash 
flows to the firm. Having deployed the assets of the firm 
to achieve this, the financial manager is concerned with 
whether the value of the firm can be enhanced by the way in 
which the assets are financed. The two constituents of the 
8 • • L The outline and general Line of argument fo Lowed in this section draws on Brealey and Myers 
(1988), chapters 2, 16, 17 and 18. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 22 
CHAPTER TWO: FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
financing decision are the dividend decision and the capital 
structure decision. 
The potential impact on share price of investment and 
financing strategies is considered in sections 3.2 to 3.4 
below. For ease of exposition, the dividend and capital 
structure decisions are considered separately in sections 
3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Strictly informational or 
reporting aspects are largely deferred to chapter 3, where 
their influence is examined in the context of the framework 
developed in this chapter with a view to the development of 
formal hypotheses. 
3.2 Investment decision 
In pursuit of the purpose objective, the financial manager 
will invest so as to maximise the net present value of the 
investment, that is, he will continue to invest until the 
difference between the present 
inf lows and outflows is equal 
values of the expected cash 
9 10 to zero. , In perfect 
markets, the net present value of assets is zero. The 
9An example of empirical results consistent with this behaviour is the positive share in-pact on 
the announcement of unexpected capital expenditure plans found by Mcconnel and Muscarella (1985). 
10 
Stated in terms of rates of return, the financial manager will invest up to the point at which 
the marginal return on the investment is equal to the rate of return on equivalent investments in the 
capital market. 
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extent to which available opportunities for investments with 
positive net present value potential may be exploited by the 
firm depends on the efficiency of markets for real assets, 
on the nature of its business and on the quality of its 
strategic management. Under examination in this thesis is 
whether the reporting of the target rate of return provides 
investors with additional information with which to evaluate 
. f . . t t t. . t. 11 the efficacy of the 1rm's 1nves men ac 1v1 1es. 
3.3 Dividend decision 
Assuming that the assets of the business have been deployed 
with the purpose objective in mind and that the firm is 
financed entirely by equity, the financial manager 
formulates dividend policy by deciding on the split of cash 
flows from earnings between their retention and the payment 
of cash dividends (with the payout ratio ranging from 100% 
earnings to 0% earnings). Any shortfall is funded by the 
issue of shares. His concern is to arrange this in such a 
way that the share price is maximised. 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) argue that dividend policy is 
irrelevant in a perfect capital market. Any dividend 
11 . 
It is acknowledged that the relatively small nllllber of companies reporting the target rate of 
return and the nature of the data do not allow a link to be established between the target rate of 
return and an observed share price impact; such impact can be evaluated only by reference to all three 
targets. This is also referred to in chapter 6, section 5.0. 
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payment reduces the value of the firm and any attempt to 
restore the lost value requires the issue of shares 
, equivalent in value to the dividend paid. The question is 
whether the irrelevance argument holds when taxes, 
transaction costs and other market imperfections are 
present. Brealey and Myers (1988) review the three 
possible positions on dividend policy (namely, high payout, 
low payout and irrelevance) in a well-functioning market. 12 
Some proponents of high dividend payout policies argue that 
dividends are safer than capital gains. However, dividends 
received by shareholders are distributions of the risky cash 
flows received by the firm. Thus it cannot be argued that 
cash flows to the shareholder are any safer than cash flows 
from realising shares in his portfolio. (Brealey and Myers, 
1988, p367). 
Transaction costs bias against a high payout policy as the 
payment of dividends and subsequent compensatory share 
issues are likely to attract higher transaction costs than 
those incurred by the shareholder in adjusting his 
portfolio. 
12
rhe term "well-functioning market" is used frequently by Brealey and Myers (1988), although 
they do not define it formally. It appears that new money can be raised and securities can be traded 
at fair prices in a well-functioning market although it is not a perfect market. Thus, although 
imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs are present, a well-functioning market does not 
suffer from extreme imperfections. While this does not appear to iq:>ly anything other than an 
efficient market (see section 4.0), the term is retained while referring to their work. 
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The effect of taxes on the dividend decision depends on the 
the legislation ruling at the time. Brealey and Myers 
(1988, p372) cite ten studies which examine shareholders' 
required rate of return under USA tax conditions during 
which time the capital gains tax rate was lower than the 
individual tax rate on dividends. They point out that the 
results of all these studies suggest that high-yielding 
stocks (shares) have lower prices and offer higher returns 
than do others, so providing support for the argument in 
favour of a low dividend payout policy. 13 
Following a change in the USA tax law which now equates the 
dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, the 
advantage from this tax differential falls away and Brealey 
and Myers (1988) shift their support to a dividend policy 
b d th . 1 't' 14 ase on e irre evance posi ion. This position does 
not deny that there are clienteles for both high and low 
dividend payout ratios, but it is argued that if the demand 
for these policies has been met, no financial manager will 
' 
be able to improve the firm's market price by altering its 
'dividend policy. This can be done only if there is 
13 
Brealey and Myers (1988, p372) do note that the results of these studies are not identical. 
They also recognise the difficulty of measuring dividend yield and of linking it to the higher return. 
The evidence is therefore not regarded as conclusive, but as strongly indicative. 
14 h . f . . h h . l h be f At t e time o wr1t1ng, t e c ange 1n tax aw as en too recent or the results of et11Jirical 
tests to reflect its impact. It remains to be seen whether shareholders in low-payout firms apply 
pressure for higher payouts. 
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unsatisfied demand for a particular policy. As the 
influence of market imperfections on dividend policy may 
vary from market to market, it is appropriate to consider 
the South African institutional and fiscal framework. 
The South African context 
For the purpose of considering the effect of South African 
tax legislation on the dividend question, investors can be 
categorised broadly as institutional, corporate and 
individual investors. The dividend income of corporate and 
institutional investors is exempt from tax. A maximum of 
66.67% of an individual's dividend income is subject to tax 
according to a progressive tax rate system. 15 There is no 
capital gains tax. However, if the Secretary for Inland 
Revenue regards the taxpayer as a dealer rather than an 
investor, share transactions may be taxed in the same way as 
d . t t' 16 or inary revenue ransac ions. 
15 .. 
In1t1ally, no tax is payable on an individual's dividend income as the allowance is 100% of 
dividends, but the percentage allowance decreases as taxable income increases, to reach a maxilll.lll of 
66.67"~ of dividend income (that is, the allowance falls to 33.33%) at a relatively low taxable income 
bracket. 
16 
Taxpayers are required to report trading in shares and other assets in their annual tax 
returns. Based on an examination of these returns, the tax authorities may decide to classify the 
taxpayer as a dealer by reference to criteria such as the taxpayer's intention and the frequency of 
the transactions. Should a taxpayer be classified as a dealer, all revenues and expenses related to 
those transactions are taxed at the normal corporate or personal rate, as applicable. 
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In the South African context, there is a clientele for a 
high dividend payout policy. This would include: 
* Individuals who do not wish to invest through 
intermediaries, who prefer a reasonably steady dividend 
flow without the need for portfolio adjustment and who 
are prepared to incur the accompanying transaction 
costs and tax charge in order to achieve this. 
* Corporate investors wishing to maintain sufficiently 
large holdings in other (associated) companies to allow 
them to exercise significant influence would prefer not 
to reduce their investments, their dividends would not 
attract tax and they would need only to meet the 
transaction costs attracted by a high dividend payout 
policy. Similar reasoning would apply to corporate 
investors which wish to maintain control and have 
exhausted other means of transferring funds from their 
b .d. . 11 su si 1ar1es. 
* Institutional shareholders which are able to alter 
their holdings but may wish to maintain a mix between 
dividends (which are not subject to tax) and capital 
gains to achieve a steady inflow without disrupting the 
market. Another consideration is to avoid being 
classified as a dealer for tax purposes. 
17
of course, holding companies are able to determine the dividend policies of subsidiary 
companies and corporate investors in associate companies may have significant influence over the 
dividend policies of those companies. 
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* Foreign investors who may prefer dividends to capital 
gains owing to the foreign exchange regulations. 
Dividends are remitted to foreign investors at the 
standard exchange rate (the Commercial Rand) whereas 
capital is remitted at a discounted rate (the Financial 
Rand) which can have a substantial impact depending on 
the ruling discount. 18 
There is also a clientele for a low dividend payout policy. 
This policy minimises transaction costs and offers tax 
advantages to investors in high taxable income brackets. 19 
With few exceptions, individual investors are likely to earn 
relatively high taxable incomes, providing a potentially 
large clientele and consequently a high demand for companies 
offering low dividend payout policies. 
Conclusion 
Brealey and Myers (1988, p376) conclude that the available 
theories and evidence on dividend policy do not allow firm 
conclusions to be drawn. The clientele effect suggests 
18 
This suggestion is made by Uliana, Correia, Wormald and Flynn (1987, p489). 
19 . 
Logically, the imposition of taxes and transaction costs would appear to support a zero payout 
dividend policy by South African companies, but they do not ordinarily appear to follow this practice. 
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that a financial manager cannot enhance the share price by 
altering the firm's dividend policy unless there is 
unsatisfied demand for the new policy. This is supported 
in South Africa by Botha, Bosch and van Zyl (1987) who find 
that dividend policy (as indicated by -the dividend payout 
ratio) has no effect on changes in shareholder wealth. 20 
Sealy and Knight (1987) identify a market-wide negative 
dividend preference on the JSE and they suggest the 
existence of unsatisfied investor clienteles, particularly 
in view of the shortage of scrip and the observed tendency 
to pay out a relatively high proportion of earnings as 
d . 'd d 21 ivi en s. This is puzzling, given the strong incentives 
for a low dividend payout policy in South Africa. Although 
the clientele effect explains the existence of a range of 
payout policies, the specific payout ratios selected by 
listed companies are not explained. The effect of dividend 
policy per se on share price thus remains a puzzle. The 
informational effects of the policy and/or reporting the 
target dividend payout ratio are examined in chapter 3. 
20 
This finding is based on a regression analysis using fifteen years' data relating to 33 firms 
listed on the JSE. 
21 
The data apply to the eight years spanning 1973 to 1980. It should be noted that the level of 
significance of the positive association between dividend yield and security returns is not uniformly 
very high (Sealy and Knight, 1987). 
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3.4 Capital structure decision 
The financial manager attempts to find a particular 
combination of debt and equity that maximises the overall 
market value of the firm. According to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), in a perfect market, a firm's market value is 
independent of its capital structure. Thus the financial 
manager cannot enhance the value of the firm by borrowing. 
Provided that investors are able to borrow or lend on their 
own account at the same risk-free rate as the firm, a 
levered (or geared) firm offers no advantage to investors. 
They would thus have no reason to invest in a levered 
rather than an unlevered firm or to pay a premium to do so. 
Under these conditions, an investor whose portfolio 
comprises only firms which are fully financed by equity can 
convert it into a levered portfolio by borrowing an 
appropriate portion of debt. The mix is determined by the 
investor's risk preference. 
If companies have limited liability, corporate debt is not 
risk-free. The proposition still holds, as individuals 
could conceivably achieve limited liability by arrangement 
with the lender, that is, without buying shares in a levered 
firm. The absence of these arrangements as a common 
phenomenon suggests that it is simpler to invest in the 
shares of a levered company. While investors do buy shares 
in levered companies, they would not pay a premium for them 
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unless they were in short supply. However, these shares 
are widely available. The conclusion remains that if a 
company levers, its shareholders are no better off than they 
were before, as they could have levered their portfolios for 
themselves. The first Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
proposition is violated when the firm can imaginatively 
design its capital structure in such a way that it is able 
to offer some financial service that meets the needs of such 
a clientele. 
The second Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition is that 
the expected rate of return on the common stock (ordinary 
shares) of a levered firm increases in proportion to the 
debt-equity ratio (as expressed in market values). The 
rate of this increase depends on the spread between the 
expected rate of return on a portfolio of all the firm's 
securities and the expected return on debt. Any increase 
in expected return is exactly off set by an increase in risk 
and therefore in investors' required rate of return. 
Investors require higher returns on levered equity for this 
reason; the required rate of return simply rises to match 
the increased risk. 
According to the traditional argument on debt policy, by 
minimising the weighted average cost of capital, the 
financial manager is able to maximise the value of the 
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f
. 22 1rm. As the weighted average cost of capital 
calculation ignores the increase in the required rate of 
return which is demanded by equity holders as the 
debt-equity ratio increases, this argument suggests that 
value can be created simply by borrowing. To create value 
by borrowing, financial managers would have to find not only 
a clientele, but an unsatisfied clientele. This cannot be 
done simply by levering the firm as there are currently 
plenty of shares available in levered firms. 
Following the above line of reasoning, the conclusion is 
that capital structure does not matter in a well-functioning 
capital market. Consequently, financial managers would not 
concern themselves with it and debt .ratios would vary 
randomly from firm to firm and from industry to industry. 
Yet financial managers are concerned about debt policy and 
differences in debt ratios are not random. If the 
traditional argument is rejected, there must be some other 
explanation for what is observed a world of taxes and other 
market imperfections. 
The table below is based on the capital structure check-list 
developed by Brealey and Myers (1988, p434-435) with 
reference to taxes, risk, asset type and financial slack. 
22 
Zakon (1971), Fruhan (1979) and Bierman (1980) provide reasonably prominent examples of 
rec011111ended financial strategies which are apparently based on the traditional argllllent. 
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TABLE 2.1 LEVERAGE IN FOUR DIMENSIONS 
DIMENSION LEVEL 
Ability to take advantage 
of interest tax shield 
Business risk 
Ratio of tangible assets to 
total ·assets 
Need for financial slack 
The financial manager is likely to 
seek the following leverage levels 
in response to the levels stipulated 












Table 2.1 shows the four dimensions of the capital structure 
decision (that is, deciding on the target debt-equity ratio) 
and their expected influence on the leverage levels (as 
expressed by the debt-equity ratio) sought by the financial 
manager. For example, the financial manager of a firm with 
a relatively high need for financial slack would be inclined 
to keep the debt-equity ratio relatively low. The levels 
shown above are the extreme ends of the spectrum; there is a 
range of intermediate levels for each of the four dimensions 
and an infinite number of permutations. Given the complex 
interaction of these variables, the table can provide only 
an indication of the influence of the four dimensions on the 
debt-equity decision; it is not an instant guide to the 
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optimal debt leve1. 23 There is thus no straightforward way 
of testing whether a firm's capital structure is optimal. 
One pointer to a company's optimal capital structure is the 
average capital structure for the applicable industry. On 
the assumption that the industry capital structure is the 
optimal structure, any movement towards that structure would 
presumably have a favourable effect on the share price, 
while a movement away from it would have an adverse 
effect. 24 It should be noted, however, that where the 
number of firms in an industry is relatively small, the 
average capital structure for an industry sector is unlikely 
to give a good indication of the optimal structure. 25 
There are other facets to the debt option, such as the 
balance between short-term and long-term debt and the mix of 
varying financial instruments of varying degrees of 
sophistication. These capital structure refinements are of 
interest in this study, but they are not considered further 
as they do not raise issues which are fundamentally 
different from those examined in this section. 
23 
"Optimal" is used here to indicate the best way of responding to the four dimensions portrayed 
in table 2.1. 
24 
Given rational expectations, the interaction is more c~lex than this (see chapter 3, section 
3.0). 
25 
Of the nineteen JSE industrial sectors, only four sectors include more than twenty CO!J1>1lnies 
and there are fewer than five companies in five of the sectors (see table 4.4). 
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Conclusion 
Similar to the conclusion on dividend policy, it appears 
that the financial manager cannot improve the firm's share 
price simply by levering the firm; it is necessary to meet 
an unsatisfied clientele. Informational issues relating to 
the three financial strategies examined in this section are 
considered and investors' responses to the reporting of the 
related financial targets and constraints are hypothesised 
in chapter 3. 
4.0 MARKET EFFICIENCY 
For any capital market study, assumptions regarding the 
degree of efficiency of the market on which the securities 
are listed have an important bearing on the interpretation 
of the results. Section 4.1 comprises a brief explanation 
of the concept of market efficiency and its implications. 
While the evidence produced by studies conducted on stock 
exchanges elsewhere in the world may be indicative for the 
JSE, it is unlikely to be directly transferable to the 
JSE. 26 Research relating to the JSE is therefore reviewed 
briefly in section 4.2. 
26 
As has been noted (chapter 1, section 2.0), the institutional framework and other 
characteristics unique to South Africa may give rise to different findings for the JSE. 
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4.1 The concept and its implications 
An efficient market is one in which prices always fully 
reflect available information. Three forms of market 
efficiency (the weak, semistrong and strong forms) have been 
identified (Fama, 1970). For each of these forms, 
efficiency is judged according to a specified information 
set. The levels of efficiency and the associated 
information set at each of these levels are shown in table 
2.2 below. 






All historical share prices 
All publicly available information 
All available information 
Foster (1986, p300-301) provides a more operational 
definition of informational efficiency and mentions two of 
its key implications. In terms of this definition, a 
capital market is efficient with respect to an information 
item if the prices of capital market securities fully 
impound the return implications of that item. One 
implication is that an investor cannot use a specific 
information item placed in the public domain to earn nonzero 
returns consistently. Another implication is that when a 
new information item is added to the information set used by 
the market, its revaluation implications for returns are 
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instantaneously and unbiasedly impounded into the current 
market price. 
Fama (1970, p416) concludes that the evidence in support of 
the efficient markets model is extensive, and that 
contradictory evidence is sparse. This conclusion is based 
on a comprehensive review of the work carried out to test 
the efficiency of stock markets in these three forms up to 
that time. Foster (1986, p396) points out that Fama's 
(1970) conclusion no longer holds as the results of a 
considerable body of subsequent studies are inconsistent 
with the efficient markets model. While acknowledging the 
evidence of anomalies, Foster (1986, p399) confirms the 
continuing importance of this model, for two reasons·. 
First, alternatives to it are not sufficiently well 
articulated. Second, there are several possible 
explanations for the anomalous evidence which do not rely on 
market inefficiency. 
A representative collection of studies on stock market 
anomalies and related surveys and commentaries is contained 
in two books; one edited by Dimson (1988) and the other by 
Guimaraes, Kingsman and Taylor (1988). The range of 
anomalies represented include: 
* Price/earnings effect. A negative relation between 
price earnings ratios and abnormal returns. It 
appears that the price earnings ratio or an underlying 
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and more fundamental variable for which the price 
earnings ratio is proxy is capable of explaining a 
considerable portion of the variation in 
cross-sectional security returns. 
* January effect. Higher returns are earned in January 
than in any other month. 
* Weekend effect. Average share returns tend to be 
higher on Fridays and negative on Mondays. It is not 
clear whether this effect owes its origin to the 
weekend nontrading period or to active Monday trading, 
but it has been observed on stock exchanges in the USA 
and elsewhere. 
* Size effect. An inverse relation between the returns 
on ordinary shares and market capitalisation; ceteris 
paribus, the smaller the size of the firm, the larger 
the share's expected return. The size effect has also 
been shown to be more pronounced in January and on 
Fridays. 
After reviewing evidence of the weekend effect, Levi {1988, 
p50) observes that before the apparent regularities can be 
considered a challenge to market efficiency, more 
consistency in the evidence is required than is currently 
shown, whereafter rational explanations should be sought for 
this phenomenon (for examples, the size of settlement lags, 
shares going ex-dividend and the inactivity of capital over 
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weekends). Only in the absence of these rational 
explanations should market efficiency be placed in doubt. 
Based on his review of anomalies, Keim (1988, p35) advocates 
caution when interpreting the magnitudes of the anomalies 
reported as inadequate adjustments for relevant costs and 
risks may be overstating the effect of these anomalies. 
Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1988, pl08) conclude that, 
notwithstanding the strength of the evidence of seasonal 
anomalies, it does not completely nullify the theorems of 
market efficiency. 
Ball's (1988, p52) conclusion on market efficiency in the 
light of evidence of anomalies is that it shows where it 
would most be expected, that is, where research 
methodologies are most sensitive to limitations of the 
existing knowledge of asset pricing. He expects that many, 
though not all, of these anomalies will be resolved in 
favour of efficiency. These views support Foster's (1986, 
p399) confirmation of the continuing relevance of the 
efficient markets model which is cited above. 
4.2 South African evidence 
The evidence relating to market efficiency, principally on 
the New York Stock Exchange, stimulated a debate in South 
Africa regarding the efficiency of the JSE. The following 
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is a brief review of results derived from tests for market 
efficiency using JSE data. 
Efficiency in the weak form 
Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) conclude that the results of 
their serial correlation tests are consistent with 
weak-form efficiency for 80% of the market. The extent of 
the dependence they do find is too small to earn abnormal 
returns through the analysis of past price patterns. 
Hadassin (1976) claims that his serial correlation test 
results are not consistent with the random walk hypothesis 
and that his runs test results strongly support the 
nonrandom behaviour of share price changes. His conclusion 
is that the JSE is not an efficient market. However, while 
he suggests that chartists and superior fundamental analysts 
should be able to make greater returns than those on the 
market, he is unable to make a firm statement on this issue. 
It is therefore possible that the degree of dependence is 
insufficient to allow superior returns. 
While Gilbertson and Roux (1977) find dependence in their 
serial correlation and runs test results, they conclude that 
it is insufficient to reject weak-form efficiency. They 
also test trading rules against a buy and hold strategy, as 
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does Bennet (1978). In both cases, the results are offered 
in support of market efficiency. Based on the results of 
runs tests of ten highly traded and ten thinly traded 
shares, Strebel (1977) challenges any suggestion that the 
market is efficient. It should be noted that Strebel's 
tests are based on a small number of shares. 
Taking the evidence derived from these JSE studies as a 
whole, it is concluded that the JSE is efficient in the weak 
form. 27 
Efficiency in the semistrong form 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983) conclude that while the 
results indicate inefficiency of the JSE, they also imply 
that efficiency is improving. 
companies changing to LIFo28 . 
This is based on a study of 
A change to LIFO has a 
negative impact on earnings, but a positive impact on cash 
27 
This conclusion is in agreement with that reached by Knight (1981, p63), who examined some of 
the contentious technical issues relating to the tests themselves. This depth of analysis has not 
been repeated here as the detail is not central to the thesis. Knight (1981) also cites additional 
unpublished studies which were not available for this study, but those results do not appear to offer 
further clarification of the issues involved. 
28 • 
LIFO 1s the acronym for last-in-first-out, an inventory accounting method whereby the cost of 
goods consuned is evaluated at the most recent prices and the inventory on hand is evaluated at the 
oldest acquisition prices. 
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. t . 29 flow owing o tax savings. The expected response to the 
positive cash flow impact in an efficient market is positive 
abnormal returns. 
The results show negative abnormal returns in response to 
the negative impact on earnings. Further, whereas the 
response would be expected to be impounded immediately in an 
efficient market, the negative response is impounded only 
over a period of several weeks. The authors do note, 
however, that the information content of announcements by 
the later changers to LIFO is impounded more quickly, and 
the negative effect is less pronounced, than is the 
information content of announcements by the earlier 
changers. They suggest a "learning effect" on the part of 
the market, which implies that the efficiency of the market 
is improving. 
In a later LIFO study, Knight, Affleck-Graves and Hamman 
(1985) introduce a further control group for comparison with 
the Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983) change group, in an 
attempt to separate the earnings and the cash flow effects. 
29 
Provided prices are rising, the application of this method has a negative effect on reported 
earnings relative to any method which evaluates usage at older prices, in particular, 
first-in-first-out (FIFO). At the time of the study, LIFO was permissible as a basis of inventory 
valuation for tax reporting purposes provided that it was also used for financial reporting. The 
adoption of LIFO consequently affected reported earnings negatively, but at the same time it effected 
tax savings, with a-positive impact on cash flow. The tax legislation has subsequently been changed 
so that LIFO is no longer recognised for tax purposes. 
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This group comprises holding companies which are able both 
to claim the cash flow benefits when their subsidiaries 
change to LIFO and to continue to report consolidated 
results based on FIFO. 
In contrast to the pronounced downward drift in the results 
of the original change group, the control group shows very 
little reaction to the announced change in policy. Having 
separated the cash flow and the earnings effects, it appears 
that the market is responding to the negative earnings 
impact. The authors offer three possible explanations: 
* The market is inefficient. Given the cash flow 
benefit, it nevertheless responds in the direction of 
the opposite earnings result which has no cash flow 
consequences. 
* The market is efficient, but the downward reaction is 
caused by some other factor owing to self-selection 
bias. 
* The market is efficient, but accounting changes provide 
information to the market on management's expectations 
which had hitherto not been available. In the case of 
the LIFO change, this would require that a motive other 
than cash saving be ascribed to management with a 
negative effect greater than the cash saving achieved. 
Knight et al. (1985) are unwilling to conclude unilaterally 
that the JSE is inefficient in the semistrong form. They 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 44 
CHAPTER TWO: FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
regard inefficiency as only one of the three possible 
explanations above, and they suggest that further research 
on the long-term effects of LIFO is required to resolve the 
questions raised by the results. In a later paper on this 
issue, Knight and Affleck-Graves (1988) firmly reject 
inefficiency of the market as a possible explanation in a 
world of rational expectations. They pref er to attribute 
the negative response to an as yet unexplained signalling 
effect implicit in the accounting change (see the third 
possi~le explanation above). 30 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1985) report fairly rapid market 
response to the earnings inf orrnation provi~ed by preliminary 
reports. This is consistent with the JSE being an 
efficient market in the sernistrong form. 
Corns, Archer and Smit (1987) conclude that the results of 
their study on the information content of dividends do not 
invalidate the efficient market hypothesis as traders on 
dividend information are not able to generate significant 
returns which are consistently different from market 
returns. 
30 
Rational expectations and signalling are considered in chapter 3. 
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In a study on takeover announcements and insider trading, 
Bhana (1987) finds that most of the market reaction (87.2% 
of the positive cumulative average abnormal residuals) 
occurs prior to (53.6%) and on (33.6%) the announcement 
date. Bhana (1987, p207) concludes semistrong inefficiency 
of the JSE on the grounds that the market reaction (the 
remaining 15.8% of the total) to the public announcement of 
a planned takeover continues for a period of five trading 
days after the announcement. 
In evaluating Bhana's (1987) results, their sensitivity to 
the accurate specification of the event date should be noted 
(see Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985). The fifteen days' 
pre-announcement (largely significant) abnormal returns 
suggest that leakages place the information in the public 
domain some considerable time before the public 
announcement. It could thus be argued that most of the 
reaction to this publicly available information occurred 
rapidly. The observation of abnormal returns from insider 
trading indicates inefficiency in the strong form and does 
not reflect on semistrong efficiency. 
Bhana (1989, pl27) finds evidence of short-term overreaction. 
to unfavourable company-specific news. He suggests market 
inefficiency in this regard which may enable astute 
investors to outperform the market. 
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While inefficiency may be suggested on the grounds of the 
results of the South African LIFO studies reported in this 
section, the results are by no means conclusive and the 
issue requires further research. The interpretation of the 
LIFO results is problematic, as has been found in USA 
t d
. 31 s u ies. The evidence against semistrong efficiency 
presented by Bhana (1987 and 1989) does not appear to be 
conclusive. The results in the Knight and Affleck-Graves 
(1985) and Ooms et al. (1987) studies are consistent with 
semistrong efficiency. Taken as a whole, the studies 
reviewed in this section are fairly consistent with 
efficiency in the semistrong form. 
Efficiency in the strong form 
Tests of efficiency in the strong form generally involve the 
the performance of portfolios under professional management, 
such as the mutual funds. On the assumption that these 
managers have access to inside information, a result which 
shows that the fund does not perform better than the market 
is consistent with efficiency in the strong form, and vice 
versa. If the assumption of access to inside information 
31 
It should be noted that contradictory LIFO results are the research experience in the United 
States. Knight, Affleck-Graves and HalTfllan (1985, p45) cite Sunder (1973) and Murray (1983) who find 
positive reactions while Abdel-Khalik and McKeown (1978) and Ricks (1982) find negative reactions. 
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is incorrect, superior performance indicates inefficiency in 
the semistrong form and inferior performance indicates only 
consistency with the semistrong form. 
Du Plessis (1974) conducted a study of this nature but as 
the mutual fund movement was in its infancy at the time, the 
study comprises only two funds. Gilbertson and Roux (1977) 
find that mutual funds' performance was not superior to that 
of the market. Strebel (1977) again questions the validity 
of the research method, based primarily on statistical 
issues relating to thinly traded shares. 
Owing to the questions on research method, the ambiguity of 
the results (that is, access to inside information must be 
assumed before efficiency in the strong form can be 
concluded) and the paucity of research, no conclusion can be 
stated regarding efficiency of the JSE in the strong form. 
Conclusion 
The results of the research conducted on the JSE are fairly 
consistent with a market which is efficient in the 
semistrong form. While it may be argued that the evidence 
is not sufficiently strong to conclude that the JSE has been 
proved an efficient market in the semistrong form, 
consistency with semistrong efficiency is sufficient to 
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provide a basis for the evaluation of the empirical results 
in this study. 32 
5.0 VOLUNTARY REPORTING 
5.1 Voluntary reporting in context 
To arrive at a share valuation or to construct a portfolio, 
an investor requires information on the key variables 
relating to the share(s) concerned. New information 
affects that valuation, and through the actions of investors 
in aggregate (the market), it affects the share price. The 
impact of information release may similarly be economy-wide, 
industry-wide or firm-specific. The timing and extent of 
the impact depends on the share market's degree of 
efficiency. Information sources range from the general 
(newspapers, radio, television, financial journals) to the 
32
citing Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983 and 1985) and Strebel (1977 and 1978), Seneque (1987, 
p35) concludes that the degree of informational efficiency on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is at 
best very weak and that as the capital asset pricing model requires a high degree of informational 
efficiency, tests undertaken using JSE data must be highly suspect. The problematic interpretation 
of the LIFO study (Knight and Affleck-Graves, 1983) and the small sample size used by Strebel (1977) 
have been noted above. According to evidence reviewed in this section, prices appear to react fairly 
quickly (although not instantaneously) to information. While the qualified nature of the evidence 
suggests less than perfect informational efficiency, it is not clear that this is sufficient to 
conclude "very weak" informational efficiency. Whether this less than perfect efficiency is 
explained by genuine inefficiency, the way in which the market is structured (being a broker only 
market, no one is compelled to trade as in a specialist or dealer market), thin trading or model 
misspecification is difficult to determine. Notwithstanding the imperfections, the market model 
methodology used in this study remains appropriate as it removes COlllllOn market factors from the return 
series. Indeed, it is hoped that this study will contribute to the literature on the efficiency of 
the JSE. 
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specific (trade or industry sources, the firm itself). The 
fewer the competing sources of information and/or the more 
firm-specific the information (for example, a firm's 
financial targets and constraints), the greater the demand 
for financial information from the firm. 
It is now well established that the objective of financial 
reporting is to provide information useful for making 
. d . . 33 economic ecisions. Financial information is demanded by 
the stakeholders in the firm; namely the investors, 
employees, customers, lenders and suppliers, government 
agencies and others. This thesis focuses on investors' 
information needs for buy, hold and sell decisions, with 
specific reference to the specified financial targets. In 
this context, a release or a report has information content 
if it is shown to have an impact on the firm's share 
. 34 price. Foster (1986, p2) portrays investors in three 
roles; those employing fundamental analysis, those employing 
technical analysis (both groups in search of mispriced 
33 
This is essentially the way in which the objective is stated by the Study Group on the 
objectives of financial statements (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973). A 
similarly worded objective appears in the FASB Conceptual Framework Series. Research efforts in 
other countries (for example, The Australian Accounting Research Foundation, The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales) also produced user-oriented objectives. While this 
objective may appear obvious, its significance lies in the unequivocal adoption of the usefulness 
criterion in financial reporting by professional bodies in several countries. 
34
This could also be used as the criterion for establishing whether information is useful. In 
this study, usefulness is encapsulated in information content; the adjective "useful" in "useful 
information" is considered redundant given the criterion for information content. 
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securities) and portfolio investors who accept that there 
are no mispriced securities but seek the best fit between 
their risk profiles and those of available investments. 
While the technical analyst has no need of financial 
statement information, investors in the other two roles do. 
Because the public interest is affected by financial 
reporting, reporting requirements have been laid down in 
most Western countries under the authority of statute and/or 
t . f f . 1 b d' 35 f t' the promulga ions o pro essiona o ies. In orma ion 
provided voluntarily by the firm thus forms only part of the 
wide range of information available from various sources. 
Voluntary reporting is placed in context in the 
representation below (figure 2.1). Management's motivation 
to report voluntarily is considered in the next section and 
is developed further in chapter 3, section 4.0. 
35 
The ability of these professional bodies to ensure compliance, varies from country to country, 
dependent to a Large degree on the linkage between statute and professional pronouncement. In South 
Africa, there is considerable regulation by the Companies Act, which is closely linked with Statements 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice issued by the APB. 
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FIGURE 2.1 THE INFORMATION SPECTRUM (FASB, 1980) 
All information uled In i-nt, 
crwdit, ..a similar decisions 
,_ All financial rwporting 
by business anierprisn 
Gene.-1 purpose 
external financial reporting 
Required 
informwtion 
.!. Voluntary.~ information 
- Financial.~ 
Noia to SuP!'lemantary 
- financial informwtion siaiemenu siatements 
Supplernenary 
Supplementary infonnation 
. + ICCOnlpanying + ~fonnation ~ financial ..,.ilabla 
ranemena on teqUllSt 
andnotaS 
Financial sumtnents 
(AICPA auditing rand.as litaniniral 
FASB's - of interest 
FinMc:ial raponint 
IC-sits s-t 1, si-graphs HI 
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The provision of information to investors for 
decision-making patently benefits them while it 
. 





facilitates the functioning of the capital market concerned. 
However, this provides no direct incentive to a firm's 
management to report voluntarily. Management is unlikely 
to report information voluntarily unless the estimated 
benefits to be derived from the voluntary reporting are 
expected to exceed the costs of producing it. 
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The potential benefit lies in the positive impact on the 
share price which is expected to occur on the voluntary 
provision of this information. Choi {1973) suggests a 
conceptual framework relating disclosure improvement to cost 
of capital which he claims supports the existence of a 
direct relationship between firm value and corporate 
disclosure. The voluntary reporting is said to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding users' estimates of key variables. 36 
Many companies have established investor relations 
departments in recognition of the need to keep investors 
properly informed {see, for example, Chugh, 1984). The 
annual report and the communication of financial strategies 
usually fall within the brief of investor relations. 
Significantly, the mission of these departments is 
frequently expressed in terms of their potential impact on 
share price. 
The attendant costs, both direct and indirect, must also be 
considered. Foster {1986, p35) lists these costs as 
collection and processing costs, litigation costs, political 
costs, competitive disadvantage costs and constraints on 
managerial behaviour. While the direct costs may be 
considerable in some instances, they need not be in others. 
36
rhis issue is pursued further in chapter 3 with specific reference to financial targets and 
constraints. 
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For instance, a company wishing to report replacement costs 
may incur considerable expense in obtaining the necessary 
estimates. On the other hand, assuming that a company is 
undertaking some form of strategic planning, management 
should already have established target ratios for the 
dividend payout, the debt ratio and the rate of return, so 
that little, if any, direct cost is incurred in reporting 
financial targets. 
Many companies tend to restrict disclosure to the statutory 
. . 37 minimum. These companies frequently cite competitive 
disadvantage costs to support this policy. Some 
managements also see a benefit in nondisclosure in terms of 
reducing shareholders' ability to exercise control. While 
competitive disadvantage costs may be a justification for 
the limitation of disclosure, reliance on this as an excuse 
to limit disclosure . 11 . d 38 is we recognise . stern (1980) 
draws a careful distinction between a company's proprietary 
information which competitors may use to their advantage and 
that information which would benefit investors without 
benefiting competitors. Foster (1986, p38) points out that 
arguments against disclosure based on competitive 
37 
Remgro (Rembrandt Group Ltd) is a well-known South African exaq:>le of c0q:>anies that still 
embrace this philosophy. 
38 
For example, Anderson (1961, p6) draws attention to this and points out that c~titors have 
many sources of information other than the reporting company's annual report. 
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disadvantage would be difficult to sustain in many 
instances, given the "rich network of information sources" 
that firms typically have relating to their competitors in 
the industry. He (1986, p39) does suggest that the 
nondisclosure of information such as that relating to 
planned research and development, new products and 
advertising budgets could well · be supported using the 
competitive disadvantage argument. In Verrechia's (1983) 
model, the decision to disclose is considerably affected by 
the disclosure threshold constituted by disclosure-related 
costs. This model is considered in the section on 
signalling since Verrechia presents it in that context (see 
chapter 3, section 4.3). 
citing studies of funds statements, management earnings 
forecasts and line-of-business disclosures, Foster (1986, 
p44) observes that firm size appears to be the variable most 
consistently reported as significant in explaining 
differences in their reporting policies. While he points 
out that it is not clear what the firm size variable 
represents, he suggests that firm size could proxy for 
attempts by larger firms to reduce political costs, for 
larger firms having lower competitive disadvantage costs 
associated with their disclosures or for larger firms having 
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South Africa 
:he Companies Act requires that 
tents of every company fairly 
1e financial position of the 
igenerally accepted accounting 
Fourth Schedule to the Act 
must be disclosed in order to 
Although the force of the 
)ted accounting practice" has 
is widely accepted that the 
.th 'the Statements of Generally 
ssued by the APB. Voluntary 
if ied in South Africa as that 
ed neither directly by the 
~ by one or more of the 
~d Accounting Practice. 
the subject of a number of 
:r and Meth (1985) surveyed 
well-developed approach in 
prepared a list of 49 items 
Exarrples of these studies, which collectively cover Europe, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are those reported by: Benjamin and Stange (1977), 
Buzby (1974), Chandra (1974), Chandra and Greenball (1977), Choi C1973b), Firer (1985) and Firer and 
Meth (1985), Firth (1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1980), Gourley and Seneque C1984a and 1984b), McNally, Hock 
and Hasseldene <1982), Singh and Desai (1971). 
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the disclosure of which is discretionary, by reference to 
previous studies and to voluntary disclosure in South 
African annual reports available at the time. Members of 
the Investment Analysts Society in South Africa (as 
surrogates for investors) were asked to rank these items 
according to their perceived importance on a scale of 1 to 
5, ranging from the least to the most important. This 
provides a disclosure index against which the information 
disclosed by companies can be rated. 40 
The first fifteen items on the disclosure index (that is, 
the fifteen most highly ranked amongst the 49 discretionary 
items selected) are listed in table 2.3 below. 
40 
Firer (1985) compares his results with those derived by Firth (1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1980) in 
studies conducted in the United Kingdom and establishes that there is little correlation between them, 
for which several possible explanations are advanced. 
is not an issue in this thesis. 
The lack of correlation between these studies 
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TABLE 2.3 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE (FIRER, 1985): TOP 15 ITEMS 













Discussion of the firm's results for the past year with reasons for changes 
Discussion of the major factors which will influence next year's results 
Statement of future dividends/dividend policies 
Forecast of next year's profit or earnings per share 
Capital expenditure - narrative and quantitative data on expenditure in past year 
and planned expenditure 
Statement of transactions in foreign currency 
Information on mergers and acquisitions 
Statement of the firm's objectives 
Share of market in major product/service areas 
Description of major products/services 
. . 41 
Statement of rate of return required by the firm on 1ts pro1ects 
Breakdown of earnings by major product lines, customer classes and geographic 
locations 
13 35 Extent of dependence on major customers 
14 46 Cash projections one to five years 
15 6 Information on major industry trends 
* I = Disclosure index ranking; A = Actual disclosure ranking 
Of the three financial targets under study in this thesis, 
the disclosure of dividend policies is ranked third, the 
required rate of return is ranked eleventh and the target 
debt ratio does not appear in the list of 49 items. 
Capital expenditure information and the statement of the 
f . b' t' 42 irm's o Jee ives, both of which were initially to be 
included in the current study, are ranked fifth and eighth 
41
As the reference is to "required rate of return" on projects, this is possibly a reference to 
the weighted average cost of capital rather than to the target rate of return (see chapter 1, section 
2.0) for the difference between these terms. If this is so, its inclusion and ranking is 
nevertheless indicative of the demand for and supply of information in that category. 
42
rhe capital expenditure details envisaged here are assumed to be over and above those required 
in terms of the Companies Act to which reference was made in chapter 1, section 2.0. 
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t . 1 43 respec 1ve y. All of these four items are thus ranked in 
the top eleven items, which represent the top 23% of the 
disclosure index. Consistent with the general lack of 
correlation between desired and actual disclosure (see 
below), the actual disclosure of dividend policy and capital 
expenditure data is low relative to the index while that of 
the required rate of return is very low relative to the 
index. The disclosure index ranking of corporate 
objectives and its actual disclosure ranking are almost 
44 equal. 
Firer (1985, p22) reports little positive correlation 
between the desired and actual disclosure of individual 
items, which is consistent with the findings of Buzby 
(1974), Firth (1979a) and McNally (1982). These results 
are also consistent with Firth's (1978) finding that 
preparer groups (auditors and finance directors) and user 
groups (financial analysts and bank loan officers) have 
different perceptions regarding disclosure priorities. 
These results emphasise the gap between what analysts are 
requesting and what preparers will provide. The gap may be 
explained by disclosure-related costs (see section 5.2 above 
43 . 
The reasons for selecting the target rate of return, target dividend payout ratio and target 
debt ratio for inclusion in this study are given in chapter 1, section 2.0. 
44 . f h The meaningfulness o t e statements of corporate objectives may, however, be questionable. 
The decision to exclude this aspect from the current study is reported in chapter 1, section 2.0. 
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and Firer, 1985, p23). A further possible explanation is 
ignorance of or indifference to users' needs (Firer, 1985, 
p23). 
Firer (1985, p32) concludes that the overall level of 
disclosure revealed by his study is low, with only marginal 
improvement over the period 1979-1983. The improvement 
noted tended to be in the items which were already widely 
reported. These results do not reflect the improved 
reporting which has apparently been encouraged by two 
financial reporting competitions which have steadily raised 
45 their standards over the years. It is possible that the 
major improvements are restricted to those few companies 
seeking to report meaningfully. 46 
5.4 Conclusion 
Information which is important for share valuation or 
portfolio construction and which is not readily available 
from other sources is likely to be in high demand from 
45
one of these has been run for more than twenty years by the Financial Mail, a leading financial 
journal in South Africa, in association with the Bureau of Financial Analysis at the University of 
Pretoria. A more recent competition is jointly sponsored by the the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and the Business Times. The grading systems for both c~titions include a 
wide range of items which may be reported voluntarily. 
46 
It is interesting that, of the twenty one outstanding corporate communicators listed by Stern 
(1980, p7), ten are South African companies. These are companies that include the kind of 
information noted in chapter 1, section 2.0. 
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firms; in particular, the more firm-specific the 
information, the investors will demand it from firms. 
Management's decision to report voluntarily is based on the 
benefit/cost criterion. The potential benefit lies in the 
positive impact on the share price which is expected to 
occur on the voluntary provision of this information. The 
attendant costs comprise both direct and indirect 
disclosure-related costs. These costs may differ according 
to the item and the industry in which the firm operates. 
The role of disclosure-related costs are considered further 
in chapter 3, section 4.3. 
While the Firer and Meth (1985) survey ranks relatively 
highly information relating to two of the financial targets 
under study in this thesis, there are some highly ranked 
items which either do not appear to be as pertinent to the 
share price or of which at least some indication could be 
obtained from other sources. The target debt ratio does 
not feature at all. The ranking of the actual disclosure 
of these items is very low relative to the disclosure index 
ranking. The survey method suffers from several 
disadvantages which may explain some of these 
inconsistencies. In the next section, four possible 
research methods are reviewed, including the survey method, 
with a view to motivating the most appropriate research 
methodology for this thesis. 
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6.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
There are several possible approaches to a study of this 
nature, more than one of which may offer interesting 
insights into the variables under study and the related 
reporting decisions. The following is a brief review of 
the broad possibilities. 
6.1 Laboratory studies 
Pankoff and Virgil (1970) highlight the difference between a 
laboratory study and a capital market study. 47 In a 
laboratory study, expectations data in the form of 
predictive probability distributions are obtained directly 
from individual subjects. In a capital market study, these 
are inf erred by relating market price changes to accounting 
data. The major advantage claimed for the laboratory study 
is that the researcher is able to control the conditions 
under which the research is conducted. It is, however, 
difficult to simulate both market conditions and the 
richness of the information set. It is also difficult to 
recruit subjects who are likely to approximate the actors in 
the capital market adequately, particularly as their 
47 f . . 7 . Panko f and V1rg1l (19 0) outline an approach to a laboratory study on the usefulness of 
financial information and incorporate a consideration of its advantages and disadvantages. A recent 
exalll>le of a laboratory study concerned with voluntary reporting is that by Chow, Haddad and Hirst 
(1989) (see chapter 3, section 4.3). 
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backgrounds and experience may be quite dissimilar to those 
whom they are regarded as representing. 
For the results of these studies to be useful, the 
researcher should have confidence that the conditions under 
which they were generated approximate the market and how it 
operates. As the impact on the share price is of central 
concern in this thesis, the disadvantages of this approach 
are considered to outweigh the advantages. 
6.2 surveys 
Using the survey method, a list of items which should be 
reported voluntarily is drawn up. This list is sent to a 
representative group of users who are asked to rank the 
items in terms of importance as inputs to their decisions. 
The list is weighted to form a disclosure index. A sample 
of annual reports is examined and the disclosure therein is 
graded and compared with the disclosure index. Inferences 
are made and conclusions are drawn from the index, actual 
disclosure levels and the comparison between them. 48 
The results of these surveys may give some indication of the 
information sought by users such as investment analysts. 
48 
Examples of survey-based studies using this or a similar approach are cited in section 5.3. 
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There is, however, no reason to believe that the impact of 
pieces of information on the advice given by analysts is 
consistent with the analysts' ranking of these items in a 
questionnaire survey. Where the survey instrument requires 
responses to lists or questions, the items brought to the 
attention of the analyst have been pre-selected and are 
presented in a particular form. This reinforces the 
possibility of a difference between the response and the 
importance likely to be placed on the item in an action 
situation. 
A further disadvantage is the generally low response to 
surveys of this nature, giving rise to the possibility of 
nonresponse bias, that is, the possibility that the views 
held by those who do not respond differ materially from 
those who do. Oppenheim (1966) suggests possible 
d
. 49 reme ies. Finally, there is no indication of the impact 
on the share price. Notwithstanding the noted limitations, 
a survey may have provided insights to complement the 
capital market study. However, as there is no reason to 
expect that a survey conducted for the purposes of this 
thesis would produce materially different results from those 
49 
One remedy suggested by Oppenheim (1966) is to aggregate the responses of late respondents and 
to compare the results with those derived from responses of earlier respondents. There is, however, 
no guarantee that the late respondents are a reliable surrogate for nonrespondents, and consequently 
the researcher cannot be sure that the results approximate those which would have been derived from 
the nonrespondents. Another approach would be to interview the nonrespondents, which is 
time-consuming and may be costly. 
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of Firer and Meth (1985), the review of that survey is 
considered sufficient (see section 5.3). 
6.3 Interviews 
The advantage of interviews over questionnaire surveys is 
that the interviewer is able to intervene to obtain 
clarification or elaboration. This advantage may, however, 
interfere with the uniformity of conditions across 
respondents. The structuring of the questions may "lead" 
respondents in the same way as questionnaire surveys, 
although this may be overcome by the use of unstructured 
. . . t 1 . t d. 50 interviews as in conten ana ysis s u ies. Again, this 
approach establishes no direct link with the market price, 
which is a central element in this study. 
Notwithstanding the disadvantages, interviews could be used 
as a secondary research method to provide useful insights 
into the motivation for the voluntary reporting under study. 
It was therefore the intention to interview senior 
executives of all the companies reporting the specified 
financial targets and of a sample of nonreporting companies, 
in an attempt to establish why the managements of the former 
companies had decided to report the targets, and why those 
of the latter group had not reported them. 
SOA current example of the use of unstructured interviews 
by Gibbons, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990). 
in a financial reporting study is that 
- - _J 
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A set of nine pilot interviews with senior executives of 
reporting companies was conducted. While interesting 
insights were gained as to the reasons behind the reporting 
of these variables, this is "soft" information. Given the 
time and cost involved, these pilot interviews led to the 
conclusion that it would not be feasible to conduct a full 
set of interviews with the potential to make a substantive 
contribution to this study. 
6.4 Capital market studies 
In a share market study, the market is the laboratory. The 
consequences of actions taken by investors are examined in 
their real setting in the context of information available 
at the time and with direct reference to the share price. 
Neither the market conditions nor the richness of the 
information set need be simulated. As the researcher is 
working with share prices, there is potential to link the 
reporting to the share price under these conditions. It 
therefore appears to be the most suitable research method 
for this study. Given this real setting, however, there 
are many influences affecting the share price other than the 
variables under study. It is necessary to control for 
outside factors and for self-selection bias. Careful 
attention must therefore be paid to these requirements in 
selecting the research methodology. No further detail is 
provided in this section as the research methodology is 
examined and developed in chapter 4. 
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7.0 SUMMARY 
Of the various stakeholders in the firm who demand 
information, this thesis is concerned with the investor 
group. The investor requires information about the firm to 
facilitate his decisions to buy, hold or sell securities of 
the firm. This information feeds into the investor's share 
valuation or portfolio model. The information which is in 
the highest demand is that which has the potential to reduce 
uncertainty and which is not available from alternative 
sources. Management has the ability to provide this kind 
of information through voluntary reporting. 
The purpose objective of the firm can be expressed in terms 
of the maximisation of shareholders' wealth. The 
investment decision provides the basis for the generation of 
cash flows to the business. The financial manager 
evaluates investment opportunities in terms of their ability 
to produce positive net present value after taking into 
account the concomitant risks. Furthermore, he seeks to 
balance investment, dividend and capital structure decisions 
in such a way that shareholders' wealth, as expressed by the 
share price, is enhanced. While net present value may be 
generated by astute investing, the evidence suggests that 
the potential for creating net present value through the 
financing decision is limited in well-functioning markets as 
there must be an unsatisfied clientele for the package 
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offered. There is not ordinarily an unsatisfied clientele 
for standard dividend and capital structure policies. 
Apart from the direct impact of financial strategies on the 
share price, the release of relevant information may have an 
impact on the share price. The question is whether it is 
in management's interests to report information relating to 
these financial strategies, in particular, the target ·rate 
of return, the target dividend payout ratio and the target 
debt-equity ratio. A capital market study is best suited 
for the examination of this question. 
The results of a capital market study should be evaluated in 
the context of the efficiency of the market concerned. 
While the results of studies using JSE data are not 
unequivocal, it is reasonable to conclude that the JSE is 
efficient in the semistrong form. This approximates 
informational efficiency as defined by Foster (1986, p300). 
Voluntary reporting and the related informational issues are 
examined further in chapter 3, with a view to developing 
formal hypotheses. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
To apply the free cash flow model, investors have to 
estimate the financial targets under study, namely the 
target rate of return, the target debt ratio and the target 
dividend payout ratio. They make these estimates based on 
information the market has about the state of the economy, 
the industry, the firm's past investment, financing and 
dividend decisions and the like. The estimates impounded 
into security prices are thus based on the perceptions of 
investors in aggregate. 
Significant events, whether they be in the form of actions 
or announcements, may alter investors' perceptions, the 
estimates they have made and thus the firm's share price. 
The potential effect on the share price is dependent on the 
nature of the response to the information content of the 
event. In this study, the event is the first occasion on 
which management reports the financial targets and 
constraints. 
Stern (1980) holds that uncertainty leads to a share being 
traded at a discount. He maintains that management is able 
to dispel a major part of this uncertainty by reporting 
information in its possession and thereby to improve the 
share price. The financial targets under study are 
included in the information specified by Stern. 
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Estimation risk {section 2.0), rational expectations 
{section 3.0) and signalling {section 4.0) will be examined 
with a view to assessing the potential theoretical support 
for this view. A critical issue in addressing each of 
these theories is the credibility of management. To 
facilitate the discussion, the credibility of management is 
assumed at this stage and its consideration is deferred 
until each of these possible explanations has been examined. 
2.0 ESTIMATION RISK 
2.1 Estimation risk 
The parameters of the probability distributions of returns 
relating to available securities are not usually known. 
In order to construct an investment portfolio in an 
uncertain world, the investor must therefore estimate the 
parameters of the available securities using available data. 
Klein and Bawa {1976 and 1977) point out that the estimation 
problem relating to parameter uncertainty introduces 
estimation risk which has an effect on optimal portfolio 
choice. Where the estimated parameters are treated as true 
parameters, estimation risk is ignored. 
In a two-asset world, where the mean of only one of the 
assets is known, Klein and Bawa (1976) show that the impact 
of estimation risk is reduced by reducing the proportion of 
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the portfolio invested in the security with the unknown 
mean. They also show that as the degree of sample 
information decreases the optimal choice for risk-averse 
investors involves investing more in the riskless asset. 
They suggest that, in the context of the capital asset 
pricing model, the effect is for risk-averse investors to 
behave as if they exhibited additional risk aversion by 
investing more in riskless assets and less in the "market" 
portfolio of risky assets. Consistent with this 
suggestion, Klein and Bawa (1977) also suggest that, after 
taking into account estimation risk, risk-averse investors 
would be expected to invest relatively more in those 
securities about which they have the most information. In 
the two papers, they develop a set of theorems under certain 
conditions which are consistent with these suggestions 
(Klein and Bawa, 1976 and 1977). 
Investors estimate future cash flows based on assumed rates 
of return (and therefore assumed target rates of return), an 
assumed debt-equity ratio (and an assumed target debt-equity 
ratio) and an assumed dividend payout ratio (and an assumed 
target dividend payout ratio). The estimation risk theory 
implies that investors price a share at a discount in 
recognition of the uncertainty surrounding their estimates. 
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Members of management have more information relating to the 
three variables than do investors. Reporting the three 
financial targets should thus reduce the level of estimation 
risk. It follows that those holding or selling shares will 
ask more for them and those buying shares will be prepared 
to pay more for them, ceteris paribus. In an efficient 
market, share prices will instantly reflect this and 
therefore, ceteris paribus, share prices will rise the 
moment the information is released. 
Alternatively, in terms of Klein and Bawa (1976), the 
reduction in estimation risk will cause investors to place 
greater weight on those shares in their portfolios than they 
did previously, thus driving the prices of these shares up. 
The information release will have the same effect on risk 
estimation in each of the separate cases of target rate of 
return, target debt-equity ratio and target dividend payout 
ratio. The hypothesis developed in accordance with 
estimation risk theory is stated below. 
2.2 Hypothesis 
On the first occasion on which a company reports the 
specified financial targets, there will be an increase in 
its share price. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 80 
CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.0 RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
3.1 Rational expectations 
Investors form expectations about future events. 1 While 
each investor may have his own expectations, it is the 
expectations of investors in aggregate (the market) that are 
impounded into the share price. These expectations are 
developed from both firm-specific and environmental 
information available to the market. Significant events 
may alter the perceptions of investors and so alter tne 
value of the firm. However, as Miller (1981, p301) puts 
it, what matters is not so much what actually happens as the 
difference between what actually happens and what was 
expected to happen. 
As the financial targets are important inputs to the free 
cash flow model, 2 investors will develop expectations as to 
what the targets are likely to be. Based on the 
information available to them, they will also estimate an 
optimal rate of return, an optimal debt-equity ratio and an 
optimal dividend payout ratio for the firms in which they 
are interested. 
1
Rational expectations are informed predictions of future events, which are neither perfect nor 
all the same (Muth, 1961). 
2 . 
See chapter 1, section 2.0 
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If, once reported, a firm's targets are identical to 
expectations, the report is confirmatory only and it will 
have no impact on the share price. Possible share price 
impacts where one of the reported targets differs from 
expectations are illustrated below by reference to each of 
the three targets under study. 
If the reported target debt-equity ratio differs from that 
on which expectations are based, the share price effect is 
dependent on whether the reported target is closer to or 
further away from the perceived optimal debt-equity ratio 
than the expected ratio. For example, if the reported 
target debt-equity ratio is higher (lower) than expected, 
there is a positive (negative) effect on the share price if 
the reported target is closer to (further from) the 
perceived optimum than was the expected ratio. 
If the reported target dividend payout ratio is higher 
(lower) than that on which expectations are based, this may 
signify a reduction (increase) in the funds available for 
reinvestment, relative to what was expected. The impact of 
this information would depend on investors' views on the 
firm's cost of capital. Where the cost of capital is 
higher than the return on marginal investment, a higher 
payout would be welcomed as investors could earn higher 
returns on the funds than could the management. Conversely, 
if the cost of capital is lower than the return on marginal 
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investment, a higher payout would not be welcomed as the 
management would be passing up wealth-creating investment 
opportunities. Similar reasoning applies to a target 
payout ratio which is lower than that on which expectations 
are based. 
The above effects may be confounded to some extent by a 
clientele effect. If the reported target rate of return 
differs from that on which expectations are based, this may 
indicate that the firm will become more (less) risky and/or 
that it is going to earn a higher (lower) rate of return. 
Given that the firm's existing clientele has chosen it on 
the basis of its expected return and risk, such a change may 
imply a change in clientele. 
If there is equilibrium before the targets are reported, the 
reporting and consequent change in clientele would cause 
increased trading volume, but would affect neither the share 
price nor the dispersion of share price changes. However, 
if the change in clientele is costly (for example, through 
transaction costs) and leads investors to suspect that 
management may later force another change in clientele, a 
negative impact on the share price may be observed. For 
the purpose of this thesis it is assumed that the trading 
costs are not sufficiently large to affect the mean share 
price. If a mismatch between a firm and its clientele is 
revealed by reporting the financial targets, and the match 
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is improved by this reporting, the share price could either 
increase or decrease. 
3.2 Summary 
As neither the expectations nor the optima referred to in 
this section can be specified, there is no way of predicting 
either the magnitude or the direction of the impact on a 
firm's share price even if it reports only one of the three 
targets. It can be said, however, that where the reported 
targets cause revised expectations, shares will change hands 
causing an increase in trading volume. 3 
Thus, from a rational expectations viewpoint, if a firm 
reports targets for one or more of the three variables, 
there is likely to be an increase in trading volume, but it 
is not possible to specify unequivocally the expected effect 
on the share price. Individual share prices will change, 
with some moving upwards and some downwards. Thus, while 
the effect on the mean cannot be predicted, the considerable 
movement in share prices will increase the dispersion of 
share price changes around the mean. This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
3 
This situation should be clearly distinguished from the possible i~cts in terms of the other 
two theories in this chapter, namely the estimation risk and signalling theories, both of which lead 
to a positive effect on the share price. 
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3.3 Hypothesis 
On the first occasion on which companies report the 
specified financial targets, there will be considerable 
movement in the individual share prices of these companies. 
This will manifest itself in a greater dispersion of share 
price changes, but there may be no effect on the mean of the 
share prices of the reporting companies. 
4.0 SIGNALLING 
In this section, the criteria for signalling are first 
identified, followed by a consideration of signalling 
extensions, Verrechia's (1983) discretionary disclosure 
model and the veracity of signals. The reporting of 
financial targets, a potential signalling mechanism, is then 
examined in the context of this coverage. Finally, the 
section is summarised and the hypothesis stated. 
4.1 Signalling criteria 
The signalling role arises where one of the contracting 
parties has more information than the other (that is, 
information asymmetry) and there is an incentive for the 
former to communicate some or all of this information to the 
latter. In the field of accounting and finance, signalling 
generally arises where the management of a firm has more 
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information than do investors or potential investors. 
Information asymmetry exists in a market which is efficient 
in the weak or semistrong form but not in one which is 
efficient in the strong form. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) point to potential rewards to 
management for the exaggeration of positive qualities and 
argue that the costliness or impossibility of verification 
by investors prevents direct information transfer. Rather, 
the information'transfer takes place through the observation 
of actions, which, as Leland and Pyle (1977, p371) put it, 
"speak louder than words". The observer is then required 
to interpret the signal conveyed by the action. 
There are many examples of information transfer by 
signalling through the actions of the party with the 
information advantage, such as signalling by workers to 
employers through the acquisition of education (Spence, 
1973), by the owner of a firm to providers of capital 
through demonstrated willingness to invest in his/her own 
projects (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and by management to 
investors through altering the capital structure (Ross, 
1977) . 
Copeland and Weston (1988, p502) refer to the choice by 
management of real financial variables such as financial 
leverage or dividend policy to send unambiguous signals to 
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investors regarding the future performance of the firm. 
These signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms 
because such firms do not have sufficient cash flow to meet 
the attendant commitments such as the debt servicing costs 
or the dividend payout and because managers have incentives 
to tell the truth. There is no equilibrium without 
management incentives to signal truthfully. 4 
Another signalling condition is that the information 
ultimately sought by the outsider is not directly 
observable. In Spence (1973), the employer cannot observe 
the individual's productive capacity at the time of hiring. 
The individual possesses many personal characteristics which 
are observable; some are fixed and others are alterable. 
Those observable characteristics which are subject to 
manipulation at the discretion of the individual are 
potential signals which may convey information relating to 
the unobservable characteristic. For example, the 
acquisition of education (an observable, alterable 
characteristic) is a signal relating to personal productive 
capacity (an unobservable characteristic). 
Signalling will not be undertaken unless the benefits to be 
derived from signalling exceed the signalling costs. 
4
rhe veracity of signals is considered in section 4.4; signals are assll!led to be truthful in 
sections 4.1 through 4.3. 
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Applying the benefit/cost criterion can result in 
unintentional signalling, as illustrated in Spence's (1973) 
job market example. He argues that an individual need not 
think of himself as signalling, but will incur the costs of 
education (the signalling costs) provided that there is 
likely to be an adequate return in terms of the offered wage 
schedule. 
Three recently reported studies (Healy and Palepu, 1988 and 
1990; Asquith, Healy and Palepu, 1989) are pertinent. 
These relate to dividend initiations, share issues and share 
splits. In each case, the announcement of the action to be 
taken by management is found to have fnf ormation content as 
evidenced by the average share price reaction. 
The dividend initiations result in an average market 
adjusted increase in share price, and the firms in question 
subsequently realise earnings increases. The share splits 
have a similar effect on share price, and these firms 
subsequently sustain the earnings growth experienced prior 
to the splits. The share issues cause an average negative 
risk-adjusted return, and this is associated with 
subsequently increased equity betas and increased earnings 
volatility. The authors maintain that pre-existing 
management forecasts can be inf erred from the post 
announcement earnings patterns and that investors interpret 
---~-------------------~-~-·- -
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each of the three actions as a signal whereby management 
communicates this superior information. 
According to the signalling criteria reviewed above, 
management signals superior information in its possession at 
its discretion and when it has the incentive to do so. It 
is suggested that these criteria are met in the dividend 
initiations and in the share splits studies, but not in the 
share issues study. In that study, the issue of equity by 
management does not appear to constitute a signal. The 
authors acknowledge that management is likely to issue 
equity only once it has exhausted retained earnings and 
external debt (see Myers and Majluf, 1984). The issue is 
thus a financing decision made in a manner consistent with 
the pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984). While 
management possesses superior information regarding the 
riskiness of future earnings, it would not choose to signal 
this information. Management thus has neither the 
discretion nor the intent to signal. Even if unintentional 
signalling were argued, management would not have used the 
equity issue as a signalling device unless the expected 
benefits were estimated to exceed the signalling costs. It 
appears most unlikely that the benefits would exceed the 
costs in this situation. It is submitted that the use of 
the term "signal" in this instance goes beyond the meaning 
intended in signalling theory. 
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4.2 Signalling extensions 
The ambit of signalling has been extended beyond the 
financial policy actions cited above. Patell (1976, p274) 
observes that the act of voluntarily committing the firm to 
a prediction of earnings per share may convey information 
separate from the numerical value predicted. He finds that 
the announcement of the prediction is accompanied by an 
immediate upward price revision, on average, which is 
relatively insensitive to the relation between the predicted 
value and other available forecasts. In other words, it 
appears that management is signalling through the act of 
releasing the forecast, as distinct from the earnings 
estimate in the forecast. It also appears that the signal 
has a positive share price impact. 
In an analytical paper, Trueman (1986) seeks to explain why 
managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts. He argues 
that managers should be indifferent to the release of 
forecasts as the actual earnings will be reported after the 
end of the period, so that the sole effect of releasing the 
forecast is to bring the information release forward. 
However, if the manager's objective is to maximise the value 
of the firm and he is in control of the production decision, 
he may be motivated to issue an earnings forecast as soon as 
he acquires new, pertinent information (subject to 
disclosure costs). His motivation would be to signal his 
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ability to anticipate future changes in the firm's economic 
environment and to adjust the firm's production plan 
accordingly. 
In terms of Trueman's (1986) analysis, managers would be 
prepared to release forecasts whether they are higher or 
lower than expected earnings. As good news forecasts and 
bad news forecasts are equally likely to be released in 
Trueman's model, the average price cha~ge at the time of 
forecast release will depend entirely on the information 
conveyed with the signal relating to managers' abilities ~o 
anticipate changes and adjust plans. Although the market 
value of a firm will fall if the earnings forecast conveys 
bad news, its market value when the actual earnings are 
reported will be higher than it would have been if the bad 
news had not been disclosed before the earnings 
announcement. 
The empirical prediction arising from the above is that the 
average share price change at the time of the forecast 
release should be positive. The prediction is consistent 
with the empirical results reported by Patell (1976), Penman 
(1980) and Waymire (1984). Trueman's (1986) analysis 
offers an alternative to Penman's (1980) suggestion that the 
positive share price change observed in his study is due to 
managers' bias toward reporting good news. On the other 
hand, Trueman's explanation is also consistent with Patell's 
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(1976) suggestion that the act of releasing the forecast (as 
distinct from the content) has information content. The 
act of releasing the forecast is thus a signalling device 
for management. 5 
Signalling through actions has developed because direct 
information transfer lacks credibility. There are, 
however, several studies in which direct disclosure is the 
signalling device. Hughes (1986) is concerned with the 
communication of inside information by direct disclosure, 
which is used by investors to infer firm value. Gonedes 
(1978) considers situations where management signals through 
.the disclosure of extraordinary items. In a study by 
Verrechia (1983), the information disclosed is a signal 
which reveals the true liquidating value of the risky asset. 
Verrechia's paper will be considered further in the next 
section with a view to suggesting when management is likely 
to disclose. 
4.3 Decision to disclose 
As in the case of pure action signalling, management will 
5
1n a study on forecast credibility, Pownall and Waymire C1989) test the Trueman (1986) model and 
are unable to detect the positive impact which he hypothesises. Although Lev and Pennan (1990) 
acknowledge this attempt, they nevertheless suggest Trueman's (1986) description of voluntary 
disclosure as a worthwhile avenue of investigation. Trueman's (1986) hypothesis thus remains an open 
empirical question. 
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incur the signalling costs if the associated benefits exceed 
those costs. Verrechia (1983) suggests that a manager's 
decision on whether to disclose or not depends on how 
traders interpret the absence of that disclosure, while 
traders' conjecture about the content of the withheld 
information depends upon the manager's motivation for 
withholding it. 6 Given that traders know that the manager 
has the information, the manager may either disclose or 
withhold information, which is a signal about the true 
liquidating value of the asset he manages. If the manager 
reports what he observes, the firm's asset value will be 
reduced by the disclosure-related cost. 
Verrechia extends the disclosure-related cost beyond the 
administrative costs of preparing, printing and 
disseminating information to include the cost associated 
with disclosing information which may be proprietary in 
nature and therefore potentially d . 7 amag1ng. The 
proprietary costs may be determined by such factors as the 
level of competition, the political sensitivity of the 
company's business or the strength of the labour movement. 
He subsequently refers to disclosure-related cost as 
6 
The term "traders" is that used by Verrechia (1983); while this is regarded as the equivalent of 
"investors" for the purposes of this thesis; the original term is used to preserve the integrity of 
his model. 
7 
This is consistent with the reference to disclosure-related costs in chapter 2, section 5.2. 
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proprietary cost. If it is assumed that the benefits to be 
derived from reporting are constant across firms and that 
administrative costs are low and non-differentiated, the 
proprietary costs drive the disclosure decision. 
While a proprietary cost may be associated with the release 
of information unfavourable to the firm, Verrechia points 
out that this may be equally true of favourable information 
where the stakeholder or a competitor may be able to use the 
information in a way which is harmful to the firm's 
prospects. Proprietary cost introduces ambiguity; when a 
manager withholds information, traders are unsure whether 
the information is bad news, or good news which is not 
sufficiently favourable to justify the proprietary cost. 
Proprietary costs thus provide a basis for explaining 
management's exercise of discretion in the decision to 
disclose. In the absence of any proprietary cost, or as 
proprietary cost approaches zero, a manager follows a policy 
of full disclosure. He does this in the knowledge that if 
he does not disclose, traders will interpret the absence of 
disclosure as bad news. As the proprietary costs increase, 
the manager is able to exercise discretion as traders will 
react less negatively in recognition of the costs associated 
with the disclosure. The level of the proprietary cost 
thus determines a disclosure threshold up to which 
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management has discretion. Thereafter, management must 
disclose. 
Chow, Haddad and Hirst (1989) use an experimental laboratory 
study to test some of the elements of disclosure models. 
When disclosure cost was zero, all managers withheld bad and 
very bad news. Although the investors price-protected 
themselves when the manager withheld news, it was clear ex 
post that the penalty imposed was too small to induce the 
disclosure of bad news. When disclosure cost was positive, 
all managers disclosed very good news, only four out of ten 
disclosed good news and there were lower penalties for 
nondisclosure than in the previous scenario. The behaviour 
under zero disclosure cost is not as expected. However, 
when there are disclosure costs, the disclosure threshold 
and the exercise of management discretion conform with 
Verrechia's model. 
Although this section contains references to mechanisms 
supporting the veracity of these signals, such veracity has 
largely been assumed. This aspect is considered in 
section 4.4. 
4.4 Veracity of signals 
Investors will act on a signal if it is perceived to be 
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true. 8 Underlying Verrechia's (1983) model of 
discretionary disclosure are assumptions that the manager's 
objective is to maximise shareholders' wealth and that 
management cannot misrepresent. The issues of motivation 
and credibility are thus avoided. In Trueman's {1986) 
model, motivation is assured by the assumption that the 
manager's remuneration is linked to the end-of period value 
of the firm. Trueman avoids the credibility issue by 
assuming that ex post verification prevents false 
disclosures. Gonedes (1978) does not consider signalling 
veracity directly either. 
The basic premise is that a financial signal is credible 
communication of inside information because the signal is 
costly and the marginal cost of false signalling exceeds the 
marginal benefit. A number of studies do, however, 
identify protections against false signals. It should be 
noted that some of these protections are situation-specific 
and cannot automatically be assumed to apply in a given 
situation. The arguments presented in several of these 
studies are reviewed below. 
8 
Truth or honesty in signalling should be distinguished from signalling reliability. A signal 
may be truthful yet unreliable relative to the unobservable attributes of interest. 
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Settling up in the managerial labour market 
Fama (1980) argues that the previous associations of a 
manager with success and failure provide information about 
his talents in the managerial labour market. Management's 
future remuneration, in the form of rental rates for human 
capital signalled by the managerial labour market, is likely 
to depend on the success or failure of the firm. In 
conformity with portfolio theory, the individual investor· 
diversifies his interests. While this diversification 
ensures that he has no strong interest in the management of 
a particular firm, he does have a strong interest in the 
efficient pricing of the firm's securities by the capital 
market. The signals about the values of the firm's 
securities are thus likely to be important inputs to the 
managerial labour market in revaluing the firm's management. 
Pressures on managers to perform are provided by the fact 
that the firm is always in the market for new managers, 
there is internal monitoring of managers by managers and the 
realisation that the managerial labour market uses firm 
performance to determine managerial remuneration. A 
manager is thus likely to suffer adverse consequences for 
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providing false information to the market in an attempt to 
influence security pricing. 9 
Requisite cash flows 
When managements signal by taking observable financial 
action such as the issue of debt securities to the market 
(Ross, 1977) or the payment of dividends (Bhattacharya, 
1979), the company must have the cash flow to meet the 
obligations involved. As unsuccessful firms do not have 
the cash flow to sustain the debt servicing costs or the 
dividend payments, they cannot mimic signals of this nature 
because they do not have the cash flow to sustain the debt 
servicing costs or the dividend payments. Based on this 
reasoning, investors ascribe credibility to the signals. 
Prohibitions against insider trading 
The managers of successful firms also have incentives to 
9 
The timing of the consequences will be determined by the circumstances. It is possible that 
the manager can escape the consequences in the short term, but it is less likely over the medium to 
long term. It has been suggested that an older manager near the end of his managerial career may be 
able to avoid the consequences as there is no future career to be affected by the settling up. 
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tell the truth as prohibitions against insider trading may 
prevent them from profiting from issuing false signals 
(Copeland and Weston, 1988, p502). 
The SEC Act 
Hughes (1986) builds a model which approximates the 
situation prevailing at an initial public offering. By 
means of contingent contracts a third party (the issuing 
bank) warrants statements made. Hughes suggests that 
direct disclosure about a firm's value on the occasion of an 
initial public offering is credible to investors because the 
issuer is penalised if the ex post costlessly observable 
cash flow indicates that the disclosure was fraudulent. In 
this situation, investors can claim damages for the issuing 
firm's fraudulent·or misleading statements or the omission 
of material information, under certain conditions, in terms 
of the SEC Act. 
Conclusion 
In the preceding paragraphs, the arguments in supporting 
truthful signalling are: 
* The marginal cost of false signalling exceeds the 
marginal benefit. 
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* Ex post settling up in the managerial labour market. 
* Management cannot act where the firm does not have the 
cash flow to support the action. 
* There are prohibitions against insider trading. 
* There may be a damages claim in terms of the SEC Act 
4.5 Signalling through financial targets 
In this section, the preceding consideration of signalling 
is related specifically to the reporting of financial 
targets in the South African context. First, it is 
established that the reporting of financial targets meets 
the signalling criteria. Thereafter, signalling through 
the act of reporting and through the content is considered. 
This is followed by the decision to report and the veracity 
of these signals. 
Signalling criteria 
Where management has formulated financial targets, a 
potential signalling situation arises. By virtue of having 
formulated the targets, management has information which 
investors do not have. This information asymmetry is 
likely to apply to a greater or lesser extent to all listed 
companies. It appears reasonable to assume that the 
managements of most, if not all, listed companies make 
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financial decisions with these targets in mind. The extent 
to which they are explicitly formulated as corporate targets 
is likely to vary. In some companies the financial targets 
may be used as informal, unwritten guidelines, while in 
others, they may be formally agreed and documented. It 
also appears reasonable to assume that those companies most 
likely to report their financial targets would fall into the 
latter category. 
Underlying the financial targets which form the focus of 
this study are the dividend, capital structure and 
investment decisions in terms of which management takes 
action. As pointed out above, these actions are primary 
signalling devices which will be construed as signals where 
the relevant criteria are met. There are, however, two 
other potential information flows relating to these three 
decisions. A formal announcement always precedes a dividend 
payout and the issue of debt or equity. A formal 
announcement also frequently precedes a decision to invest. 
Reporting the target variables adds a third point of 
information release which may affect the share price. The 
three potential information flows are indicated in 
chronological order in table 3.1 below. 
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TABLE 3.1 THREE POTENTIAL INFORMATION FLOWS 
ReEort target Announcement Management 
variables action 
Dividend Dividend payout Pay dividend 
payout ratio 
Debt-equity Debt or equity Issue debt or 
ratio issue equity 
Rate of Investment Invest 
return 
In the absence of earlier announcements by management, the 
actions shown above are the sort of actions ref erred to by 
Leland and Pyle (1977, p371) through which management 
signals. Where there is a preceding announcement, the 
force of the signal may be transferred to the announcement 
date. 10 By effectively making policy statements through 
reporting the target variables, management may be able to 
provide broad signals at a still earlier point in time. 
Signalling through the act of reporting 
As noted in section 4.1, Patell (1976) raises the 
possibility that voluntary forecasts carry a message 
separate and distinct from the numbers being reported, while 
Trueman (1986) builds a disclosure model based on signalling 
10
rhis is illustrated, for example, by the three studies cited in section 4.1 above, namely, 
Healy and Palepu (1988 and 1990) and Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989). 
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through the act of voluntarily releasing forecasts. The 
act of reporting financial targets could signal that. 
management has an enlightened attitude to external 
stakeholders in that it is prepared to provide key 
information voluntarily. On the assumption that management 
is able to report only on the basis of targets rooted in 
strategic plans, the reporting could signal a company which 
undertakes strategic planning. This could, in turn, imply 
other things such as a well managed company and/or a 
sophisticated management. This is similar to Trueman's 
(1986) assertion that the act of releasing the forecast 
tells investors something about the manager's ability. 
Signalling through the content 
A full statement of financial targets as defined in this 
study comprises the target rate of return, the target 
dividend payout ratio and the target debt-equity ratio. 
Patell (1976, p274) notes that, apart from the upward price 
revision that accompanies the act of forecast release, there 
are longer range cumulative effects which appear to be 
consistent with the relation between the predicted value of 
of the earnings number and other estimates of market 
expectations. A similar distinction applies to Trueman's 
(1986) model. In neither study is the information content 
of the management forecast denied, but it is the act and not 
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the content which provides the signal. By contrast, in 
Verrechia (1983), Hughes (1986) and Gonedes (1978), the 
signal is 
disclosed11 . 
provided entirely through the information 
The content of the statement of financial targets may thus 
also carry one or more signals, but the force of the 
signal(s) is strengthened by the direct link with the 
management actions listed in table 3.1 above, namely the 
payment of dividends, the issue of securities or the making 
of an investment. Management is able in this way to signal 
information pertinent to the. share price by providing 
insights into its intended actions and into its view on 
future prospects. 
The statement of financial targets also provides a framework 
which may serve to assist investors with their ex post 
interpretations of these intended actions. This is 
particularly important where management takes an action 
which is not intended as a signal, especially if the 
relevant variable temporarily moves outside the policy 
framework as a result of that action. If this action were 
interpreted as a signal, it could have an inappropriate 
effect on the share price. Management should be able to 
11 
This applies insofar as Gonedes (1978> is concerned with extraordinary items. 
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avoid misinterpretations of this nature by publishing a 
statement of financial targets. 
As indicated above, while (signalling through) the voluntary 
reporting of financial targets involves an element of direct 
disclosure, there is a strong and direct link with the 
related management actions. This is therefore essentially 
a hybrid form of signalling; there is a strong similarity 
with action signalling while there is also an element of 
direct disclosure signalling. 
Decision to signal through financial targets 
Verrechia's (1983) model provides a good basis for analysing 
the signalling aspect · of this study. As investing, 
financing and the payment of dividends are central to the 
financial management of any company, investors in a company 
would know that the management has information on the 
applicable targets and constraints. The disclosure 
threshold (level of disclosure-related costs) is central to 
any attempt to explain the decision to report or to withhold 
the information. 
In terms of this model, the nonreporting companies do not 
report because they have not formally set financial targets 
and constraints, or the information is bad news which would 
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adversely affect the share price, or the information is good 
news, but the disclosure-related costs are estimated to 
exceed the beneficial effect on the share price. If it is 
assumed that most companies have formulated at least some 
view on the policy variables, a high disclosure threshold 
provides a potential explanation where relatively few 
L _______ - --------
companies report their financial targets. If the 
disclosure threshold is assumed to be low, the share prices 
of the nonreporting companies would be adversely affected. 
Veracity of these signals 
The question is whether the arguments in section 4.4 above 
can be said to apply specifically to the reporting of 
financial targets in the South African environment. The 
first issue is whether these protections operate in relation 
to the reporting of financial targets. The second is 
whether these protections are operable in the South African 
environment. 
To assess a manager's performance, conformity of the firm's 
performance with the stated targets must be verified ex 
post. 12 Although the performance may take some time to 
12
1t should be noted that a difference between the outcomes and the stated targets is not 
necessarily evidence of false signalling. 
____ _J 
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feed back, adherence to the leverage and dividend targets is 
observable by calculating the relevant ratios ex post on the 
same basis on which the targets were stated. The rate of 
return is not as easy to monitor. The actual returns in 
any one period result from a number of investment decisions 
which may have been taken in several different prior periods 
owing to the time lags between decision and implementation, 
and between implementation and fruition. This makes it 
more difficult to establish a direct connection between the 
target and subsequent performance. 
The circumstances surrounding the reporting of the financial 
targets are not comparable with the initial public offering 
described by Hughes (1986) and no sanctions similar to those 
imposed by the SEC legislation apply in South Africa. 
Further, the financial targets are reported in a section of 
the annual report which falls outside the ambit of the 
financial reporting 
Companies Act. 13 
and attestation sections of the 
Although the provisions in the Companies Act (s229-s233 and 
s224) relating to insider trading and its regulation have 
13 
In terms of s286 of the Companies Act, the directors are required to present annual financial 
statements comprising balance sheet and related notes, income statement and related notes, directors' 
report and auditors' report. In terms of s300 and s301, the auditor is required to audit and report 
on these statements. Financial targets generally appear in the chairman's statement or similar, 
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been in place for fifteen years, they appear to have been 
inadequate as there has been no prosecution over that period 
(Botha, 1989). However, it is important to note that the 
absence of a prosecution does not necessarily prove that the 
provisions have been completely ineffectual. It is thus 
argued that even though insider trading may be less 
stringently monitored on the JSE than it is in the United 
States, the legal provisions nevertheless act as some form 
of deterrent. 
With the exception of the SEC legislation, all of the 
protections against false signalling apply in this study. 
It is therefore concluded that the veracity of the signals 
conveyed by the voluntary reporting of financial targets and 
constraints is reasonably assured. 
4.6 summary 
Where there is asymmetric information between management and 
investors about the value of the firm, management will 
signal provided that the benefits exceed the signalling 
costs. The attribute of ultimate interest to the investor 
is unobservable. Management is able to signal through 
alterable, observable attributes at its discretion and it 
communicates by signalling because investors may regard 
direct information transfer as suspect and difficult or 
costly to verify. Where the signal is effective, investors 
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respond to its information content and the benefit shows 
itself in an improved share price. 
Early examples of corporate signalling involved actions 
exclusively related to real financial variables, with 
consequential cash flow obligations to be met by the 
signalling firm. Subsequently, the range of signalling 
devices has been extended to include other actions (such as 
forecast releases) and direct d~sclosure, neither of which 
categories necessarily have direct cash flow implications~ 
The initial reporting of financial targets may be regarded 
as a hybrid between action signalling and direct disclosure 
signalling. The statement of targets links directly with 
the relevant actions, the act of reporting is a signal, and 
the reported content conveys a signal. 
When management signals, the expected effect on the share 
price is positive. The term "signal" has, however, also 
been used in the literature to describe an action or a 
statement by management which has resulted in a decrease in 
the share price. The explanation for management taking 
action which results in a decrease in the share price 
probably lies elsewhere. The use of the term "signal" may 
accurately reflect the investor's interpretation in that the 
observable action provides information relating to the 
unobservable characteristic. In this situation, as 
management essentially has no discretion in the matter, does 
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not choose to communicate through this action and the 
benefit/cost trade-off does not appear to be favourable, the 
management action in question is not regarded in this study 
as a signalling action. Where a manager makes a statement 
aimed at reducing the security price, the primary cause may 
again lie 14 Signals generally involve or elsewhere . are 
linked to action, while negative announcements are not. 
Verrechia (1983) shows that discretionary reporting 
precludes negative signals in most cases. A case against 
the notion of negative signalling has been made. However, 
even if negative signals were admitted, it is most likely 
that, in the mix of positive and negative signals, the 
positive signals would predominate. 
The initial reporting of financial targets· meets the 
signalling criteria examined in this chapter. This 
provides strong support for a positive effect on the share 
price when the financial targets are reported. 
Accordingly, a positive impact on the share price is 
hypothesised below. 
14 
A management statement aimed at reducing the share price may be in response to a stock exchange 
enquiry, or it may accompany a management action unrelated to signalling. It is also possible that 
the statement has been made to preserve a signalling reputation. 
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4.7 Hypothesis 
When a company signals by reporting the specified financial 
targets, there will be an increase in its share price. 
5.0 CREDIBILITY 
Although the statement of financial targets is contained in 
the annual report, it is provided voluntarily and is not 
subject to the statutory protections promoting the 
verifiability or reliability of reported information. 15 In 
terms of the three hypotheses, the reporting of financial 
targets is expected to affect the share prices of the 
reporting companies. However, the information content of 
the disclosure is likely to be discounted if its credibility 
is perceived to be low, so reducing or nullifying the share 
price effect. 
The credibility issue potentially affects the share price 
impact under any or all of the three hypotheses. It 
therefore requires attention notwithstanding the strong 
arguments supporting the veracity of signals which were 
brought in sections 4.4 and 4.5. Further, the support for 
15
see the subsection entitled "veracity of these signals" in section 4.5. 
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the veracity of signals, while strong, is based 
analytical studies. 
on 
Pownall and Waymire (1989), observe that previous findings 
to the effect that voluntary management forecasts have 
information content (see for example; Patell, 1976; Penman, 
1980; Waymire, 1984) suggest that traders regard them as at 
least partially credible. Using voluntarily released 
forecasts, Pownall and Waymire (1989) test their credibility 
by comparing the share price impact with that of the fully 
audited mandatory earnings announcements with documented 
stock price effects. They conclude that the overall 
results do not indicate that management forecasts are 
discounted relative to earnings announcements. 
Two points should be acknowledged. First, the study 
applies to management forecasts. Although the forecasts 
are not audited, it is reasonable to assume that 
management's knowledge that a fully audited, mandated 
release providing a basis for comparison shortly after the 
end of the period would influence their reporting. It is 
also reasonable to assume that investors would take this 
probable influence into account when assessing the 
credibility of a forecast. As mentioned in section 4.5 
above, while the monitoring of reported targets is feasible, 
it is not as direct. Second, the differences between the 
USA and the South African environments should be noted. 
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However, an important difference currently prevailing does 
not apply when considering the Pownall and Waymire (1989) 
results as the tests were done over a period when there were 
no USA regulations covering management forecasts. With due 
regard to the differences, the results of these empirical 
studies, and in particular, the Pownall and Waymire (1989) 
study, reinforce the share price impact predicted in the 
three hypotheses. 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
Three theories have been examined in this chapter with a 
view to predicting and explaining the possible effect on 
share prices of reporting the financial targets and 
constraints specified in this study. 
In terms of estimation risk theory and signalling theory, it 
is hypothesised that there will be an increase in the share 
price of the reporting company on the first occasion on 
which the specified targets are reported. In terms of 
rational expectations theory, it is hypothesised that on the 
first occasion on which the targets are reported, there 
will be considerable movement in the individual share prices 
of the reporting companies. This will manifest itself in a 
greater level of dispersion of share price changes, but 
there may be no effect on the mean of the share prices of 
the reporting companies. 
-----------------------------------
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The three theories are not mutually exclusive and all may 
apply simultaneously to a greater or lesser extent. It 
will not be possible to establish which of the three 
theories is dominant. The voluntary reporting of financial 
targets and constraints should affect either the mean of 
share price or the dispersion of share price changes or 
both. The null hypotheses can therefore be state as: 
* The voluntary reporting of financial targets has no 
effect on the mean share price. 
* The voluntary reporting of financial targets has no 
effect on the variance of share price. 
The rejection of either of these null hypotheses will imply 
that the reporting of financial targets affects share 
prices. The rejection of the first null hypothesis will 
furthermore imply that the effect on share prices is 
positive. The research · methodology for testing these 
hypotheses is developed in chapter 4. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on three key variables, all of which 
relate to central elements of financial strategy. They are 
the target rate of return, the target debt ratio and the 
target dividend payout ratio. Disclosure of these 
variables is not mandatory either directly in terms of the 
Companies Act or in terms of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice. Companies reporting financial targets and 
constraints thus do so voluntarily. 
In developing a reporting strategy, financial managers n~ed 
to establish whether users, and in particular, investors, 
use this information and to what extent. Four possible 
methods for researching this area were examined in chapter 2 
(namely laboratory experiments, questionnaires, interviews 
and market studies). It has been noted that a disadvantage 
common to these methods is the necessity to assume a linkage 
between the information gathered and the action taken in the 
market place. Nonetheless, of the four methods, only the 
share market study provides the potential to link the 
information provided with the investment decision taken, 
through its impact on the share price. 
to use a market study in this thesis. 1 
Hence the decision 
1 
Although interviews with senior executives of reporting and a saq:>le of nonreporting c~nies 
potentially offered valuable insights to the market study, it was decided not to pursue this after 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The hypotheses developed in chapter 3 are all expressed in 
terms of potential share price impact. Clearly, with the 
multiplicity of influences which may affect the share price 
of a company at any one time, considerable attention to the 
research methodology is required to ensure the researcher's 
confidence that an impact on the share price is caused by 
the voluntary reporting under study. 
The research methodology is summarised in section 2.0. 
Supporting explanations and references are generally 
deferred to sections 3.0, 4.0, 6.0 and 7.0 in which each of 
the major elements of the research methodology is examined 
and justified. The data are described in section 5.0. 
2.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research takes the form of an event study of the 
information content type (Bowman, 1983). The event is the 
first occasion on which information relating to one or more 
of the three financial targets becomes publicly available. 
The focus is on the mean effect of the information on the 
returns of securities. To eliminate market-wide effects, 
excess returns are calculated. As the sign of the excess 
(footnote Continued) 
conducting a set of nine pilot interviews. This decision and the supporting reasons are reported in 
chapter 2, section 6.3. 
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returns is central to the hypotheses based on estimation 
risk and signalling, a directional test is required. A 
nondirectional test is appropriate for the hypothesis based 
on rational expectations as the central issue is the extent 
of the variation of returns irrespective of the sign. 2 To 
test this hypothesis, the variability ratio is calculated. 
This provides a ratio of the variability in the event week 
relative to the average variability in the estimation 
period. 
Actual returns are calculated from weekly observations of 
share prices and of the index during the test period and 
from four-weekly observations during the estimation period. 
The logarithms of the price relatives are used rather than 
traditional returns. Sixty four-weekly returns are 
calculated in the estimation period and fifty one weekly 
returns in the test period. 
The market model and a simplified version of the market 
model are used as return-generating models. The alpha (a) 
and beta (B) parameters for each company have been estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression. The relatively 
short interval during the test period provides greater 
precision in examining the effect of the information event. 
2 
As has been noted above (chapter 3, section 6.0), a significant positive illl>Sct in the 
directional test will also support this hypothesis. 
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The longer interval during the estimation period diminishes 
the potential for bias in the estimated parameters of the 
market model which may result from nonsynchronous trading. 
Two further control procedures are used to counter 
confounding effects. One control is the performance of the 
experimental group in a period comparable to the test period 
(the internal control group). The other control is the 
performance of a group of companies matched by industry and 
by annual report release date (the external control group). 
3.0 EVENT DATE 
The event is the first occasion on which information 
relating to one or more of the financial targets becomes 
publicly available. As the vehicle for the dissemination 
of this information is the annual report, the event date is 
estimated by reference to the date on which the information 
in the relevant annual report becomes publicly available. 
Accurate identification of the event date is pivotal if the 
information effect is to be assessed reliably. As this 
allows a smaller "window" to be used than would otherwise be 
the case, there are fewer factors unrelated to the event 
which are capable of affecting the excess returns. This 
greatly increases the power of the statistical tests (Brown 
and Warner, 1980 and 1985) . Reference to a few selected 
research papers which use event studies brings out the 
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increasing attention paid to determining the event date 
accurately. 
In a relatively early event study, Sunder (1973, p13) uses 
the last day of the fiscal year, an apparently arbitrary 
choice, 3 as a broad approximation of the event date. Brown 
(1980, p42) uses the release date of the preliminary 
earnings report. While this date is also an arbitrary 
choice, it is likely to be a closer approximation of the 
event date than is the financial year-end. Stevenson 
(1987, p308) goes to great lengths to establish the precise 
dates on which the information was released in his LiFO 
study. In two studies on the JSE, Knight and 
Affleck-Graves (1983, 1986) similarly take care to establish 
precise dates. The identification of the event date in the 
current study is considered below. 
The date on which the annual report is approved by the 
directors and the date of the auditors' report both appear 
in the annual report. These dates generally coincide, but 
where they do not, the auditors' report is the later. The 
date of the auditors' report was initially selected as the 
event date. It was later rejected as the printing and 
distribution process could cause a significant delay between 
3
rhis apparently arbitrary approximation was to a large extent forced by a lack of sources for 
more accurate dates for most of the accounting changes in Sunder's sample (1973, p13). 
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this date and the date on which the information becomes 
available to investors. 
Another possibility is to request from the officers of each 
company the date on which the annual report was mailed in 
the relevant year. These dates were personally requested 
of the officers of a sample of companies during visits to 
those companies. It appears, however, that an 
approximation was frequently given based on what was thought 
to be the usual mailing date rather than by reference to 
accurate records. This approach is therefore not 
considered satisfactory. 
All listed companies are required to send a specified number 
of copies of their annual reports to the JSE as soon as they 
are available. On a visit to the JSE, it was established 
that a record is kept of the date on which the annual report 
was received at the JSE. This is considered to be the best 
available estimate of the date of the release of the 




This date is defined as the event 
Notwithstanding the care taken to identify the best available estimate, some doubt may remain 
regarding the accuracy of the event date. The identification should nevertheless be sufficiently 
accurate for the purposes of this study as weekly return data are used in the test period. 
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The public availability of the information before the 
release date through leakage is an obvious potential problem 
in information event studies. Although not all the 
managements of the companies concerned were questioned, 
those members of management who were interviewed were 
emphatic that this information was not released before the 
5 annual report release date. Reliance is placed on these 
assurances as there is no means of controlling for leakages 
in this study. 
4.0 MARKET MODEL AND ITS USE 
In terms of the hypotheses developed in chapter 3, the 
reporting of financial targets is expected to affect share 
prices. An observed effect on the share prices of one or 
more companies is not sufficient evidence to support these 
hypotheses as the effect could have been caused by a 
multiplicity of influences. The well-known market model 
provides both the return-generating model and an important 
control in this study. The model and its use in 
calculating abnormal residuals, market adjusted returns and 
variability ratios are described in this section. The need 
for controls, their use in this study and the role of the 
market model in that context are examined in section 7.0. 
5 
This question was put during the pilot interviews mentioned in chapter 2, section 6.3. 
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4.1 Market model 
The market model provides a starting point for 
distinguishing between the impacts which may be traced to 
the information event of interest and other share price 
impacts. This model is stated as follows: 
rit = a. + Birmt + eit' l. 
and 
2 = a , 
Cov(e e ) = o for all s ~ o, it' it-S T 
where: 
rit = return on security i in period t, 
rmt = return on the market in period t, 
eit = residual return on security i in period t, 
a., B. = intercept and slope respectively for security i. 
l. l. 
a. and B. are estimated using ordinary least squares 
l. l. 
regression; these estimates will be referred to as 
and b .. 
l. 




fluctuations in the share price and, from time to time, a 
dividend. The return on a share is thus given by: 
= 
and the return on the market is given by: 
= 
where P = price and D = dividend, and the subscripts have 
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the same role as in the market model equation above. 
The "market" as reflected in the above equations is not 
defined; a surrogate for the market is required to calculate 
market returns and to estimate regression parameters. The 
importance of an acceptable surrogate for the market is well 
recognised (see Roll, 1977). In this context, it should be 
noted that there are in effect two markets incorporated in 
the JSE; the mining market and the industrial market (see 
Gilbertson and Goldberg, 1981). As the study concerns the 
industrial sector, the appropriate surrogate for the market 
is the industrial index rather than the overall index. 6 
Affleck-Graves, Money and Carter (1981) point out that 
returns calculated in terms of the formulae given above are 
non-additive across return intervals but that this is 
overcome by calculating the logarithms of the 
relatives 
log P.t/ p,t 1' e 1 1 -
price 
where loge = the natural logarithm and the other terms have 
the same role as previously. 
6 
As the index is a capital index, it does not include dividends. A gross index including 
dividends was not available and the resources required to construct a gross index specifically for 
this study would not be justified. The potential effect of excluding dividends from the denominator 
is to bias returns and beta upwards, but as there is no reason to expect material bias, the results 
should not be affected. 
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Affleck-Graves et al. (1981) conclude that, with weekly 
returns, the traditional return is almost equal to the 
logarithm of the price relative, but that the latter should 
nevertheless be used on the grounds of its theoretical 
superiority. They further suggest that with increased 
intervals, for example where monthly data are used, the 
potential problem is greater. The logarithms of the price 
relatives have accordingly been used in this study. 
4.2 Abnormal residuals 
The abnormal residual (uit) 7 of the return for any share i 
in period t is the excess return given by: 
uit =fit - ((1/4)ai + bifmt>• 
The expected returns in the test period are calculated by 
inserting the a and B estimates (that is, ai 
each company in the market model equation. 8 
and b.) for 
1 
The expected 
returns are then deducted from the actual returns to arrive 
at the abnormal residuals (uit>• The abnormal residuals 
are summed and divided by the number of companies to arrive 
at the average of the abnormal residuals in each of the 
7 
Note that u. is distinguished from e. (see section 4.1 above). e. is a residual after 
f . . Jt l" . h d" lt ed . h lt. . "od -1tt1ng a regression 1ne using t e or 1nary least squares proc ure 1n t e est1mat1on per1 • u. 
is the residual remaining after deducting the return expected in the test period (which is calculat~ 
by applying the parameters estimated in the estmation period) from the actual return (see Patell, 
1976). 
8
As a is estimated using four-weekly returns in this study, a. is divided by 4 where the market 
1 
model equation is used to calculate the weekly expected returns in the test period. 
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weeks in the test period. This weekly average is a test 
statistic in the directional tests and it forms the basis 
for the test statistic in the nondirectional test. 
4.3 Market adjusted returns 
The weekly average of the market adjusted returns is the 
other test statistic in the directional tests. Market 
adjusted returns are excess returns calculated using a 
simplified, one factor market model which adjusts for the 
market but not for systematic risk. In terms of this 
model, the expected return for any security is assumed to be 
equal to the expected return on the market. Effectively, 
the value of a is assumed to be zero and that of B is 
assumed to be one. Based on the results of a simulated 
event study, Brown and Warner (1980) conclude that market 
adjusted returns are as likely to detect abnormal 
performance correctly as is the market model. 9 The market 
adjusted return of any share i in period t is given by: 
= 
The aggregation and averaging procedures are identical to 
those for abnormal residuals. The reasons for expressing 
the results in terms of market adjusted returns are related 
9 
Brown and Warner (1980) reach this conclusion based on the results of si11a.1lated event study 
using monthly data relating to 250 randomly selected samples of 50 securities each. 
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to the availability of internal control group data (see 
section 7.5). 
4.4 Variability ratios 
A nondirectional test is required for the second of the 
three hypotheses developed in chapter J. 10 The weekly 
average variability ratio is the test statistic for the 
nondirectional test used in this study. The variability 
ratio is a measure of the variability of the returns in the 
event week (as an approximation of the event date) relative 
to the average variability of returns in the estimation 
period. The research method followed is that developed by 
Lobo and Mahmoud (1989, pll9-120), in which they designate 
the variability ratio by wiR" They use this approach to 
investigate the stock return variability at the time of 
annual earnings announcements relative to the amount of 
prior information available about a firm. In this thesis, 
the variability ratio measures the ratio of the event-week 
variance to the estimation period variance of unexpected 
returns for security i. It is a measure of the new 
information conveyed to the market by reporting the 
10 
This hypothesis is restated here for convenience: On the first occasion on which Ce>qlllnies 
report the specified financial targets, there will be considerable movement in the individual share 
prices of those companies. This will manifest itself in a higher Level of dispersion of share price 
changes, but there may be no effect on the mean of the share prices of the reporting Ce>qlllnies. 
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specified financial targets, relative to the average 
information available during the estimation period. 
In Lobo and Mahmoud (1989), a two-day cumulative 
announcement period is involved and daily return intervals 
are used throughout. With a one-week event period and 
weekly returns, there is no cumulation of return variances 
in this study. Accordingly, the expressions have been 
presented in simplified form below. Further, the 
expression for the ci,tt term has been modified as noted 
below, in recognition of the return interval being 
four-weekly in the estimation period while it is weekly in 
the test period. 11 
Lobo and Mahmoud (1989) show that the terms Vit and WiR 
below have expected values equal to zero and variances equal 
to one. A value of WiR greater than zero (the expected 
value) implies that the voluntary reporting conveys more 
than the average amount of information available and vice 
versa. In the computation of WiR' the event-week period 
variance is standardised by the estimation-period variance. 
This avoids problems that may arise from differences in 
variability across firms. In view of the standardisation 
11 
The selection of return intervals is justified in section 6.0. 
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procedure, it is important to emphasise the distinction 
between estimation-period and test-period statistics. 12 
The calculation of the unexpected security returns (or 
abnormal residuals), uit' in the event week (week O) is 
described in sections 4.1 and 4.2 above. The 
assumed to be normally distributed with: 




rmt> = o, 
N = number of firms in the group, 
2 
ai = variance of uiT' 
are 
1/4 is used to adjust from four-weekly to weekly variance, 
ci,tt = {l + l/Ti + (rmt -
where: 
-* 2 2 rm) /(Ti-l)sm }, 
-* c1/4)r , r = m .m 
r = m the mean return (4-weekly) in the estimation period, 
2 
(1/4)am 
2 s = m ' 
2 
T. 
- 2 a ~1( = T=l rmT - rm) /(Ti -1) , m 
T = number of four-week periods in the estimation period 
for firm i. 
12
rhe subscript 7 refers to the estimation period whereas the subscript t refers to the test 
period. For example, u. refers to the residuals in the estimation period while u. refers to the 
. . . 17 . lt 
pred1ct1on residuals (unexpected returns). 
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The ci,tt term reflects the increase in variance owing to 
prediction outside the estimation period. It is a function 
of the sample size used in the estimation process, the 
variance of rm'f' and the distance between -rmt and rm {the 
mean of the rm values used to compute a. and b.). 
1 1 
vit measures the standardised unexpected return for security 
i in the event week and WiR measures the ratio of the event-
week variance to the estimation-period variance: 
1/2 2 1/2 
v
1
.t = {(T. - 4)/(T. - 2)} . u.t /{{l/4)s. c. tt} , 
- 1 1 1 1 1, 
where: 




an estimate of a2 the standard error of market 
model residuals, 
Ti 2 
1/(Ti - 2)'f~ 1 {ri'f - (ai + birm'f) }, 
1/4 of si2 is taken to adjust from four-weekly to 
weekly standard error, 
the number of periods in the event period over 
which return variances are cumulated. As the 
event window in this study is one period only, 
R = 1. 
The aggregation and averaging procedures are identical to 
those for the abnormal residuals (see section 4.2). 
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5.0 DATA 
The experimental group comprises thirty four reporting 
companies (table 4.1). Any company which reports one or 
more of the financial targets is classified as a reporting 
company. Thirty six such companies (two of which were 
excluded from the 
. 13 
identified in 1983 by study) were 
examining the most recent annual reports of all the 
non-mining companies listed on the JSE. 14 The shares of 
all of these companies are listed in the JSE industrial 
sector. The year of the event for each company was 
established by tracing its annual reports retrospectively to 
the year in which the information was first reported. 
The financial targets and constraints reported by the 
companies are summarised in table 4.2. Twenty of the 
thirty four companies reported all of the variables, five 
reported two, and nine companies reported one of the three 
variables. The distribution of the event dates over time 
is given in table 4.3. From 1974 to 1976, one company per 
annum adopted the practice of reporting one or more of the 
13 . • 
The two companies excluded from the study are Amrel and Yorkcor. Amrel reported the variables 
in its first annual report after listing date. As the information had been available from the 
outset, it is not possible to establish the impact of the disclosure in this case. Yorkcor shares 
traded in only 178 weeks out of a total period of 292 weeks. There are consequently insufficient 
data to execute the research method reliably. 
14
The reports were housed in ~he library of the Graduate School of Business of the University of 
Cape Town. 
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variables under study and there were three or more new 
reporting companies each year over the period 1977 to 
1982. 15 As shown in table 4.4, the thirty four shares are 
well distributed over the various sectors within the JSE 
industrial sector. There is thus a reasonable spread of 
companies across industry sectors and across time. This 
means that clustering is unlikely to be problematic in this 
study. 
Twenty five nonreporting companies (table 4.5) were selected 
to form the external control group. By design, the spread 
of companies across sectors and across time is similar to 
that of the experimental group. The external control group 
is smaller than the experimental group because it was not 
possible to find suitable partners for all the reporting 
companies. The use of control groups and the selection of 
control groups for this study are the subject of section 7.0 
below. 
Most of the share price data were obtained from the 
University of Cape Town and from the JSE. Three of .the 
reporting companies were delisted subsequent to the period 
of the study. 16 As a company's share prices are deleted 
from the JSE data bank when it is delisted, the missing 
15 . l . The two rejected companies, Amre and Yorkcor, first reported in 1977 and 1980 respectively. 
16 . 
The three delisted companies are Calan, Scotts Shoes and Dunswart. 
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share price data were obtained by reference to the finance 
section of the Sunday Times. Dividend information was 
obtained from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Monthly 
Bulletin (1971-1975). 
The event week and its equivalent are labelled week o in the 
reported results. The total of 292 weekly share price 
observations captured for each company comprises 146 
observations before week O, the week O observation and 145 
observations thereafter. From these observations, 51 
returns are calculated for the test period, which is centred 
on week O. There are 240 observations in the estimation 
period; 120 before and 120 after the test period. This 
provides 30 four-weekly returns before and 30 four-weekly 
returns after the test period. Market returns are 
similarly calculated from 292 corresponding observations of 
the JSE Actuaries Index (industrial sector). 
6.0 RETURN INTERVAL17 
In information event studies, returns are generally 
calculated for two purposes. One is to facilitate the 
examination of the information effect as expressed in the 
form of abnormal residuals or a similar measure. The other 
17 . l . h . . l l eel The return 1nterva 1s t e time 1nterva a low between observations when calculating returns. 
It is also referred to as the differencing interval or the unit of duration. 
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is to enable the parameters of the market model to be 
estimated. Before the returns can be calculated, it is 
necessary to select the time interval between observations. 
In practice, this usually involves a choice as to monthly, 
weekly or daily intervals between price observations. 
As noted by Foster (1986, p346) and by Morse (1984), earlier 
studies investigating the association between information 
events and security returns used monthly returns. With the 
availability of the CRSP (Center for Security Prices at the 
University of Chicago) daily return file, most subsequent 
studies of note in the USA have used daily return data. 
Most of the studies of this nature on the,JSE, and some on 
other stock exchanges, have used weekly return data. 18 
Until recently, JSE share price data were not readily 
available from comprehensive and easily accessible data 
banks (see section 5.0 above), and this has applied in 
particular to daily data. In addition, given the 
relatively low volume on the JSE, 19 there is more likely to 
be nonsynchronous trading in daily data than in weekly or 
monthly data. 20 As the issues bearing the choice of on 
18 
Examples are studies by: Patell (1976) on the New York Stock Exchange; Hawawini, Michel and 
Vial let (1983) on the Paris Stock Exchange; Emanuel (1984) on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
19 
See for example, Affleck-Graves et al. (1981) and Bradfield (1989). 
20
rhe meaning and impact of nonsynchronous trading is covered in section 6.2 below. 
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return interval vary according to the purpose, these are 
considered separately in sections 6.1 and 6.2 below. 
6.1 Test period 
In an econometric analysis of the use of daily versus 
monthly return data in event studies, Morse (1984) asserts 
that the most powerful estimate of mean abnormal returns is 
generated by the return series that minimises the bias and 
maximises the efficiency of this estimate. While the impact 
of weekly return data is not directly included in the 
analysis, he points out (1984, p605) that it is easily 
extended to weekly return data. Where he concludes 
superiority of daily return data over monthly return data,· 
it appears reasonable to infer that weekly return data are 
similarly superior to monthly return data and vice versa. 
In the analysis, Morse (1984) distinguishes between issues 
relating to the characteristics of the information event and 
those relating to the return-generating model. 
The characteristics of the information event include the 
existence of confounding information events, uncertainty 
about the magnitude of the effect of the information event 
on security returns and uncertainty about the date of the 
information release. Morse (1984) finds that daily return 
data are clearly superior to monthly return data in relation 
the first two characteristics. As regards release date 
uncertainty, the issue is less clear-cut and he suggests a 
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decision rule which prefers monthly return data with some 
exceptions. Again, it can be inferred that weekly return 
data rate favourably in relation to this characteristic. 
While care has been taken to identify the event date 
accurately in this thesis, it probably remains an imprecise 
estimate of the event date. By working with the event week 
rather than the event day, there is a greater probability of 
capturing the event. 
The conclusion is that shorter return intervals are superior 
with reference to the information event, but where there is 
release date uncertainty, a longer return interval may be 
appropriate. Weekly return intervals thus off er the 
advantage of being shorter than monthly return intervals 
while providing the wider "window" where there is event date 
uncertainty. These considerations and data availability 
are the primary reasons for choosing weekly return intervals 
in the test period for this study. 
6.2 Parameter estimation 
Ceteris paribus, greater estimation efficiency is achieved 
by increasing the number of observations. Given the return 
interval, this can be done by increasing the time period 
from which the observations are obtained. As this time 
period is increased, so the observations become more remote 
from the event, increasing the likelihood that firms have 
changed structurally. With monthly data, 60 to 84 
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observations are a common choice (Foster, 1986, p348), 
spanning a period of from five to seven years. An 
alternative is to shorten the return interval; for example, 
one year provides about 250 daily observations. However, 
measurement problems are increased by shortening the return 
interval which may give rise to the intervalling effect. 
The phenomenon driving the intervalling effect is described 
variously as nonsynchronous trading (Scholes and Williams, 
1977), infrequent trading (Dimson, 1977), thin trading 
(Affleck-Graves et al., 1981) and trading friction (Cohen et 
al., 1983b) . The main concern of these authors is with the 
estimation of the market model parameters. While the 
estimated beta coefficient should theoretically not vary 
with the length of the interval, it has bee.n shown to do so 
in several studies. 21 The following outline of 
nonsynchronous trading and its consequences is drawn 
essentially from Scholes and Williams (1977). 
As long as the assumptions underlying the market model are 
met, the coefficients of the model should not vary when the 
return interval is changed. While securities are trading 
continuously, true returns could be calculated for any 
security and for the market from prices noted at any 
stipulated points appropriate to the selected unit of 
21 
See for example, Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1977), Cohen et al. (1983a and 1983b). 
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duration. In practice, the market is not continuously 
observable. Securities· trade at discrete time intervals 
and prices are recorded only when these trades take place. 
Under these circumstances, the dates on which a security is 
traded will not necessarily coincide with the dates 
demarcating the selected time intervals. This applies 
equally to the index. This problem of nonsynchronous 
return intervals is clearly more likely to occur where 
trading is infrequent. 
The differences between the measured returns and the true 
returns represent differences between the observed market 
model and the true model. Where measured r~turns are not 
synchronised, the econometric problem of errors in variables 
is introduced. Market model coefficients estimated using 
ordinary least squares are consequently biased and 
inconsistent. In particular, the beta coefficients of 
shares trading more frequently than average are 
overestimated while those trading less frequently than 
average are underestimated. 
The problem of nonsynchronous trading has little impact on 
recorded returns for most ordinary shares (common stocks) 
where monthly return data are used. With monthly return 
data, the Scholes-Williams (1977) procedure is likely to be 
required only where trading is extremely infrequent, such as 
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in the case of a stock exchange seat. 22 This suggests that 
monthly data may be more appropriate for the estimation 
phase of this study. 
The use of monthly rather than weekly data is supported by 
Affleck-Graves, Money and carter (1981) in a paper which 
provides guidelines for the estimation of beta coefficients 
in the market model where JSE data are used. In 
particular, they examine the effect of "false zeros" on the 
beta estimate. 23 A "false zero" arises when a zero return 
on a share is recorded although the share did not trade 
during that period. The period is included in the series 
by assuming a closing price equal to the latest recorded 
price of the previous period. Using least squares 
regression, the inclusion of "false zeros" artificially 
decreases the beta coefficient as the line fitted is flatter 
than it would have been if they had been omitted. 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1981) conclude that the exclusion of 
zero returns using weekly data is unlikely to result in a 
statistically significant difference in the beta coefficient 
and that there is thus no need to exclude the "false 
22 
Cohen et al. (1983a and 1983b) also suggest that a better estimate is obtained by Lengthening 
the interval. Beaver, Christie and Griffin (1980, p141) use monthly return data for parameter 
estimation (while using daily data for the test period) to avoid problems raised by the nonsynchronous 
nature of daily return data. 
23 . . b These gu1del1nes are ased on the results of tests on 2,520 different beta coefficient 
estimates using seven years of weekly data for each of fifteen shares Listed on the JSE. 
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zeros 11 • 24 They suggest, however, that any potential impact 
of "false zeros" on the beta estimate is reduced where 
observations are taken over longer time intervals as fewer 
zero returns, and in particular, fewer nontrades are likely. 
This implies a preference for monthly return data over 
weekly return data where the data includes "false zeros". 
It is concluded that monthly data are more appropriate for 
the estimation phase of this study. Accordingly, 60 
four-weekly returns were calculated for each share and 60 
corresponding returns for the market by selecting every 
fourth weekly share price observation (and the corresponding 
observation on the index) in the estimation period. 
6.3 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that there are conflicting 
requirements for the return interval. In particular, the 
considerations for examining the test period and those for 
parameter estimation differ. For the test period, the 
conclusion is in favour of a shorter return interval with 
the qualified exception where there is event date 
24 
The data used by Affleck-Graves et al. (1981) do not allow a distinction between false and 
genuine zeros. The authors first exclude and then include all zero returns, estimate the betas in 
each case and test for significant differences between them. This test would thus potentially 
overstate the impact of "false zeros". The result on which their conclusion is based should thus be 
relatively robust, even though some of the fifteeen shares in the relatively small salll>le may be 
regarded as amongst those relatively more frequently traded on the JSE. 
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uncertainty; thus the most appropriate choice is weekly 
return data. 
Owing to thin trading on the JSE and the possibility of 
concomitant nonsynchronous return intervals, the 
intervalling effect may cause the parameter estimates based 
on this data to be biased and inconsistent. This is most 
likely when shorter return intervals are used but is likely 
to have little or no impact where monthly returns data are 
used. The data used for this study include "false zeros" 
which cannot be distinguished from genuine zeros in the 
data. Where monthly returns are used, the inclusion of 
"false zeros" has been shown to have no effect on beta 
estimation. It is therefore appropriate to use four-weekly 
returns for parameter estimation in this study. 
7.0 CONTROLS 
7.1 Need for controls 
This study seeks to establish whether the reporting of 
financial targets and constraints has an effect on share 
prices. It is thus necessary to show not only that there 
is an effect on share prices, but also to demonstrate, as 
far as possible, that the event caused the effect. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963, p5) identify eight different 
classes of extraneous variables which may jeopardise the 
internal validity of the research design. If these factors 
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are not controlled in the research methodology, they may 
produce effects which are confounded with the effects of the 
event. 
Three of the eight factors identified by Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) are relevant to the current study, namely 
history, maturation and selection: 
* The history problem refers to extraneous events which 
occur at the time of the event and which can confound 
the assessment of the effect of the event. 
* The maturation problem occurs when extraneous 
phenomena influence the dependent variable as a 
function of time. 
* Self-selection bias occurs when subjects who volunteer 
for the experiment are predisposed to the treatment in 
a manner which differs systematically from the 
population of interest. In laboratory experiments, 
individuals are randomly assigned to groups. In 
contrast, random assignment of firms is not usually 
possible in capital market studies (Foster, 1980, 
p43) • 
7.2 Controlling for confounding events 
The calculation of abnormal residuals by applying the market 
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model, or the calculation of market adjusted returns (Brown 
and Warner, 1980), 25 is an important control as it has the 
effect of removing economy-wide factors which affect the 
market as a whole. The market model procedure also 
captures the differential impact of these factors on 
individual companies owing to differences in systematic 
risk. 
The severity of the impact of the history problem on an 
event study depends on whether it is a study of a single 
event or of a type of event. With a single event, 
observations have been exposed to a common set of 
"exogenous, contemporaneous influences" with· a high 
potential to confound the information effect (Bowman, 1983, 
p563). 26 Not all of these influences are eliminated by 
applying the market model. 
This study is concerned with a type of event. The event 
type is the voluntary reporting of specified pieces of 
information. Event time and calendar time are not 
contemporaneous as the annual report release dates concerned 
are well spread over the period 1974 to 1982, as shown in 
25 
See sections 4.1 through 4.3 above. 
' 26 
Foster (1980, p54) raises the importance of addressing the confounding events problem in 
capital market studies and notes its potential severity io accounting policy decision studies as event 
time and real (calendar) time are coincident in most studies of this nature. 
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27 table 4.3. Reliance on diversification of dates assumes 
that the net effect of other events is minimal. Foster 
(1980, p55) cites Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968) and 
Foster (1977) as prominent examples of studies in which this 
approach is adopted. Even where event time and calendar 
time are not contemporaneous, clustering of dates may 
present a problem. While Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) 
and Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephan (1984) offer evidence 
that clustering by dates has limited impact on the results, 
extreme clustering may have a marked effect. However, it 
can be seen from table 4.3, which shows the event dates by 
month, that the clustering in this study is so small that it 
. f 28 is o no concern. 
As firm-specific confounding events adhere to event time, 
they are not dissipated by diversified calendar dates. In 
an event study of dividends, the earnings announcement is 
potentially a firm-specific confounding event as dividend 
announcements are frequently made at the same time and/or in 
the same document as earnings announcements. 29 Earnings 
and dividend announcements are similarly potentially 
27 
Table 4.3 shows that from 1974 to 1976, one company per annlM!l adopted the practice of reporting 
one or more of the variables under study. From 1977 to 1982, the nl.lllber of newly reporting companies 
per annlMll (with frequencies in brackets) were three (1), five (3), six (1) and seven (1). 
28 
Table 4.3 shows that, over the period 1974 to 1982, the nl.lllber of newly reporting companies in 
any one month of any year Cwith the frequencies in brackets) was one (18), three (2), two (3) and four 
(1). 
29 
Bowman (1983, p564) provides this example. 
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confounding events in a study of reporting financial targets 
in the annual report. They are not confounding events in 
this study as they are made in the preliminary report, which 
is released several weeks before the annual report. 
However, as Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) show that the 
annual reports of companies listed on the JSE have 
information content, other pieces of information contained 
in the annual report may have a confounding effect on the 
results. 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) test for the information 
content of the preliminary report, the interim report and 
the annual report respectively. They use the share price 
data of 95 industrial shares quoted on the JSE over a 405 
week period spanning the years 1973 to 1980. Using 
Beaver's (1968) absolute residual analysis, the results for 
this test show abnormal absolute residuals at 78.4%, 45.0% 
and 38.8% above the normal price variation on the release 
date of the 
t . 1 30 respec ive y. 
preliminary, interim and annual report 
Their conclusion is that the annual report 
has information content, albeit at a considerably lower 
level than that of either of the other two reports. 
30 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) also tested by calculating the abnormal performance index 
(Ball and Brown, 1968). These results suggest that the annual report does not provide any 
information incremental to that already provided by the interim and preliminary reports. Knight and 
Affleck-Graves (1986, p76) suggest that the inconsistency between the two sets of results may be 
explained by the misspecification of the Ball and Brown (1968) earnings expectations model at annual 
report release date. 
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In view of this finding, a positive and significant average 
variability ratio in the event week in the current study is 
not sufficient to confirm the information content of 
financial targets as other pieces of information in the 
annual report could have a confounding effect on the 
results. It is therefore necessary to show that the 
information content for the thirty four reporting companies 
as indicated by the average variability ratio is greater 
than that which would ordinarily be expected on the annual 
report release date. This is aimed at separating the 
information content of the financial targets from that of 
other items in the annual report. 
The Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) finding has no 
implications for the directional tests. The squared 
residuals methodology they use (drawn from Beaver, 1986) 
provides a nondirectional test which shows increases or 
decreases in variability irrespective of whether the share 
price impact is positive or negative (as does the Lobo and 
Mahmoud (1989) methodology in the current study). There is 
also no reason to expect a positive impact on the share 
price on the release of the annual report. A positive 
impact on the share prices of the reporting companies should 
therefore be sufficient support for the hypotheses based on 
estimation risk and signalling. However, as the use of 
control groups does mitigate the problems of self-selection 
bias, they are also used for the directional tests. The 
inclusion of this control also allows the results of the 
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directional tests to be used for the hypothesis based on 
rational expectations. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) advocate the use of strong 
controls to eliminate rival hypotheses and it has become 
practice to use control groups in capital market studies 
where required. The efficacy of control groups in capital 
market studies is considered in the next section. 
7.3 Efficacy of control groups 
As Foster (1980) observes, 'the ideal would be to have two 
groups which are identical in every respect with the 
exception of the impact being tested and those differences 
which are controlled by the model. As the firms are not 
randomly assigned, they self-select the group to which they 
belong. This leads to the possibility of self-selection 
bias; that is, any difference observed between the two 
groups' results may be a reflection of differences between 
the groups rather than differences in the disclosure being 
examined. 
Harrison, Tomassini and Dietrich (1983) conclude that the 
control group choice can make a difference to empirical 
conclusions in an actual setting relating to accounting 
changes. They reach this conclusion after testing their 
data with four different control groups ranging from the 
_ _J 
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market model as sole control to increasingly complex control 
groups matched on beta, industry and earnings measures. 
Murray (1983, pl29) cites studies by Abdel-Khalik and 
McKeown (1978), Brown (1980) and Ricks (1982). Control 
groups are used in all of these studies to examine the 
impact on security prices of firms' changing their inventory 
accounting policies to LIFO and they reach conflicting 
conclusions. One aspect of the research designs on which 
the studies differ is the matching variables for the 
selection of the control groups. In a further study on 
LIFO changes, Murray (1983) employs all the matching 
variables from the three studies cited above (namely 
industry, systematic risk, unexpected change in earnings per 
share and fiscal year end) as well as size. This provides 
thirty two different combinations for control group 
construction. He finds that, by altering the control group 
construction, the relative performance of the change and 
nonchange groups is altered. He suggests that while 
certain self-selection biases may be controlled by any one 
control group, this does not necessarily prevent the 
persistence of others. 
This review suggests that the use of control groups will not 
guarantee unequivocal results. The difference between the 
results of two groups may reflect differences between the 
groups rather than in the disclosure being examined. It 
also appears that a variation in the matching criteria can 
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be sufficient to cause different conclusions to be reached 
although the same experimental group data and the same tests 
are used. It should be noted that the use of control 
groups nevertheless continues to be an accepted and expected 
practice in market t d . 31 s u ies. Notwithstanding its 
limitations, the control group design appears to be the most 
appropriate available to mitigate self-selection bias and to 
control for the confounding effect of other information 
accompanying the financial targets in the annual report. 
Two control groups are used in this study; the external 
control group (section 7.4) and the internal control group 
(section 7.5). 
7.4 External control group 
The external control group (table 4.5) has been constructed 
using industry sector as the matching variable. 32 In 
respect of each reporting company: 
* All the names of nonreporting companies in the same JSE 
sector were noted. 
* The descr~ption of business for each of the 
nonreporting companies was located in the Stock 
31 
Examples of studies using control groups are Abdel-Khalik and Mckeown (1978), Ricks (1982), 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983) and most recently, Ruland et al. (1990) and Lev and Pennan (1990). 
32 
Industry sector is considered the most appropriate matching variable for this study. Industry 
sector is a conmonly used matching variable. See for example, Abdel-Khalik and Mckeown (1978), Ricks 
(1982), Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983), and most recently, Ruland et al.(1990) and Lev and Pennan 
(1990). 
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Exchange Handbook (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 1983) 
and compared with the business description of the 
reporting company. The most suitable candidate was 
then matched with the reporting company. 
* Where there were two or more suitable candidates, the 
company with the stated rand cost of total assets 
nearest to that of the reporting company was selected. 
* Where this process revealed no suitable partner, the 
33 company was not matched. 
As certain industry sectors comprise very few companies (see 
table 4.4), it is difficult to match every reporting company 
with a control partner. There are consequently twenty five 
companies in the external control compared with thirty four 
in the experimental group. This is considered preferable 
to equating group membership sizes at the expense of 
including poorly matched companies. 34 
It could be argued that any difference in the magnitude of 
the results revealed in this study in the event week is 
33 h . . h" T ere 1s one exception to t 1s. There was no suitable partner for SA Breweries in the 
Beverages and Hotels sector, but in view of the considerable diversification of this COIJ1:>Clny, it is 
considered acceptable to match it with a company in the Industrial Holding sector (Barlow Rand). 
34 
It is acknowledged that the matches achieved may not be perfect, but as a control is necessary, 
the aim is to build the most appropriate control with what is available. While limited to a lesser 
extent, both Lev and Penman (1990) and Ruland et al. (1990) find it necessary to compromise in 
matching. In the Lev and Penman (1990) study, 35% of the group is matched on two-digit industry 
classification and in the Ruland et al. (1990) study, 16 of the 146 firms on two- and three-digit 
industry classification. 
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explained by differences in the two groups rather than by 
the reporting or nonreporting of financial targets. Foster 
(1980) suggests that the characteristics relating to 
self-selection be considered and that, as an internal 
validity check, a firm profile analysis of the experimental 
and .control groups be made to establish the statistical 
significance of the differences in these characteristics. 
The firm profile analysis of the experimental and control 
groups in this study is shown in table 4.7. The selected 
financial variables include total assets and market 
capitalisation (as size measures), the debt ratio, return on 
assets, dividend payout ratio and several related variables. 
This analysis reveals that there is no significant 
difference between the selected financial variables for the 
two groups, with the exception of the debt ratio. There is 
thus no significant difference between the two groups on the 
basis of firm size (whether measured in terms of total 
assets or market capitalisation) or on the basis of 
variables relating to the three targets with the exception 
of the debt ratio. The absolute difference between the 
average debt ratios is not very large given · the limited 
scope for matching in small industry groupings. 
Differences in leverage should be controlled to some extent 
by the market model. Also, it should be noted that this 
difference relates to only one of the three targets. 
Notwithstanding the imperfect matching, the firm profile 
analysis shows limited potential for self-selection bias. 
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For each company in the external control group, the annual 
report release date closest in time to the event date for 
its partner in the experimental group has been identified 
from the JSE records. The test period equivalent comprises 
the fifty one weeks centred on the annual report release 
date. The results in this period are compared with those 
calculated for the experimental group in the test perioa. 35 
7.5 Internal control group 
The internal control group is formed by matching the 
companies in the experimental group with themselves. This 
control is effected by comparing the abnormal performance of 
the experimental group during the test period with its 
abnormal performance during comparable periods centred on 
the equivalent of the event date in contiguous years (the 
test period equivalent). 36 This provides an almost perfect 
match which overcomes most, if not all, of the difficulties 
encountered in matching with other companies. Consequently, 
the effect of self-selection bias is essentially eliminated. 
35
The results are expressed in terms of the averages of the abnormal residuals (see section 4.2), 
the averages of the market adjusted returns (see section 7.5) and the averages of the variability 
ratios (see section 4.3). The tests for significance are described in chapter.5, section 2.3. 
36 
The annual report release dates in the preceding and succeeding years were obtained from the 
JSE records. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 155 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A comparison of the performance of the experimental group 
with that of the internal control group in either the 
preceding or the following test period equivalent should 
provide a strong control. However, an even stronger 
control is provided by averaging the excess returns in the 
two periods. This reduces the impact of any changes in the 
control group companies that may have taken place over time, 
so mitigating the maturation problem. 
Approximately 56 weekly observations for each company in 
each of the periods before and after the 292 weekly 
observations already gathered are required for estimation of 
the market model parameters for the internal control group. 
The unavailability of this additional data precludes this 
re-estimation. Another option is to use the parameters 
calculated for the experimental group. This entails the 
loss of a degree of independence as some of the data points 
used in calculating the abnormal residuals under examination 
will also have been used in estimating the parameters 
concerned. It does, however, allow comparisons across 
groups to be made on a reasonably consistent basis and it 
provides the basis for the calculation of average 
variability ratios. 
A further option is to calculate market adjusted returns 
(see section 4.3 above) using a simplified version of the 
market model which Brown and Warner (1980) conclude to be as 
effective as the market model. As a=O and B=l in this 
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model, the estimation error in the parameters is avoided. 
A disadvantage is that market adjusted returns do not 
control for differences in systematic risk. Both available 
options are therefore exercised. For comparability and 
completeness, the abnormal performance of all three groups 
is measured in terms of averages of abnormal residuals, 
averages of market adjusted returns and average variability 
ratios. The significance tests applied to the results are 
described in Chapter 5. 
8.0 SUMMARY 
In this study, the event date is defined as the first 
occasion on which a company releases an annual report 
containing a statement of one or more of the specified 
financial targets. 
Two directional tests and a nondirectional test are used to 
test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3. Abnormal 
performance is measured in terms averages of abnormal 
residuals, averages of market adjusted returns and average 
variability ratios. The market model parameters are 
estimated using four-weekly returns calculated from data in 
the estimation periods. This largely avoids the problems 
arising from nonsynchronous trading. Actual and expected 
returns are calculated during the test and equivalent 
periods using weekly return intervals. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 157 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The calculation of excess returns (abnormal residuals or 
market adjusted returns), and diversification of release 
dates control for most confounding events. The control 
group design mitigates self-selection bias and provides the 
best available means of controlling for the firm-specific 
effects of information accompanying the financial targets 
and constraints in the annual report. The traditional 
external control group is formed with industry sector as 
matching variable. Owing to matching difficulties, it 
comprises only twenty five companies, which may reduce its 
effectiveness as a control. A firm profile analysis of the 
experimental and external control groups shows littie 
potential self-selection bias. The companies in the 
internal control group are almost perfectly matched, 
essentially eliminating the potential limitations of a 
control group comparison. This creates a powerful control. 
The results generated by applying the research methods 
described in this chapter are reported in chapter 5 after 
providing a framework for their analysis by re-stating the 
hypotheses, stating the expected results and describing the 
significance tests to be used. 
9.0 TABLES 
The tables listed below appear on pages 158 to 163: 
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Reporting companies (experimental group} 
Financial targets and constraints reported 
Distribution of event dates by month and year 
Number of reporting companies and total number 
of companies by industry sector 
Nonreporting companies (external control group} 
Matched experimental and control group companies 
Firm profile analysis 
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5 Blue Circle 
6 Boumat 













20 OK Bazaars 
21 Plate Glass 
22 Powertech 
23 Premier Group 
24 Protea 
25 Quinton Hazell Superite 
26 Romatex 
27 Saf icon 
28 Scotts Shoes 
29 Seardel 
30 Sentrachem 




Mean a and B values 
for all firms 
Mean a and B values 
for matched firms 
Number of firms with B>l 















































































37 . . . f . As a 1s estimated using our-weekly returns 1n this study, the estimate is divided by 4 where 
the market model equation is used to calculate the weekly expected returns in the test period. 
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TABLE 4.2 FINANCIAL TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS REPORTED 
VARIABLES COMPANIES DIVa D/Eb RETc 
All 20 20 20 20 
Two only 5 4 5 1 
One only 9 5 3 1 
-----------------------------------------
34 29 28 22 
a Target dividend payout ratio 
b d b . . Target e t-equ1ty ratio 
c 
Target rate of return 






























2 2 12 
TOTAL 




1 1 5 
1 1 3 
6 
2 1 5 
1 1 7 
1 5 
3 2 5 1 1 0 34 
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TABLE 4.4 NUMBER OF REPORTING AND TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES 
BY INDUSTRY SECTOR 
SECTOR 
Industrial Holding 
Beverages and Hotels 
Building and Construction 
Chemicals and Oil 





Furniture and Household 
Motor 
Paper and Packaging 
Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Printing and Publishing 
Steel and Allied 
Retailers and Wholesalers 
Sugar 
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6 Darling & Hodgson 
7 Fedblaikie 
8 Foschini 
9 Imperial cold Storage 
10 Irvin & Johnson 
11 McCarthy 
12 Messina 
13 Murray & Roberts 
14 Natal Cons. Industrial Inv. 
15 ovenstone Investments 
16 Plascon-Evans 
17 Pretoria Portland Cement 
18 Reunert 
19 Rex Truef orm 
20 Sasol 
21 Spitz Footwear Holdings 
22 Tiger oats 
23 Triomf Fertilizer 
24 Union Steel Corporation 
25 Vereeniging Refractories 
Mean a and B values 
























































38 . . 
As a is estimated using four-weekly returns in this study, the estimate is divided by 4 where 
the market model equation is used to calculate the weekly expected returns in the equivalent period. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 163 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 

















21 Plate Glass 
23 Premier Group 
24 Protea 
26 Romatex 
27 Saf icon 
28 Scotts Shoes 
29 Seardel 
30 Sentrachem 





17 Pretoria Portland Cement 
7 Fedblaikie 
6 Darling and Hodgson 
16 Plascon Evans 
24 Union Steel 
8 Foschini 
10 Irvin and Johnson 
1 Amie 
3 Bonuskor 




13 Murray & Roberts 
22 Tiger Oats 
15 Ovenstone Investments 
14 Natal Cons. Ind. Inv. 
11 McCarthy 
21 Spitz Footwear 
19 Rex Trueform 
23 Triomf 
2 Barlows 
25 Vereeniging Refractories 
TABLE 4.7 FIRM PROFILE ANALYSIS 
FINANCIAL VARIABLE 
Total assets (rands) 
No. of ordinary shares 
Share price (Rands) 
Market capital~sation (rands) 
Debt ratio (%) 
Return on assets (%) 
Growth in prof it attributabla 
to ordinary shareho!ders (%) 
Dividend growth (%) d 













































bThe experimental and external control groups comprise 34 and 25 firms respectively. 
The COll1Jarison is made using two-sarrple significance tests which is regarded as appropriate in this case (see chapter 5, section 2.3). 
The p·values relating to a comparison of the subgroup of 25 matched reporting firms with the external control group in terms of both 
the two-sarrple and paired difference tests agree with the above (that is, only the debt ratio differs significantly). 
cDebt ratio = total debt/total assets 
d . Five-year average. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The examination of estimation risk, rational expectations 
and signalling theories led to the development of three 
hypotheses for the expected share price reaction on the 
event date (that is, the first occasion on which financial 
targets are reported). The research methodology described 
in chapter 4 is designed to isolate and measure those 
effects which can be linked to the information event. The 
results so generated are reported in this chapter. 
The expected results and their interpretation are considered 
in section 2.0. 
The results g~nerated in respect of the 
experimental group, intern~l control group and external 
control group are pre~ented and compared in sections 3.0 
through 7.0. 
They are summarised and'evaluated in section 
8.0. 
To provide a close focus 
on the weeks immediately 
surround.ing .week o, the results for 
week -10 to week +10 are 
presented in tables at the end of this 
chapter. Plots of 
the wee~ly re:sults for the full 
51-week period are provided 
in figures 5.1 through 5.15 
(see appendix 5.1). The period 
from week. -10 through +10 is demarcated by vertical lines in 
these figures to allow cross-referencing to the tables. 
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* The voluntary reporting of financial targets should 
have no effect on the mean share price. 
* The voluntary reporting of financial targets should 
have no effect on the dispersion of share price 
changes. 
2.2 Expected results 
The three stated hypotheses are not mutually exclusive as 
the three underlying arguments all support a reaction in 
share prices. A positive result in any one of the measures 
(namely AAR, AMAR or AVR) indicates share price reaction. 
However, further interpretation of a positive AAR or AMAR 
differs from that of a positive AVR. 2 In the directional 
tests, a positive AAR or AMAR indicates a positive impact on 
share prices in aggregate. In the nondirectional test, a 
positive AVR indicates a higher level of variability than 
the average variability level in the estimation period 
irrespective of direction. 3 
2 . l h . . This fol ows from the researc method 1n each instance (see chapter 4, section 4.0). 
3 
The variability ratio has an expected value of zero and a variance of one. If the variability 
ratio for any firm exceeds zero, the information content exceeds that conveyed on average during the 
estimation period and vice versa. In this study, the weekly averages of the variability ratios are 
calculated to indicate the effect of the voluntary reporting on the average variability of returns in 
each week in the test (or equivalent) period relative to the average variability in the estimation 
period. 
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As there is no reason to expect a positive impact on share 
prices when the annual report is released, a positive and 
significant AAR and/or AMAR for the experimental group 
indicates a positive impact on share prices in aggregate and 
suggests that it is caused by the reporting of financial 
targets. Positive differences between the experimental and 
control group results strengthen the linkage between 
reporting and share price impact as this control mitigates 
the problem of self-selection bias. 
A positive and significant AVR for the experimental group is 
on its own not sufficient to conclude that the reporting of 
financial targets has an impact on share prices as the 
annual report ordinarily has information content (Knight and 
Affleck-Graves, 1986). 4 Other pieces of information in the 
annual report are thus likely to have a confounding effect 
on the results. As this confounding effect is 
firm-specific, it is not controlled for by either the market 
model or by the diversification of calendar dates. It is 
therefore necessary to show that the positive result for the 
experimental group is larger than that which would 
ordinarily be expected on the release of the annual report. 
To test for this, the results are compared with those of the 
control groups. 
4 
The Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) findings are reported in chapter 4, section 7.2. 
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Several difficulties are faced in forming the external 
control group owing to the many factors giving rise to 
differences between a reporting firm (in the experimental 
group) and its potential partners. This is exacerbated in 
those industry sectors which are not well represented on the 
market. As the internal control group comprises the 
reporting firms, these problems are avoided. 5 The internal 
control group is thus likely to be a more effective control 
on the results than is the external control group. 
The results reported in this chapter can be expected to 
include large share price impacts in weeks other than 
week o. Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) examine the share 
price impact of the preliminary report, the interim report 
and the annual report. In each case, the results are 
centred on the information release date in question. The 
preliminary report includes an announcement of earnings and 
dividends for the year and it is released some weeks (say, 
between week -08 and week -04) before the release of the 
annual report. Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) find that 
the preliminary report has the strongest share price impact 
of the three reports included in their study. Similarly, 
the approximate timing of the interim report release date 
5 
The formation of these two groups and the supporting rationale is described in chapter 4, 
sections 7.4 and 7.5. Included is a consideration of the limitations of the use of control groups 
and the specific difficulties encountered in this study, leading to compromise matches in some 
instances and the failure to identify a partner at all in others. 
-----~~--~------------------------------------...,.j 
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(some weeks after the mid-year point) relative to the annual 
report release date suggests impacts late in the test 
period. Being firm-specific, these information events are 
not controlled for by the market model. The timing of the 
release of the preliminary report and of the interim report 
is related to, but not rigidly linked to, the annual report 
release date. Therefore the associated share price impacts 
are likely to be dissipated, but not fully controlled for, 
by the diversification of calendar dates. If a 
sufficiently large number of preliminary (or interim) report 
release dates were to coincide, large share price impacts 
could be evident. Owing to the relative weakness of the 
annual report effect, there is no reason to expect the 
results in the event week to be the largest in the test 
period, nor is this a criterion for confirmation of the 
hypotheses. 
2.3 Tests of statistical significance 
In selecting the appropriate tests for statistical 
significance, it is necessary to choose between 
* two-sample and paired-difference tests 
* parametric and nonparametric tests 
Having selected the test(s), it is necessary to consider the 
interpretation of significance and nonsignificance in the 
results. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 177 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
The experimental and internal control groups are both 
composed of the same companies, with the results centred on 
the event date and its equivalent respectively. There are 
thus two measurements for each company, providing thirty 
four paired measurements. The paired-difference test is 
clearly appropriate in this instance. 
The issue is not as clear-cut in the case of the external 
control group. The intention was to identify thirty four 
nonreporting companies which could be matched with the 
reporting companies using industry sector and business 
description as the primary and total assets as the secondary 
matching criterion. Not all reporting companies were 
matched, and the matches that were achieved were not 
necessarily perfect. For these reasons, the results for 
the twenty five matched reporting companies (in the 
experimental group) and the twenty five nonreporting 
companies (external control group) respectively are not as 
readily seen as paired measurements in one sample as are the 
results for the experimental and internal control groups. 
While there is a clear case for the paired-difference test 
where the matching is close, one of the assumptions for the 
two-sample test is that each observation is unrelated to 
every other observation. The matching in this study 
ensures that matched observations are related to one 
another, but it can be argued that matching is not 
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sufficiently close to support the paired-difference test. 
In view of this ambiguity, it seems appropriate to apply the 
two-sample test to the comparison of the thirty four 
reporting companies with the twenty five nonreporting 
companies, the paired-difference test to the twenty five 
matched companies, and to bear the above considerations in 
mind when interpreting the results. An advantage of the 
two-sample test is that, as the observations are not 
matched, the sample sizes need not be equal. The data 
relating to the nine nonmatched reporting companies can thus 
be retained in the two-sample test whereas the 
paired-difference test requires that they be discarded. 
The second choice is between parametric and nonparametric 
tests. Parametric tests are applied as there is no reason 
to believe that the assumptions for parametric tests are not 
met. However, nonparametric tests are also applied because 
the relatively small sample sizes may raise questions as to 
whether parametric tests can be used appropriately if the 
data are nonnormal. The nonparametric analogues to the 
paired-difference and two-sample t-tests are the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test and Wilcoxon Rank sum Test respectively. 
Where a result is statistically significant, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and there is clear support for the 
alternative hypothesis. Lack of statistical significance 
in a result indicates that there is insufficient evidence to 
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reject the null hypothesis. Given the relatively small 
sample sizes in this study (34 and 25), failure to reject 
the null hypothesis may indicate low power of the test 
rather than the truth of the null hypothesis. It should be 
noted that lack of power may be more serious in the case of 
experimental and external control group comparisons owing to 
imperfect matching which adds a further source of variation. 
Thus where a result lacks statistical significance, it 
should be interpreted with care. Secondary indications of 
support for the hypotheses are provided by the relative 
magnitude of the impact, and in the directional tests, by 
conformity with the hypothesised direction. In view of the 
ambiguity introduced by the possible low power of the test, 
weight will be placed on these secondary indications where 
the results lack statistical significance. 
3.0 EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
Table 5.1 shows the results for the thirty four reporting 
companies (the experimental group). 6 These results include 
AARs, AMARs, AVRs and related p-values for the t-test and 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test over the 21-week 
period from week -10 to week +10. Plots of weekly results 
for the 51-week period are reflected in figures 5.1, 5.2 and 
6 . 
All tables appear at the end of this chapter. Figures of weekly plots and of cllll.ilative plots 
appear in appendices 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. 
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5.11 (see appendix 5.1). Table 5.2 shows the results for 
the subgroup of twenty five matched reporting companies. 
The relative magnitude of the reported results is noted 
although it is not a criterion for acceptance of the 
hypotheses. 
Week 0 (event week) resu7ts1 
The average of abnormal residuals (AAR) in week O (the event 
week) is 2.5% and it is significantly different from zero in 
terms of both the t-test (p-value=0.0033) and the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test (p-value=0.0005). It is the only AAR in 
the 51-week period which is significantly different from 
zero. It is also the largest over the 51-week period and 
it is considerably larger than the next largest AAR (1~%) 
which occurs in both week -13 and week -04; in neither week 
is it statistically significant. 
The pattern of the averages of market adjusted returns 
(AMARs) over the test period is similar, although not 
identical, to that of the AARs. The AMAR of 2.8% in week O 
is significantly different from zero in terms of both tests 
(p-values of 0.0004 and 0.0003 respectively). It is the 
7 
The event week is identified in chapter 4, section 3.0. 
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largest in the 51-week period, considerably larger than the 
AMARs of 1.9% and 1.3% in weeks -04 and -02 respectively. 8 
The average of the variability ratios (AVR) for the 
experimental group is 0.69 in week o, but it is not 
statistically significant. Care should be taken in 
interpreting this result owing to the possible low power of 
the significance test (see section 2.3 above). Although it 
is not significantly different from zero, the AVR is one of 
the five largest means in the 21-week period. Being in 
excess of the expected value of zero, this AVR indicates 
that the variability in the event week is higher than the 
average variability in the estimation period. 
Both the AAR and the AMAR in the event week are positive, 
statistically significant and respectively the largest in 
the test period. These results provide strong support for 
the view that information has been released in the annual 
report on the event date. Although not statistically 
significant, the AVR supports this view. The results are 
therefore consistent with Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986). 
The AAR and AMAR results further indicate that the 
8 
These AMARs are both statistically significant in terms of the t-test but not in terms of the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The AMAR in week -15 is the only other statistically significant result, 
measured in terms of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
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information in the annual report has a positive and 
significant effect on share prices. 
Impacts in other weeks 
Other information releases may explain the more noticeable 
impacts in other weeks. These include: AARs of 1.4% in 
weeks -13 and -04 and an AAR of 1.1% in week +24; AMARs in 
weeks -04 (1.9%), -02 (1.3%) and +24 (1.1%); AVRs in weeks 
9 -16 (2. 81), -15 (1.4), -05 (1.42), -04 (0.75) and -03 
(0.74). In particular, the timing of the impacts in weeks 
-04 and +24 is consistent with the information effect 
expected on releasing the preliminary report and interim 
reports t. 1 10 respec ive y. 
Matched reporting companies 
As explained above, only twenty five of the thirty four 
9
This AVR result is affected by an outlier in the data. Outliers have not been adjusted. This 
presents a potential problem but as no error was found in the data (that is, they appear to be genuine 
observations) there is no reason to drop any of the observations. None of the results in the central 
twenty one weeks is affected in this way. 
10
The cumulative effect of the preliminary report impact is discernible in the strong upward 
trend in the CAARs commencing at week -14 and the cumulative effect of the interim report in weeks +24 
and +25 (figure 5.1c). The AMAR results contribute to the corresponding upward trend in the CAMARs 
plotted in figure 5.2c. Both figures are to be found in appendix 5.2. 
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reporting companies could be matched satisfactorily with 
nonreporting companies to form the external control group. 11 
As the results for each company in this subgroup of twenty 
five matched reporting companies (table 5.2) are paired with 
those of a company in the external control group to 
calculate paired differences, they are briefly reviewed 
below. 
In the 51-week test period, the AAR of 2.95% is the largest 
positive result and the only result which is significantly 
different from zero (p-values are 0.0053 and 0.007 
respectively}. The positive AMAR of 2.8% in week O is 
similarly the largest and the only result in the test period 
which is significantly different from zero (p-values are 
0.0016 and 0.001 respectively}. The positive AVR of l.53 
in week o is the largest but two in the central 21-week 
period but it is not significantly different from zero. 12 
The week o results for the matched reporting companies are 
thus consistent with those for the full experimental group. 
4.0 INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
Table 5.3 shows the results and the p-values for the related 
11 
See chapter 4, section 7.4. 
12 . . 
The result 1n week +02 1s significantly different from zero in terms of both tests, that in 
week +OS in terms of the t-test and that in week +08 in terms of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
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t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the internal 
13 control group. The results are also plotted in figures 
5.3, 5.4 and 5.12 (see appendix 5.1). 
Week 0 (equivalent week) results 14 
The AAR and the AMAR in week O (the equivalent week) are 
relatively small (0.29%) and neither is significantly 
different from zero. These results indicate that the 
release of the annual report has no positive impact on share 
prices in aggregate. The AVR of -0.26 in week o is not 
significantly_ different from zero. This indicates that the 
variability in the equivalent week may be lower than the 
average variability in the estimation period and that there 
is no share price effect associated with the release of the 
annual report. 
Impacts in other weeks 
In week -04, the AAR (2.57%), AMAR (2.6%) and AVR (1.56) are 
all positive and are respectively considerably larger than 
any other result in the test period using each of these 
13 
The formation of the internal control group is described in chapter 4, section 7.5. 
14 
This is the equivalent of the event week; its identification in the case of the internal 
control group is described in chapter 4, section 7.5. 
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measures, but none is statistically significant. These 
results are consistent with the expected information effect 
of releasing the preliminary report. 
5.0 EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
Table 5.4 shows the results and the related p-values for the 
t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the external 
15 control group. These results are plotted in figures 5.7, 
5.8 and 5.13 (appendix 5.1). 
Week 0 (equivalent week) resu7ts16 
Neither the AAR of 0.55% nor the AMAR of 0.65% in week O 
(the equivalent week) is amongst the larger AARs or AMARs 
respectively and neither is significantly different from 
zero. 17 The AVR of 0.05 in week o is also not 
significantly different from zero. While it is the 
15 l . . f . h. h h The externa control group comprises an appropriate group o c~nies w 1c serves as t e 
second control on the results of the experimental group. The supporting rationale and the basis of 
selection are contained in chapter 4, section 7.4. 
16 . 
In forming the external control group, the annual report release date of each c~ny closest 
to the event date for its matching partner in the experimental group is identified. The week in 
which this date falls is week 0, also referred to as the equivalent week. This is fully described in 
chapter 4, section 7.4. 
17
The results are very similar; The AAR in week 0 is 0.55% while the three largest AARs occur in 
weeks -08 (1.95%), -05 (1.7%) and +01 (1.3%). Of these, only the AAR in week -05 is significantly 
different from zero in terms of both tests. Similarly, the AMAR in week 0 is 0.65% while the three 
largest AMARs occur in weeks -08 (1.7%), -05(1.9%) and +01(1.3%). Of these, only the AMAR in week 
-05 is significantly different from zero. 
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smallest positive AVR in the 21-week period, eleven of the 
AVRs in this period are negative. All these results are 
very similar to the results for the internal control group; 
they indicate that the release of the annual report has no 
impact on share prices. 
Impacts in other weeks 
Both the AAR (1.7%) and AMAR (1.9%) in week -05 are positive 
and statistically significant, reflecting an information 
impact. Although not significantly different from zero, 
there are similar results in week -08; an AAR of 1.9% and an 
AMAR of 1.7%. The the AVRs in weeks -11 (2.6) 18 and -02 
(0.86) are the largest and the largest but one in the period 
respectively, and the latter is statistically significant. 
Again, the results some weeks before week O may indicate the 
information effect of releasing the preliminary report. 
6.0 COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL 
GROUPS 
The results reported in this section highlight the 
differential impact after controlling for self-selection 
bias and for the potential (firm-specific) confounding 
effect of other pieces of information in the annual report. 
18
rhe AVR in week -11 is affected by an outlier. See footnote 9. 
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This is done by comparing the experimental group results 
with those for the internal control group. Specifically, 
the difference is taken between the result in each week for 
each company in the experimental group and the paired result 
in the internal control group, and the weekly averages of 
these differences are computed. The results in each week 
are tested for statistical significance using the 
paired-difference t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
The rationale for using paired-difference significance tests 
is given in section 2.3 above. The results and the related 
p-values for the central 21-week period are given in table 
5.5. They are also plotted in figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.14 
(see appendix 5.1). 
Week 0 (event week) results 
The AARD of 2.2% in week o represents a statistically 
significant, positive difference between the results of the 
two groups in that week with p-values of 0.017 and 0.0397 
respectively. It is the largest but one AARD (that in week 
+24 is 2.4%) in the 51-week period. 19 These results are 
consistent with those reported in sections 3.1 and 4.1; the 
AAR for the experimental group is large (2.51%) and 
statistically significant as compared with that for the 
19 
The only other positive and statistically significant AARD in the period is 1.53% in week -13. 
That in week +10 is statistically significant in terms of the t-test. 
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internal control group which is small (0.21%) and is not 
statistically significant. 
The AMARO of 2.5% in week O also represents a statistically 
significant, positive difference between the results of the 
two groups in that week with p-values of 0.0057 and 0.007 
respectively. It is also the largest difference in the 
51-week period. These results are consistent with those 
reported in sections 3.2 and 4.2 above; the AMAR for the 
experimental group is large (2.7%) and statistically 
significant as compared with that for the internal control 
group which is small (0.3%) and is not statistically 
significant. 
These results provide strong support for the contention that 
the reporting of financial targets has a positive impact on 
the share prices of the reporting companies. 
The AVRD of 0.95 in week O is a positive, statistically 
significant, difference between the results of the two 
groups in terms of the t-test (p-value=0.0309) but not in 
terms of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (p-value=0.1421). 
It is the fifth largest AVRD in the 21-week period. 
Although the result is statistically significant only in 
terms of the t-test, no statements can be made about the 
null hypothesis in view of the possible low power of the 
tests (see section 2.3 above). Further, as the AVRD is 
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positive and relatively large, it provides some support for 
the view that there is greater information content in the 
annual reports released by reporting firms than is 
ordinarily the case. 
Impacts in other weeks 
Consistent with the results reported in.sections 3.1 and 4.1 
above, the AARDs and AMARDs in weeks -05 and -04 are 
negative while relatively large AVRDs of 1.2% and 0.8% occur 
in weeks -05 and -04 respectively. These results may 
suggest not only that there is greater information content 
in the preliminary reports released by the internal control 
group companies than in those issued by the companies in the 
experimental group but that this information has a greater 
positive impact on the share prices of the former group than 
on those of the latter. However, care should be taken in 
interpreting these results as none of them is significant 
and the weeks are not centred on the preliminary report 
release date. The largest AVRD (3.1) occurs in week -16; 
this has been influenced by an outlier in the data. 20 The 
largest, and statistically significant, AARD of 2.4% occurs 
in week +24. Fairly large AMARDs of 1.06% and 1.2% occur 
20 
This is the influence of the outlier in week -16 of the experimental group results reported in 
section 3.0. Outliers have not been adjusted. This presents a potential problem but as no error 
was found in the data (that is, they appear to be genuine observations) there is no reason to drop any 
of the observations. None of the results in the central twenty one weeks is affected in this way. 
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in week +20 and week +25 but these are not statistically 
significant. The AVRD in week +24 ranks third in size and 
it is statistically significant. These effects may be 
owing to the release of the interim reports for the 
following year. 
7.0 COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL 
GROUPS 
As in section 6.0 above, the results (AARDs, AMARDs and 
AVRDs) reported in this section highlight the differential 
impact after controlling for self-selection bias and the 
potential firm-specific confounding effect of other pieces 
of information in the annual report. In this case, the 
control is provided by the external control group. The 
paired-differencei procedure is as described above (see 
section 6.0) except that the differences are between the 
results for each of the matched reporting companies and 
those of its partner in the external control group. The 
results and the related p-values are given in table 5.6. 
The results for the full 51-week period are also plotted in 
figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.15 (see appendix 5.1). In 
addition, the weekly means of the two groups (AARs, AMARs 
and AVRs) are compared and they are tested for significance 
using the two-sample t-test and the Wilcoxon Rank sum Test. 
The differences between means (DAARs, DAMARs and DAVRs) and 
the related p-values are reported in table 5.7. The use of 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 191 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
both approaches to this comparison is justified in section 
2.3 above. 
Week 0 (event week) results 
The AARD of 2.4% in week o (table 5.6) is the largest 
positive difference over the 51-week period; the DAAR of 
1.96% (table 5.7) is also relatively large. Both the 
paired differences and the comparison of means indicate that 
the difference between the two groups in week O is not 
statistically significant. The AMARD of 2.1% in week O 
(table 5.6) is the largest positive difference in the 
51-week period and the DAMAR of 2.11% is also relatively 
large. Only the two-sample t-test indicates a significant 
difference between the two groups, and this is marginal 
(p-value=0.0426). 
The AVRD of 1.47 in week O (table 5.6) ranks seventh in size 
in the 51-week period but it is not significantly different 
from zero. The AVRs in week o for the experimental group 
(0.69) is considerably greater than the expected value of 
zero relative to most of the other results in the central 
period, while the AVR in week O for the external control 
group (0.05) is very small and the AVR for the internal 
control group is negative (-0.26). This suggests that 
there is greater variability ~n the event week than there is 
on average in the estimation period, but neither two-sample 
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test (table 5.7) indicates a significant difference between 
the two groups. 
Given the lack of statistical significance, no strong 
statements can be made about the null hypothesis owing to 
possible low power of the tests. As the comparison in this 
section involves the external control group, the imperfect 
matching is an additional source of variation, potentially 
affecting the power of the test more seriously (see section 
2.3 above). It should be noted that all these event week 
results are in the hypothesised direction (positive) and are 
relatively large (in particular, the AARD and AMARO are 
respectively the largest in the test period). Although 
these results are not as strong as those reported in the 
previous section, they do support those results. First, 
they indicate greater variability in share price movements 
than ordinarily applies. Second, the results of the 
directional tests indicate a differential positive share 
impact on the release of the annual report. 
Impacts in other weeks 
The AARDs in weeks -04 (1.96%) and -01 (2.01%) are 
respectively the largest but two and largest but one in the 
test period (table 5.6); The DAARs in those weeks are the 
largest and the largest but one in the period. The 
two-sample test (table 5.7) shows a significant difference 
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between the means of the two groups in week -04 according to 
the t-test (p-value=0.01) but not according to the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test. There are relatively large AMARDs in weeks 
-04 (1.7%), -01 (1.8%) and +24(1.7%). The DAMAR of 3.2% in 
week -04 is statistically significant (two-sample p-values 
of 0.008 and 0.0262 respectively) and the, largest in the 
period. The AVRDs in weeks -06, -05 and -04 are also 
relatively large but none is statistically significant; the 
DAVR results are consistent with these. The difference 
between the two groups in week -04 suggests that the release 
of preliminary reports by reporting firms has a greater 
share price impact than does the release of preliminary 
reports by nonreporting firms. The impact in week +24 may 
similarly correspond with the approximate timing of the 
interim reports for the following year. 
8.0 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Two groups of companies were selected for the study. These 
provide data for the experimental, internal control and 
external control groups. The impact on share prices of the 
information released in the annual reports of the reporting 
companies (the experimental group) was examined by 
calculating and plotting 
* AARs, AMARs and AVRs for the experimental, internal 
control and external control groups 
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* AARDs, AMARDs and AVRDs representing the averages of 
the paired differences between the results of 
individual companies in the experimental group and 
those of individual companies in each of the control 
groups. 
The tests and the results do not partition neatly to align 
directly with the stated hypotheses. A significant and 
positive AAR and/or AMAR in week O indicates that there is a 
positive share price reaction on average, that is, share 
prices have been revised upwards in response to the 
information released. A significant and positive AVR in 
week O indicates that there is relatively greater 
variability in the event week than in the estimation period, 
but it provides no insight into whether the mean share price 
has altered. Thus a significant and positive result of any 
of the tests indicates that there has been a significant 
revision of share prices. A significantly positive result 
from the directional tests (those involving abnormal 
residuals and market adjusted returns) indicates not only 
that share prices have been revised, but that there has been 
a positive impact on share prices in the aggregate. 
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The following points, in particular, should be borne in mind 
when interpreting the results. 21 First, statistical 
significance is an attribute sought in the results, and such 
statistical significance justifies rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Where the results lack significance, care 
should be taken in interpreting them owing to the possible 
low power of the tests arising from the relatively small 
sample(s) involved, and in the case of the external control 
group comparisons, owing to imperfect matching which may be 
an additional source of variation. In these cases, weight 
has been placed on the magnitude and, in respect of the 
directional tests, on the direction of the result even where 
it is not significant. 
Second, the imperfect matching of reporting companies with 
suitable partners and the failure to match in some cases, 
may have affected the results for the external control group 
and the related comparisons, as well as affecting the power 
of the tests of statistical significance referred to above. 
This contrasts with the close match achieved in forming the 
internal control group, which is consequently a particularly 
effective control. It is therefore appropriate to place 
relatively more weight on the internal control group results 
and the related comparisons. 
21 
For a more detailed coverage of these points, refer to chapter 4 and chapter 5 (section 2.3). 
Only brief reference is made to them here in the context of interpreting the results. 
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Third, the difficulties in calculating the market model 
parameters and the compromise made in applying the market 
model to the internal control group are noted. As market 
adjusted returns are calculated with a=O and B=l, the 
estimation error related to parameter estimation is 
excluded, at the expense of ignoring differences in 
systematic risk. It is therefore appropriate to 
acknowledge the deficiencies in both approaches and to read 
both sets of results together in arriving at a conclusion. 
The AAR, AMAR and AVR for the experimental group in the 
k 't' 22 event wee are pos1 ive. The AAR and the AMAR are also 
statistically significant and respectively the largest in 
the 51-week period. The AVR is both positive and one of 
the larger AVRs in the test period, although it is not 
statistically significant. Taken as a whole, these results 
provide clear evidence of the information content in the 
annual reports issued by reporting companies. 
The experimental group results are a necessary condition for 
the support of the three hypotheses. However, they would 
be sufficient for the nondirectional test only if it could 
be argued that the information content of the annual report 
is ordinarily negligible on the grounds that the information 
22
There is reasonable assurance that the positive AAR, AMAR and AVR results in the event week are 
not confounded by exogenous events. The market model and the diversified calendar dates underlying 
event time control for these. 
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is encapsulated in the earnings announcement, the dividend 
announcement or other sources available to the market. As 
the findings of Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) suggest 
that a share price impact is ordinarily to be expected on 
the release of the annual report, it is necessary to show 
that the impact caused when a company first reports its 
financial targets is greater than that ordinarily expected. 
Thus, in addition to mitigating the effect of self-selection 
bias, a comparison with control group results must be made 
to control for the potential firm-specific confounding 
effect of other pieces of information accompanying the 
financial targets in the annual report. 
The directional test results (expressed in AAR and AMAR) in 
week o are almost identica1. 23 The AAR (and AMAR) for the 
experimental group in the event week is positive, relatively 
large and statistically significant. The AAR (and AMAR) 
for the internal control group in the equivalent week is 
positive, but it is very small and it is not statistically 
significant. There is a large, positive and statistically 
significant difference between the two results in the event 
week. These AAR and AMAR results across the experimental 
and internal control groups suggest that share prices are 
23 
The only differences are differences in the magnitude of the AARs and the AMARs and the 
p-values for the AMAR results in week 0 tend to be lower (that is, they tend to show higher levels of 
significance) than the AAR results (see detailed results in sections 3.0 through 7.0 above). 
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affected by reporting financial targets and provide strong 
··, 
support for the three hypotheses. 
The AAR (and AMAR) for the external control group in the 
equivalent week is positive but very small and it is not 
statistically significant. While the difference between 
the results for the two groups in the event week is not 
significant, it is positive (that is, in the hypothesised 
direction) and relatively large. These results support the 
the the strong results noted above. 
Although the AVR for the experimental group in the event 
week is not significant, it is positive. The AVR in the 
equivalent week for the internal control group is negative 
and significantly different from zero. The difference 
between the two results is relatively large but it is not 
statistically significant. The AVR in the equivalent week 
for the external control group is positive, very small and 
not significantly different from zero. Although the 
difference between the two results is not statistically 
significant, it is positive and relatively large. These 
results support the view that share prices are affected by 
reporting financial targets. 
Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that expectations and share prices are revised on 
the first occasion on which financial targets are reported. 
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Further, it can be concluded from the directional test 
results that the reporting of financial targets has a 
positive impact on share prices. This is consistent with 
the hypotheses based on estimation risk and signalling; 
namely that when financial targets are reported for the 
first time, prices are revised upwards because estimation 
risk is reduced and that, concurrently or alternatively, 
management has signalled to investors. 
In several of the figures and tables, large, , and in some 
instances, significantly large share price impacts appear in 
weeks other than either the event week or its equivalent. 24 
These impacts frequently occur about four weeks before the 
date of the release of the annual report or about twenty 
four weeks thereafter. They are probably explained by the 
release of the preliminary and interim reports respectively. 
As the test period centres by construction on the annual 
report release date, these impacts would be apparent only if 
there were a sufficiently pertinent information event and/or 
the coincidence of a sufficiently large number of 
information events. As these results are not centred on 
the preliminary or interim report release date, only 
tentative conclusions can be drawn. In particular, no firm 
statement can be made about the relative information effect 
24
rhe c1.111Ulative effects of these can be seen in the figures in appendix 5.2. 
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of preliminary reports released by firms reporting financial 
targets. 
In chapter 6, these findings are placed in context and are 
linked to the motivation for the thesis. 
9.0 TABLES 












Experimental group (matched) 
Internal control group 
External control group 
Experimental and internal control groups; 
paired differences 
Experimental and external control groups; 
paired differences 
Experimental and external control groups; 
comparison of means 
TABLE 5.1 RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
(') 1-3 ~ 
WEEK AAR% P-VALUES AMAR% P-VALUES AVR P-VALUES 
s;· ~ (j) 
'"C (j) c::: 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox 1-3 trj H trj 1-3 :::0 
:::0 CJ') trj 
-10 0.24 0.3489 0.4042 0.41 0.2435 
.. 
0.1841 -0.1423 0.8552 0.9139 '"rj > 
-9 0.51 0.2397 0.3595 0.49 0.2571 0.3933 0.3254 0.1716 0.0639 H Z 1-3 <:o::r: 
-8 0.26 0.3123 0.2816 0.34 0.2341 0.2989 -0.2743 0.9964 1. 0000 trj trj 
-7 0.29 0.3709 0.1540 0.66 0.2384 0.3849 0.7852 0.1827 0.2174 
.. (') 
OH 
-6 0.65 0.2254 0.3107 0.60 0.2328 0.2816 0.5498 0.1292 0.1540 z :s: :::0 CJ') '"C 
-5 0.32 0.3739 0.33.48 0.47 0.3219* 0.3342 1. 4209 0.0694 0.2174 trj 1-3 > 
CJ') ~ (') -4 1. 36 0.0577 0.1007 1.94 0.0399 0.1037 0.7562 0.1014 0.4568 c::: 1-3 
-3 -0.24 0.5979 0.7516 -1.45 0.9595* 0.9139 0.7376 0.0938 0.3226 t"' H 1-3 z 0 
-2 0.90 0.1637 0.1500 1. 33 0.0488 0.0545 0.4604 0.0599 0.4900 CJ') 1-3 z 
CJ') 
-1 0.38 0.3109**0.3785** 0.23 0.3794**0.4501** 0.4883 0.0806 0.4634 . CJ') 
0 2.51 0.0033 0.0005 2.76 0.0004 0.0003 0.6931 0.0718* 0.3595 ::r: > 
1 -0.16 0.5668 0.5893 0.05 0.4804 0.4172 1.1480 0.0481* 0.2593 :::0 
2 0.85 0.1913 0.1665 1.12 0.1302 0.1037 1.1635 0.0172 0.0708 
trj 
3 0.67 0.2094 0.1796 -0.01 0.5040 0.5234 0.3896 0.1007 0.2989* '"C :::0 
4 -0.12 0.5709 0.5631 -0.28 0.6483 0.5763 0.0025 0.4935 0.0413 H 
(') 
5 -0.06 0.5403 0.6279 0.15 0.3924 0.3849 -0.1697 0.7818 1.0000 trj 
6 -0.05 0.5297 0.6714 0.37 0.3289 0.4900 0.0106 0.4804 0.0782 CJ') 
7 -0.51 0.7055 0.6834 -1. 09 0.9101 0.8114 0.4309 0.0845 0.4501 0 
8 -1. 38 0.9682 0.9712 -1. 22 0.9555 0.9555 0.3833 0.1953 0.0947 
'"rj 
9 -0.75 0.8100 0.6953 -0.48 0.7339 0.6087 0.6037 0.0788 0.2931 :::0 trj 






**Significant at the 5% level 




N H o> 
.... t"' 
TABLE 5.2 RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GROUP (MATCHED) 
WEEK AAR% P-VALUES AMAR% P-VALUES AVR P-VALUES 
n 1-3 ~ ; g; G) 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox '1::1 G) c 1-3 trj H 
trj 1-3 ::0 
::0 Cll trj 
-10 0.11 0.4443 0.4636 0.23 0.3645 0.3236 -0.0689 0.6302 0.9773 .. 
-9 0.58 0.2517 0.4636 0.70 0.1753 0.3287 0.4728 0.1643 0.0878 "':I> H Z 1-3 
-8 0.30 0.3081 0.2436 0.23 0.3106 0.4533 -0.2157 0.9423 0.9952 <: 0 ::r: trj trj 
-7 1. 04 0.1874 0.4430 1.10 0.1463 0.3331 0.5829 0.1775 0.2691 .. n 
-6 0.80 0.2234 0.2691 0.84 0.1733 0.2605 1. 7294 0.1490* 0.0989 
OH z::s: 
-5 0.66 0.3081 0.4740 0.76 0.2631 0.4890 1.9249 0.0291 0. 3143 ::0 Cll '1::1 
trj 1-3 > 
-4 0.58 0.2604 0.3236 0.48 0.2808 0.3820 0.6676 0.1271 0.2039 ro ~ n 
-3 -1.24 0.9214* 0.8636 -1.14 0.9186* 0.8451* 0.4484 0.1142 0.4327 c 1-3 t"1H 
-2 1. 55 0.0484 0.0730 1. 37 0.0449 0.0443 0.0421 0.4333 0.1549 1-3 z 0 Cll 1-3 z 
-1 0.33 0.3534**0.4740** 0.46 0.2873**0.4021** 0.2633 0.2417 0.2115 Cll . Cll 0 2.95 0.0054 0.0070 2.76 0.0016 0.0010 1.5278 0.0606 0.4430 ::r: 
1 -1. 32 0.8662 0.8319 -0.94 0.8290 0.8319 1. 3144 0.0872**0.3524** > ::0 
2 0.96 0.2215 0.1964 0.93 0.1916 0.1549 1.6990 0.0028 0.0090 trj 
3 -0.02 0.5070 0.5980 -0.10 0.5534 0.5260 0.7691 0.1120 0.2273 '1::1 
4 0.16 0.4169 0.4327 0.12 0.4279 0.4533 0.1463 0.2956 0.2115 ::0 H 
5 0.18 0.4029 0.4740 0.20 0.3742 0.3331 -0.0425 0.5515 0.9995 n 
6 -0.02 0.5101 0.6080 0.01 0.4949 0.4636 0.9181 0.1292 0.1964 
trj 
Cll 
7 -0.80 0.8207 0.7885 -0.75 0.8396 0.7309 0.7177 0.0959 0.2353 0 
8 -1. 68 0.9596 0.9563 -1.34 0.9451 0.9380 0.9695 0.1512 0.3331 "rj 
9 -1.33 0.9342 0.8576 -1. 02 0.9325 0.8319 0.5561 0.1492 0.0730* ::0 






**Significant at the 5% level G) 








TABLE 5.3 RESULTS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
() 8 ~ 
WEEK AAR% P-VALUES AMAR% P-VALUES AVR P-VALUES s; gj (j) 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox "d (j) c 8 tr.I H 
tr.I 8 :::0 
:::o en trJ -10 0.40 0.2236 0.3849 0.36 0.2504 0.3913 -0.2852 0.9958 0.9999 .. 
-9 0.03 0.4819 0.4568 0.27 0.3397* 0.3658 -0.1095 0.7310 0.9845 ltj > H Z 8 -8 0.73 0.0686 0.0757* 0.86 0.0495 0.0575 -0.3639 0.9927 1. 0000 <:o::r: tr.I tr.I -7 0.70 0.2702 0.0254 0.49 0.3369 0.0639 0.1595 0.2856 0.1421 .. () 
-6 -0.35 0.6749 0.5367 -0.23 0.6232 0.5631 0.1638 0.2490 0.1933 OH z :s: -5 1. 03 0.0970 0.1134 1.19 0.0673 0.0596 0.2213 0.1371 0.4435 :::0 en '1:1 
tr.I 8 > -4 2.57 0.1208 0.0575 2.60 0.1177 0.0732 1. 5574 0.1305 0.1421** en ~ n c 8 -3 -1.84 0.8782 0.7353 -1. 97 0.8962 0.7928 0.3706 0.3002 0.0042 t"-iH -2 -0.51 0.8054* 0.8501* -0.49 0.7948* 0.8159* -0.0844 0.6619 0.9900 8ZO en 8 z -1 0.86 0.0333 0.0445 1. 02 0.0141 0.0233 -0.2757 0.9951 0.9994 en . en 0 0.29 0.3227 0.3785 0.29 0.3245 0.3471 -0.2555 0.9946 0.9941* ::r: 1 0.72 0.2403**0.0684* 0.76 0.2241**0.0639* 0.0651 0.3773 0.0498 > :::0 2 1.40 0.0058 0.0123 1. 34 0.0084 0.0179 -0.3341 0.9991 1.0000 tr.I 
3 -0.06 0.5490 0.5433 0.14 0.4016 0.2538 -0.3661 1.0000 1.0000 "d 4 0.37 0.2077 0.3471 0.07 0.4345 0.4369 -0.2939 0.9827 0.9997 :::0 H 5 -0.48 0.8186 0.8204 -0.51 0.8239 0.7353 -0.0834 0.6063 0.9999* () 
0.3537 0.2327 tr.I 6 0.52 0.2661 0.1460 0.30 0.0568 0.4023 0.0382 en 7 0.16 0.3952 0.4967 0.26 0.3230 0.4238 -0.3021 0.9992 0.9994 0 8 0.95 0.0762 0.1500 0.98 0.0762 0.1421 -0.3387 0.9994 1.0000 ltj 




H * z **Significant at the 5% level (j) 









TABLE 5.4 RESULTS FOR EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP 
n 1-3 ~ 
WEEK AAR% P-VALUES AMAR% P-VALUES AVR P-VALUES s; ~ G) 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox ·t-test Wilcox "ti G) c: 1-3 tx:l H 
tx:l 1-3 ~ 
-0.36 0.7647 -0.18 0.6181 ~ en tx:l -10 0.7100 0.6132 -0.2080 0.9132 0.9875 .. 
-9 0.55 0.1592* 0.2273 0.71 0.1122 0.1750 -0.3297 0.9968 0.9990 "'1j > H Z 1-3 -8 1.95 0.0496 0.0810 1. 70 0.0757 0.1306 0.2395 0.2569 0.0692 <:o ::z: tx:l tx:l -7 0.24 0.4174 0.4021 0.22 0.4265 0.4636 0.5725 0.1177 0.3920 •• n 
-6 0.38 0.3427* 0.4327* 0.51 0.3009**0.4766**-0.1396 0.7325 0.9952 OH z ::s: -5 1. 67 0.0141 0.0212 1.88 0.0076 0.0070 0.0573 0.4168 0.1088 ~ en "ti 
tx:l 1-3 > -4 -1. 39 0.9732 0.9148 -1. 23 0.9697 0.9380 -0.2024 0.8568 0.9937 en ~ n -3 0.28 0.4049 0.3236 0.49 0.3381 0.2894 0.2704 0.2416* 0.0810 c: 1-3 t'-iH -2 0.37 0.3844 0.3427 0.57 0.3260 0.3187 0.8622 0.0176 0.1038 1-3 z 0 en 1-3 z -1 -1. 68 0.8936 0.8752 -1. 37 0.8497 0.7481 0.4243 0.2600 0.0769 en 
0.55 0.2677* 0.2273* 0.65 0.2608 0.2015 0.0514 0.3998 . en 0 0.2039* ::z: 1 1. 34 0.0499 0.0320 1. 34 0.0649 0.0587 0.0721 0.4017 0.0364 > 
~ 2 -0.40 0.6875 0.7961 -0.75 0.8106 0.9104 -0.1868 0.8684 0.9875 tx:l 
3 0.82 0.1924 0.2691 0.57 0.2770 0.4021 0.1888 0.1698 0.2779 "ti 4 1. 01 0.1604 0.1549 1.15 0.1328 0.1364 0.3857 0.1655 0.0810 ~ H 5 0.68 0.2005 0.3820 1.02 0.0877 0.1194 -0.0633 0.6022 0.9637 n 
6 -1.10 0.8925 0.8860 -0.98 0.8597 0.8514 -0.0587 0.6301 0.8451 tx:l en 7 0.28 0.3081 0.4021 0.58 0.1884 0.2436 -0.3788 0.9988 1.0000 0 8 -0.33 0.6836 0.7309 -0.22 0.6174 0.6871 -0.2150 0.9158 0.9910 "'1j 





H * z **Significant at the 5% level G1 









TABLE S.S EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES (') 1-3 ~ 
~ ~ G1 
WEEK AARD% P-VALUES AMARO% P-VALUES AVRD P-VALUES "ti G1 c::: 1-3 ttj H 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox ttj 1-3 ::0 ::0 Ul ttj .. 
-10 -0.16 0.5786 0.5234 0.05 0.4781 0.4238 0.1429 0.1719 0.2759 
"lj > 
H Z 1-3 
-9 0.48 0.2930 0.3721 0.22 0.3881 0.2703 0.4348 0.1165 0.1237** <o::i:: ttj ttj 
-8 -0.48 0.7172 0.5034 -0.52 0.7552 0.7408 0.0896 0.2713 0.0082 .. (') OH -7 -0.41 0.6132 0.9293 0.18 0.4603 0.0782 0.6258 0.2523 0.4900 z::s: 
-6 1. 00 0.2229 0.3046 0.84 0.2148 0.3409 0.3860 0.2021 0.2703 ::0 Ul "ti ttj 1-3 > 
-5 -0.71 0.7153 0.8020 -0.72 0.7047 0.7516 1.1997 0.1080 0.3348 Ul $? (') c::: 1-3 -4 -1.21 0.6924 0.5499 -0.66 0.6011 0.7925 0.8012 0.3018 0.2431 t'-f H 
-3 1. 59 0.2197 0.2873 0.53 0.3679* 0.2275 0.3670 0.3445 0.0834 1-3 z 0 Ul 1-3 z 
-2 1.41 0.1147 0.0834 1. 82 0.0337 0.0555 0.5448 0.0638* 0.2593* Ul . Ul -1 -0.48 0.6926* 0.6653* -0.78 0.8323**0.8159** 0.7640 0.0151* 0.0367 ::i:: 
0 2.21 0.0170 0.0397 2.46 0.0057 0.0070 0.9486 0.0309 0.1421 ~ 
1 -0.88 0.7375 0.7408 -0.72 0.7280 0.7353 1.0829 0.0746**0.0782** ttj 
2 -0.55 0.6982 0.6342 -0.22 0.5758 0.5300 1. 4976 0.0047* 0.0001 "ti 
3 0.74 0.2125 0.2593 -0.14 0.5624 0.6152 0.7557 0.0132 0.0617* ::0 H 
4 -0.49 0.7027 0.6834 -0.35 0.6560 0.6087 0.2964 0.0531 0.0413 (') 
ttj 5 0.43 0.2956 0.4834 0.67 0.2011 0.2816 0.0863 0.4087 0.4900 Ul 
6 -0.57 0.6816 0.8799 0.07 0.4762 0.4369 0.0462 0.4460* 0.4767* 0 
7 -0.67 0.7112 0.6279 -1. 35 0.9046 0.8292 0.7331 0.0152 0.0300 "lj 
8 -2.32 0.9924 0.9969 -2.21 0.9857 0.9938 0.7220 0.0646* 0.0555** ::0 
9 -0.67 0.7349* 0.7462 -0.34 0.6417* 0.5300* 0.9890 0.0140 0.0086 ttj "ti 






**Significant at the 5% level "ti "lj 






TABLE 5.6 EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES 
WEEK AARD% P-VALUES AMARO% P-VALUES AVRD P-VALUES 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox 
-10 0.47 0.2982 0.4224 0.40 0.3052 0.4327 0.1391 0.2719* 0.2436 
-9 0.03 0.4894 0.4844 -0.01 0.5047 0.5260 0.8025 0.0466 0.1088 
-8 -1.65 0.8498 0.6951 -1. 47 0.8449 0.7133 -0.4552 0.9528 0.7565 
-7 0.80 0.2713 0.4224 0.89 0.2433 0.4224 0.0105 0.4947 0.3143 
-6 0.42 0.3712 0.3720 0.33 0.3976 0.4021 1. 8690 0.1349* 0.2115 
-5 -1. 01 0.7646 0.7565 -1.12 0.8125 0.7961 1. 8677 0.0244 0.0587 
-4 1. 96 0.0617 0.1194 1. 71 0.0753 0.1549 0.8700 0.0880 0.0730 
-3 -1. 52 0.8523 0.9613 -1. 63 0.8840 0.9535 0.1780 0.3692 0.2519 
-2 1.18 0.2180 0.1820 0.80 0.2850 0.2353 -0.8201 0.9377 0.8386 
-1 2.01 0.1173 0.1306 1.83 0.1291 0.1486 -0.1611 0.5801 0.8036 
0 2.39 0.0602 0.2519 2.11 0.0830 0.2605 1. 4 763 0.0578 0.1820 
1 -2.65 0.9677 0.9589 -2.27 0.9590 0.9104* 1.2423 0.1134**0.0655** 
2 1. 36 0.1614 0.1364 1. 68 0.0805 0.0465 1. 8859 0.0013 0.0001 
3 -0.84 0.7189 0.7133 -0.66 0.6979 0.7133 0.5803 0.1988 0.2958 
4 -0.85 0.7309 0.8386 -1. 03 0.7820 0.7961 -0.2395 0.7004 0.8036 
5 -0.50 0.6673 0.8386 -0.82 0.7796 0.8912 0.0208 0.4807 0.3920 
6 1. 08 0.2042 0.2115 0.99 0.2311 0.2115 0.9768 0.1251* 0.3524* 
7 -1.08 0.8783 0.8386 -1. 33 0.9523 0.9380 1.0965 0.0305 0.0280 
8 -1. 36 0.8814 0.8695 -1.13 0.8660 0.8251 1.1845 0.1142 0.2193 
9 -1.12 0.8813* 0.8752* -1.09 0.9134* 0.9309* 0.7370 0.1114 0.3236 
10 1.83 0.0358 0.0341 1. 68 0.0208 0.0280 0.5175 0.1556 0.1750 
* **Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 1% level 
TABLE 5.7 EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
COMPARISON OF MEANS 
WEEK ·DAAR% P-VALUES DAMAR% P-VALUES DAVR P-VALUES 
t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox t-test Wilcox 
-10 0.60 0.2539 0.2308 0.59 0.1908 0.1807 0.0657 0.3718* 0.2573 
-9 -0.04 0.5193 0.6234 -0.22 0.6852 0.6408 0.6551 0.0366 0.1398 
-8 -1. 69 0.9083 0.7277 -1. 36 0.8140 0.7017 -0.5138 0.9098 0.6801 
-7 0.05 0.4850 0.2723 0.44 0.3838 0.4360 0.2127 0.4142 0.1889 
-6 0.27 0.4171 0.4001 0.09 0.4773 0.3708 0.6894 0.0987 0.1266* 
-5 -1. 35 0.8631**0.9550 -1. 41 0.8884**0.9631* 1.3636 0.0850 0.0496* 
-4 2.75 0.0098 0.0812 3.17 0.0080 0.0262 0.9586 0.0623 0.0156 
-3 -0.52 0.6354 0.7897 -1. 94 0.9360 0.9198 0.4672 0.2432 0.1767 
-2 0.53 0.3630 0.4001 0.76 0.3130 0.2983 -0.4018 0.8011 0.6635 
-1 2.06 0.0912 0.1650 1. 60 0.1399* 0.3091 0.0640 0.4655 0.1002 
0 1.96 0.0618 0.1203 2.11 0.0426 0.0936 0.6417 0.1048 0.3255* 
1 -1. 50 0.8734 0.8193 -1.29 0.6941 0.7175* 1. 0759 0.0735**0.0227** 
2 1.25 0.1734 0.0674 1.87 0.0643 0.0271 1. 3503 0.0095 0.0012 
3 -0.15 0.5487 0.5214 -0.58 0.7487 0.5640 0.2008 0.2876 0.2475 
4 -1.13 0.8337 0.7762 -1.43 0.8825 0.8193 -0.3832 0.8173 0.5519 
5 -0.74 0.7812 0.7477 -0.87 0.8606 0.8887 -0.1064 0.6282 0.5940 
6 1. 05 0.1733 0.2475 1. 35 0.1014 0.1889 0.0693 0.4066**0.3942* 
7 -0.79 0.7648 0.6578 -1. 67 0.9321 0.8462 0.8097 0.0086 0.0182 
8 -1.05 0.8466 0.7669 -1.00 0.8269 0.6578 0.5983 0.1032* 0.3708 
9 -0.54 0.7037 0.5580 -0.55 0.6547 0.5940 0.7846 0.0447 0.0545 
10 1.27 0.0798 0.1056 1. 20 0.1153 0.0873 0.0625 0.4073 0.2331 
* **Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 1% level 
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APPENDIX 5.1 FIGURES DEPICTING WEEKLY RESULTS 
This appendix comprises the figures showing the plots of the 
results over the full 51-week period. The commentary on 
the results for the 21 central weeks is given in sections 
3.0 to 7.0, with references to results in other weeks where 
pertinent. These figures complement the commentary and the 
tables by covering the full fifty one weeks and by providing 




















Experimental group: AARs 
Experimental group: AMARs 
Internal control group: AARs 
Internal control group: AMARs 
External control group: AARs 
External control group: AMARs 
Experimental and internal control groups; 
paired differences: AARDs 
Experimental and internal control groups; 
paired differences: AMARDs 
Experimental and external control groups; 
paired differences: AARDs 
Experimental and external control groups; 
paired differences: AMARDs 
Experimental group: AVRs 
Internal control group: AVRs 
External control group: AVRs 
Experimental and internal control groups 
paired differences: AVRDs 
Experimental and external control groups 
paired differences: AVRDs 
As the Tange of AVR and AVRD results is quite different from that of the others, it is not 
feasible to standardise all they-axes without sacrificing clarity. The scale on the y-axis has been 
standardised for figures 5.1 to 5.10 and a different standard scale has been used for the AVR and AVRD 
results which are reported in figures 5.11 to 5.15. The sequence of the results thus differs 
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FIGURE 5.1 EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: AARs (in percent) 
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FIGURE 5.3 INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: AARs (in percent) 
Plot of AAR*WEEK. Symbol used is '*'· 
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FIGURE 5.4 INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: AMARs (in percent) 
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FIGURE s.s EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: AARs (in percent) 
Plot of AAR*WEEK. Symbol used is'*'· 
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FIGURE 5.6 EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: AMARs (in percent) 
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FIGURE 5.7 EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AARDs (in percent) 
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FIGURE 5.8 EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AMARDs (in percent) 
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FIGURE 5.9 EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AARDs (in percent) 













I * I 
I 
+ * * I 
I 




I * I * + 
I 
I * I 











































I * I I 
0.0 +---------------*-+*--------+---------+-----------------+ 
I ** I I 
I I I 
I * I * I I I I 
-0.5 + * *: * * * * + 
I I I 
I I I 
I I ** I I I I 
-1. 0 + * : * * + 
I I * * I I I I 
I I * I I I I 
-1. 5 + : * * + 
! * ! * ! 
I I I 
-2. 0 + : + 
I I 1 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
-2. 5 + : + 
I I * I I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
-3.0 + : + 
I I I 
I I I 
---+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 
WEEK 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 218 








FIGURE 5.10 EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AMARDs (in percent) 
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FIGURE s.11 EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: AVRs 
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FIGURE 5.13 EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: AVRs 
Plot of AVR*WEEK. Symbol used is'*'· 
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FIGURE S.14 EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AVRDs 
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FIGURE 5.15 EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
PAIRED DIFFERENCES: AVRDs 
Plot of AVRD*WEEK. Symbol used is '*'· 
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APPENDIX 5.2 FIGURES DEPICTING CUMULATIVE RESULTS 
The results reported in chapter 5 are associated with the 
weeks to which they relate. This allows the results to be 
compared directly with the impacts expected in terms of the 
stated hypotheses. In earlier capital market studies, it 
was common practice to report the cumulative results. This 
presentation requires that the reader extract the 
incremental results to establish the impact in any 
particular week. However, readers who are familiar with 
interpreting results in this form may prefer it. This 
presentation may also provide further insights into the 
results. For these reasons, the following figures 
depicting the cumulative results for the fifty one weeks are 













Experimental group: CAARs 
Experimental group: CAMARs 
Internal control group: CAARs 
Internal control group: CAMARs 
External control group: CAARs 
External control group: CAMARs 
Experimental and internal control groups; 
paired differences: CAARDs 
Experimental and internal control groups; 
paired differences: CAMARDs 
Experimental and external control groups; 
paired differences: CAARDs 
Experimental and external control groups; 
paired differences: CAMARDs 
In the absence of significant impacts in weeks other than 
week o, the cumulative average of the abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) and the cumulative average of the market adjusted 
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returns (CAMAR) for the experimental group are expected to 
increase in the event week and to flatten out thereafter. 
As other impacts are expected to occur, 23 however, the CAARs 
and CAMARs can be expected to increase in the weeks leading 
up to the event week. 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: FIGURES 5.lc-5.2c 
The CAARs for the experimental group are plotted in figure 
5.lc. A strong upward trend commencing at week -12 is 
evident. The CAAR in week o is 6%, moving to a peak of 
7.3% in week +03 and flattening out thereafter. 
Figure 5.2c shows the CAMAR plots for the experimental group 
in the test period. The plots are random up to week -14, 
rise to 7.4% in week o and continue to 8.8% in week +06. 
Thereafter, the plots flatten out and fluctuate between the 
bounds of 6.2% and 8.1% before rising to 10% in week +25. 
INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: FIGURES 5.3c-5.4c 
The CAARs for the internal control group are shown in figure 
5.3c. Although the trend is initially not dissimilar to 
that found in the experimental group, the plots rise to only 
23
see section 2.2 above 
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2.1% in week O, but rise further thereafter to fluctuate 
between 3.8% and 5.5%. 
There is initially some random movement in the CAMARs for 
the internal control group (figure 5.4c) up to week -12. The 
plots then rise steadily, albeit with some fluctuations, to 
an initial high point at 4.7% in week -04. The CAMAR in 
week O is 3.5%, after which the plots rise again to flatten 
out between the bounds of 4.4% and 6.7%. 
EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: FIGURES 5.5c-5.6c 
The CAARs for the external control group plotted in figure 
5.5c do not show the same rising trend to week o as that 
reflected in the CAARs for the experimental group (figure 
5.lc). They fluctuate in a random manner, between the 
bounds of -4.5% in week -12 and 2.2% in week +05, with a 
CAAR of -1.3% in week o. 
The CAMARs for the external control group (figure 5.6c) 
fluctuate initially between -0.8% and -2.9% before rising 
from -2.5% in week -10 to 2.5% in week -02, registering 1.5% 
in week o, rising to 5% in week +05 and thereafter 
fluctuating between 5% and 2%. 
EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS: FIGURES 5.7c-5.8c 
The cumulative averages of differences between the weekly 
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abnormal residuals (CAARDs) for the experimental and 
internal control groups are plotted in figure 5.7c. The 
movements in this graph appear to be random until week -05, 
rising to 2.5% in week -02, falling to 2.0% and then rising 
markedly to 4.0% in week o. The plots then fall to a low 
of -0.8% in week +09, whereafter there is a rapid rise to 
the highest CAARD of 5.2% in week +24. 
Reflected in figure 5.8c are the cumulative averages of 
differences between the weekly market adjusted returns 
(CAMARDs) for the experimental and internal control groups. 
The pattern of these plots is the same as that of the CAARDs 
described above. The movements in this graph also appear 
to be random until week -05, rising to 2.2% in week -02, 
falling to 1.4% and then rising markedly to 3.8% in week o. 
The plots then fall to a low of -0.8% in week +09, 
whereafter there is a rapid rise to the highest CAMARD of 
5.7% in week +25. 
EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS: FIGURES 5.9c-5.10c 
Plotted in figure 5.9c are the cumulative averages of the 
paired differences between the abnormal residuals of these 
two groups (CAARDs). After random movements, the plots 
rise from 0% in week -03 to 5.6% in week O and flatten out 
thereafter to move randomly, with the exception of a rise in 
week +22 to 7.0% in week +24. The pattern of the CAMARDs in 
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figure 5.lOc is similar to that of the CAARDs, but the peaks 
in week O (4.5%) and week 24 (5.5%) are lower. 
CONCLUSION 
Generally, the results conform with the expected pattern. 
By construction, they conform with the results reported in 
the body of the chapter. Clearly, the points made in 
chapter 5 regarding the effect of the size of the samples 
and the selection of the external control group apply 
equally to the interpretation of the cumulative results. 
The rising trends which are generally a feature in figures 
5.lc to 5.lOc reflect the impacts which can be seen in 
figures 5.1 to 5.10 (see appendix 5.1) in the weeks building 
up to week O and in the weeks at the end of the period. As 
previously suggested, these may be explained by the reaction 
of the market to other information (such as that contained 
in preliminary and interim reports) as it becomes available 
even though the results are not centred on those events. 
The trend is also consistent with the market's anticipation 
of information in the annual report, but this explanation is 
less convincing owing to the relatively weak information 
effect of the annual report (Knight and Affleck-Graves, 
1986). 
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FIGURE S.lc EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: CAARs (in percent) 
Plot of CAAR*WEEK. Symbol used is'*'· 
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FIGURE S.2c EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: CAMARs (in percent) 
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FIGURE S.3c INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: CAARs (in percent) 
Plot of CAAR*WEEK. Symbol used is'*'· 
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FIGURE S.4c INTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: CAMARS (in percent) 
Plot of CAMAR*WEEK. Symbol used is '*'· 
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FIGURE s.sc EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: CAARs (in percent) 
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FIGURE S.6c EXTERNAL CONTROL GROUP: CAMARS (in percent) 























































































: * * : : 
1 + * *: : + 
: * : : : 
0 +-----------------+-**------+---------+-----------------+ 
I I I 
I I I 
-1 + * I + I 
I ** * I I I I I 
-2 + * * :* + I * ** * ** I I I 
-3 + * *** + 
I I 
I I 
-4 + + 
I I 
I I 




-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 
WEEK 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 235 













FIGURE 5.7c EXPERIMENTAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL GROUPS 
CUMULATIVE PAIRED DIFFERENCES: CAARDS (in percent) 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter commences with a brief review of the study, 
whereafter the implications of the results are considered. 
The limitations of the study are then identified, extensions 
suggested and conclusions drawn. 
2.0 REVIEW 
2.1 Objective 
As stated in chapter 1, the objective of this thesis is to 
examine the impact of voluntary reporting on share prices, 
with particular reference to the reporting of financial 
targets and constraints in South Africa. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The information event in this thesis is the first occasion 
on which an annual report is released which contains a 
statement of financial targets and constraints. A positive 
impact on the mean share price is hypothesised following an 
examination of estimation risk and signalling theories. 
Based on an examination of rational expectations theory, it 
is hypothesised that the dispersion of share price changes 
will increase but the effect on the mean share price is not 
predicted. An observed positive share price impact is 
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consistent with a reduction in the level of estimation risk, 
the revision of expectations and a signalling effect. The 
revision of expectations is also indicated by an increase in 
the variability of share price changes. 
2.3 Methodology 
The hypothesised information content of financial targets 
and constraints set by management is tested by examining 
share price behaviour accompanying the voluntary reporting 
of financial targets over the period 1974 to 1982 by thirty 
four companies listed on the JSE. 
Owing to the multiplicity of influences affecting share 
prices, controls are introduced to provide reasonable 
assurance that there is a link between the reporting of 
financial targets and any observed share price behaviour. 
Abnormal residuals are calculated using the market model. 
This controls for events influencing the market as a whole 
and adjusts for differences in systematic risk across 
shares. The diversification of calendar dates provides a 
control for the influence of events which are not captured 
by the market model but which may affect particular groups 
of companies. 
Two control groups are formed to control for self-selection 
bias and for the firm-specific confounding effect of other 
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information included in the annual report. The external 
control group is formed by matching reporting companies with 
nonreporting companies, but owing to the small number of 
companies in some sectors, matching is not always perfect 
and, in some instances, no suitable partner can be 
identified. The internal control group is formed by 
matching the reporting companies with themselves, whereby 
the results of the reporting companies in the test period 
are compared with the average of the results in the 
equivalent periods in the years before and after the test 
period. 
There are insufficient data surrounding the two test period 
equivalents to estimate market model parameters for the 
calculation of the abnormal residuals for the internal 
control group. Consequently, the a and B estimated for the 
experimental group are used for this purpose. As some of 
the data are common to the estimation period and to the 
equivalent period, the abnormal residuals may be biased. 
Therefore market adjusted returns (Brown and Warner, 1980) 
are also computed using a simplified version of the market 
model with a=O and B=l for all shares. This adjusts for 
market effects but not for systematic risk differences 
across shares. As it is assumed in this model that a=O and 
B=l , market adjusted returns exclude estimation error in 
the parameters. For comparability and completeness, the 
market adjusted returns are calculated for all three groups. 
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The methods described above are used to generate results to 
test for the positive information impact on share prices (a 
directional test). To test for any increase in the 
variability of share price changes, variability ratios are 
calculated by applying standardisation procedures to the 
abnormal residuals (Lobo and Mahmoud, 1989). This 
nondirectional test is also applied to all three groups. 
2.4 Results 
The effects of the release of the annual report, the 
reporting of financial targets and other information 
releases are discernible in the results. These are 
reviewed briefly below. 
Annual report impact 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) conclude that annual 
reports convey information. Their conclusion is based on 
the results of a squared residual test, which are reported 
in the form of an index where unity indicates that the 
release conveys no information. 1 They report an absolute 
residual on the annual report release date of 1.388 (1986, 
p75). In the current study, the average variability ratios 
1 
Given that W. represents the variability ratio in the current study, the index in Knight and 
Affleck-Graves (19S6) is essentially the equivalent of (1 + W.). 
1 
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in week o for the internal and external control groups are 
-0.26 and 0.05 respectively, neither of which is 
statistically significant (see tables 5.3 and 5.4). These 
results indicate a level of variability similar to the 
average variability level in the estimation period. 
Direct comparisons of the impacts on share prices in these 
two studies are not appropriate because the units of 
measurement are different. It is, however, reasonably 
clear that the control group used in the current study does 
not exhibit the information content of the annual report 
which is so apparent in the results reported by Knight and 
Affleck-Graves (1986). Self-selection bias on the part of 
the reporting companies provides a possible explanation for 
the different results, insofar as only the larger companies 
or some other special category of companies would tend to 
make these disclosures. The resultant effect of this bias, 
should it exist, would be that the average information 
content of either of the control groups in this study would 
be lower than that in the Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) 
sample. While the differences between the two studies and 
the smaller size of the sample in the current study are 
noted, the current results are interesting in that they 
contradict the earlier findings. Although the results are 
on their own insufficient evidence to challenge those 
findings, they may provide grounds for examining this issue 
further. 
MAGUIRE: THE IMPACT ON SHARE PRICES OF REPORTING FINANCIAL 
TARGETS AND CONSTRAINTS. PAGE 246 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
The current study also indicates clearly that there is no 
positive information effect emanating from the release of 
annual reports by nonreporting companies. In week o, the 
average excess returns resulting from the directional tests 
are very small for both control groups and none of them is 
statistically significant (see tables 5.3 and 5.4). This 
confirms the a priori view that there is no reason to expect 
that the release of the annual report would ordinarily have 
a positive impact the share price in an efficient market. 
It should be noted that these results are not comparable 
with those of Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986) as the latter 
were derived from a nondirectional test. 
Financial targets impact 
The conclusion reached in chapter 5 is that the reporting of 
financial targets does provide information to investors, as 
exhibited by its impact on share prices. Using the 
directional tests, the experimental and internal control 
group results provide strong evidence that the reporting of 
financial targets has a positive impact on share prices. 
This is supported by the experimental and external control 
group results. These results indicate information content 
and are consistent with all three hypotheses. The 
nondirectional test for the variability of share price 
changes provides somewhat weaker support for the information 
content and is consistent with the revision of expectations. 
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Taken together, the results are consistent with all three 
hypotheses and they provide strong support for the research 
conclusion. 
Impacts in other weeks 
Impacts in weeks other than the event week are discernible 
in the results of the directional tests. Particularly 
noticeable are those which occur four to eight weeks before 
the event week. Although week O is aligned with the annual 
report release date and not with the preliminary report 
release date, the information effect of favourable results 
in the preliminary report may nevertheless be sufficiently 
strong to explain the impact observed. The results thus 
provide weak evidence that reporting companies have better 
results in the financial year covered by the annual report 
than do nonreporting companies. This suggests that 
companies which have performed well are more likely to 
report financial targets than are other companies. 
The favourable results may in some way motivate the 
reporting of financial targets (by, for example, promoting 
management confidence to commit itself publicly to the 
targets). This explanation should be distinguished from 
the hypothesised good news motivation for the release of 
forecasts. As forecasts are released before the firm's 
results are available, one suggestion is that firms release 
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forecasts to signal favourable results thus aiming to 
distinguish the firm from those remaining silent. 
Investors inf er from the silence that they can expect bad 
news (see, for example, Lev and Penman, 1990). 2 
2.5 Conclusion 
The results support both the hypothesised information 
content and the hypothesised positive impact on share 
prices. They also suggest that the annual report does not 
ordinarily convey information, in contrast to the conclusion 
reached by Knight and Affleck-Graves (1986). While 
explanations for the differing results may lie in the data 
or the methodology, further examination of this issue may be 
merited. The results also show that the annual report does 
not ordinarily have a positive impact on share prices. 
Finally, some of the impacts in weeks other than the event 
or its equivalent support the information effect of the 
release of the preliminary report and provide weak evidence 
that those firms reporting favourable performances are more 
likely to report financial targets. 
2
As mentioned in chapter 3, Verrechia (1983) refines this argument by pointing out the ari:>iguity 
introduced by the disclosure threshold. 
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3.0 IMPLICATIONS 
Management 
The trade-off between benefits and costs lies at the base of 
the disclosure decision. The results in this study 
indicate that the reporting of financial targets is 
accompanied, on average, by an enhanced share price. The 
implication is that management is able to improve the share 
price by providing this information. This could be done by 
providing a statement incorporating all three targets, 
qualitative supporting information, a statement of corporate 
objectives and specific information on the target 
composition of the debt component of the capital structure. 
The managements of diversified companies could include a 
range of target rates of return in this statement, together 
with the nature of the applicable investments. This 
information is required unless the intended mix of 
investments approximates the current mix of investments, as 
target rate(s) of ~eturn should be determined by the beta(s) 
of the project(s) concerned, which will vary where there is 
considerable diversification. 3 
3
rhe reporting companies listed in the Industrial Holding Sector are likely to be diversified 
companies. Eight of the reporting companies are listed in the Industrial Holding sector. To these 
can be added companies listed in other sectors which are effectively diversified, such as the Premier 
Group (Food sector) and SA Breweries (Hotels and Beverages sector; some 50% of its interests are in 
businesses other than brewing). 
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Few of the reporting companies in this study provide a 
comprehensive statement of this nature, yet the information 
has a favourable impact on share prices. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that extensions of this reporting or 
improvements in its quality are likely to cause a more 
pronounced reduction in estimation risk, a more pronounced 
revision of expectations and/or a stronger signal. 4 
Two pertinent questions for management are whether the 
potential benefits and/or the disclosure-related costs are 
uniform across sectors. If the benefits were uniform 
across sectors, the decision would be driven by 
disclosure-related costs. The disclosure of proprietary 
information attracts proprietary costs. 5 The target rate 
of return and the target dividend payout ratio have some 
potential to attract union attention while the target 
debt-equity ratio may affect the company's credit standing. 
These costs are unlikely to be uniform across sectors. 
Once the policy of reporting the targets has been adopted 
and is pursued, the financial targets reported should have 
no effect on share prices on subsequent release dates, 
unless one or more of the targets have changed significantly 
4 
The feasibility of testing the impact of this additional information is considered in section 
4.0 below. 
5 
Proprietary costs are defined and considered in chapter 3. 
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since the last reporting date. 6 On such subsequent 
occasions, however, the positive impact attributable to the 
act of reporting (as distinct from the content) may no 
longer apply. Management should note that the 
discontinuation of reporting any of the targets may affect 
share prices adversely. 7 
Although this study provides weak evidence suggesting that 
managements tend to make their first report when performance 
is favourable, there is nothing to suggest that this is a 
prerequisite for the positive share price impact. While 
good·results may boost confidence, there is no reason to 
wait for them before deciding to report the financial 
targets. 
Regulation 
Although regulatory issues have not been addressed in this 
study, the results may form useful input to regulators' 
discussions. Trueman (1986, p56) suggests, in the USA 
context, that understanding the motivation behind the 
voluntary release of earnings forecasts is important to the 
6 
Had the targets not changed, the information would be purely confirmatory and estimation risk 
should be unaffected, expectations would not be revised and there would be no signalling effect. 
7 
Possible reasons for this adverse effect on the share price are the resultant increase in 
estimation risk and/or signals which are the opposite in effect to those acCCOIJl>Bnying the act of 
reporting and/or favourable content (see chapter 3, sections 2.0 and 4.0). 
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debate over how active the (USA) Securities and Exchange 
Commission should be in mandating information disclosure. 
Similar reasoning could apply to the South African 
legislature, the Accounting Practices Board and the South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
4.0 LIMITATIONS 
owing to insufficiency of data, it was not possible to 
estimate parameters for the calculation of expected returns 
for the internal control group in the test period 
equivalent. The parameters estimated for the expected 
returns were thus used as surrogates. Any distortion 
arising from this approximation is likely to be minimal. 
It should also be noted that in this study, essentially the 
same results are obtained whether measured in terms of 
abnormal residuals or in terms of market adjusted returns. 
In calculating variability ratios, weekly variability levels 
in the test period or its equivalent is standardised by the 
average variability level in the estimation period. Owing 
to the data insufficiency referred to above, the 
observations for each weekly return have been drawn from the 
same data as have 14 of the four-weekly returns used to 
calculate average variability in the estimation period. 
This may distort the average variability ratios for the 
internal control group. 
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The efficacy of the external control group may have been 
limited by the limited number or unavailability of suitable 
companies to match those in the experimental group. As 
noted in chapter 4, Murray (1983) illustrates that the 
results vary with changes in the control group design to the 
extent that conclusions may differ according to the matching 
criteria adopted~ Industry sector is regarded as the most 
appropriate matching criterion for this study, but the 
question may nevertheless be raised as to whether another 
control group using different matching criteria (for 
example, size) may have served better, at least insofar as 
allowing the construction of a control group comprising the 
same number of firms as the experimental group. However, 
apart from the difference in the average firm size between 
the two groups, there appears to be no strong argument for 
the use of other matching criteria. 
The interpretation of the results in this study has been 
limited to some extent by the sizes of the experimental and 
control groups. As all companies identified as reporting 
financial targets were included in the experimental group, 8 
this group of reporting companies comprises the population 
of reporting companies. The further limitation on the 
external control group size is referred to above. Thirty 
8 
With the exception of two companies, as noted in chapter 4, section 5.0 (footnote 5). 
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four reporting companies may appear a small group relative 
to the total of 285 companies in the industrial 9 sector •• 
However this group represents 11.9% of that total which 
compares with the 10% to 15% of public companies which 
voluntarily release forecasts in the USA (Lev and Penman, 
1990, p51). In a follow-up study, the reporting group 
could be extended to include all those companies which 
initiated their reporting of financial targets after the 
latest initial reporting date included in this study (1982). 
The share price impact is associated with all three 
hypotheses. It is not possible to establish whether the 
effects are explained equally by all of the hypotheses, to a 
varying extent by each of them or effectively by any one of 
them. The share price impact is similarly associated with 
all three targets. The results do not allow the influence 
of any one or two of the specified individual targets to be 
isolated. As the primary contributor to the purpose 
objective is the rate of return on assets, it may be 
suggested that the reporting of the target rate of return is 
likely to explain the majority of the share price reaction. 
There are, however, too many variables involved to be able 
to make a strong case for the impact attributable to any one 
target. 
9 
This is an estimate for the period over which initial reporting dates were identified, based on 
the number of companies in the industrial sector of the JSE in 1985 (see table 4.4). 
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5.0 EXTENSIONS 
Voluntary reporting remains a contemporary topic which 
offers research opportunities in the South African context. 
The development and testing of disclosure models feature in 
recent studies (see, for example, Chow et al., 1989 and 
Gibbons et al., 1990). Issues related to the voluntary 
release of forecasts is the subject of studies reported 
recently by Lev and Penman (1990), Pownall and Waymire 
( 1989) and Ruland et al. ( 1990) . It may thus prove 
worthwhile to seek further insights by extending the study. 
The number of reporting companies could be increased by 
adding those companies which have subsequently initiated 
their reporting of financial targets. This should to some 
extent overcome one of the limitations of this study noted 
in section 4.0. If there were a sufficiently large number 
of reporting companies, it may be possible to associate the 
share price impact with individual targets. Those 
companies which do report only one or two of the three 
targets initially may extend their reporting to the 
remaining one or two target(s) in subsequent years. If 
like changes and like initiations were to be aggregated 
across companies, they may provide an opportunity to 
separate out the share price effects of individual targets. 
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Another unknown element is the effect of conformity or 
nonconformity with past investment, dividend and debt 
policies. If the pertinent ratios achieved in the past 
were reported on a basis consistent with the reported 
targets, it may be possible to establish the differential 
share price impact relative to policy changes. 
Numerous references to studies of the information impact of 
voluntarily released management forecasts have been made in 
this thesis as there are a number of similarities between 
them and financial targets. Although the issues are not 
identical, it should be legitimate and revealing to draw 
further on research studies on the voluntary release of 
forecasts for inferences about reporting financial targets. 
In particular, some indication of the motivation for 
reporting of financial targets in South Africa may be gained 
from an examination of American research into the release of 
management forecasts. It may also be of interest to 
establish how many of these companies also release 
forecasts, how many forecasters are not reporting, and to 
compare a group of nonreporting forecasting companies with 
reporting companies. 
The study could also be extended to examine a number of 
issues related to reporting financial targets which are 
raised by research into voluntarily released forecasts. 
Some of these issues are: 
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Size: A larger-firm bias appears to be evident in 
forecasting studies (see, for example, Ruland, 1979 and 
10 Lev and Penman, 1990). This may suggest a similar 
bias in companies reporting financial targets. 
Variability of earnings: Imhoff (1978) reports that 
forecast firms have significantly less variability in 
their time series properties of earnings more 
frequently than others. Ruland (1979) finds that 
earnings variability is lower for forecast firms. 
Waymire (1985) finds that forecasters have less 
volatile earnings processes 





financial targets may have similar characteristics, 
suggesting that companies operating in the more stable 
environments (including diversified companies, which 
are able to neutralise variability to some extent by 
pooling increases and decreases in earnings), are more 
likely to report. 
Ownership: The greater the proportion of outside 
ownership, the more likely are companies to report 
forecasts (Ruland et al., 1990). Again, this may be 
an indication for companies reporting financial 
targets. 
Lev and Pervnan (1990) suggest that this may be owing in part to a bias in favour of reporting 
the forecasts of larger firms. 
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* Good news: Lev and Penman (1990) find a tendency to 
report good news forecasts. On the other hand, Ruland 
et al. (1990) conclude that the results of those 
reporting forecasts are not significantly better than 
those of nonreporting companies. 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
The results in this study provide strong evidence that 
reporting financial targets, namely the target rate of 
return, target dividend payout ratio and target debt-equity 
ratio, has a positive impact on share prices. This is 
consistent with all three hypotheses, to the effect that a 
positive share price reaction will accompany the reduction 
of estimation risk and/or the signalling associated with 
reporting financial targets, and that a share price 
reaction, in either direction, will accompany the revision 
of expectations associated with this reporting. This 
conclusion also supports Stern's (1980) contention that if 
managements follow his recommendations, there will be a 
favourable effect on the share prices of their companies. 
Finally, the results presented confirm the information 
content of annual reports issued by companies which report 
the specified financial targets. 
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